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PREFACE

The purpoae of till• paper i• to preMnt Pblllpp G. Frank

a• epitoml&lna aome of the develop11ent• 'tbat have occurred in the

philo•opby of acle.nce during th.la century.

Frank i• particularly

well aulted ae a •ubject for thl• •tudy, for aeveral raa•ona.

In

the tlr•t place, b.e baa been an i.nf luential contributor to the
growth of modern science, tbrough hi• work aa Proteaaor of Theo•
retical Pbyeica at Prague, fr• 1912 to 1938, aact aa Lecturer on

Physic• and Mathematica at Banard, fc• 1939 until hi• ret!zwnt
1n

1954.

DUl:lft& thia

time be vaa a friead &nd ps:ofeaalonal aaao-

c1ate of audl leadlag aclentlata, . .tl\ematlclana aad logiciafta aa
Elnatela, Caraap, Schlick, voa
lridpan, to aame only a

DztP.t

ll!SIMllrl&

up~

wlth voa

Ml••••

f•.

Ml•••
Pit

bicbeDbac:b, Bobr, and

Ditfs•tlt,1l•&aye•• deg:

'tlbt.cb. be publiabed in 1925

I.A collaboration

waa tile bible for atudenta of . .tbealtlcal phyalca

during tb.e late Twentie• and Tb1rti••·

Be produced a wide range

of teclullcal papers from 1904 to the early Thirties, dealt..ng with
variational calculus, Fourier

•z:i•••

function apacea, convex

bodies, application• to analytical dynalca and bydrodyllalli.ca, and
tb.e apec1aL Cb.eory of relativity.

la a-. of tbeae efforta, be

joined f orcea with velL•known colleaguea 1 Like the -tb.wtlclaoa

iii

iv
Pick and Lowner.1
ln the aecond place. and perhaps more important for thia
diacusalon. Frank waa a philosopher too. criticizing and interpreting modern science, and shoving an ever-increasing concern
with its revolutionary impact on our culture.

ln this latter

role, he demonstrated a unique power of objectivity.

Although he

waa closely allied to the Vienna Circle, and the growing •new
poaitlviam,• he managed to maintain a degree of detaduaent that
permitted him to eee this movement in it• context, and to present
its beat ideas without prejudice to the world at large. T. E. Hill

has underscored this quality in setting Frank apart from the drift
of Logical Positlviam, noting that Frank showed an unusual concern
for philosophy and the aocial lllplicationa of sclence.2

But it is

not juat Frank•a dual skill• aa scientist and philosopher Which
mark him as unusual.

lt la the role he played of synthesizing the

two that proves hia leadership in the philoaopb.y of science.

In

this senae, he personifies what he sought to eatabliah throughout
hie life • a goal summarized in the title of his last book:
fbilosoptq of Sciyce1 , IU Lt.als Betnen Sg1;1;ce 19d fl)l:L2•0Dl!z.

let. Laszlo T1aza, "Philipp Frank and fhyaica," in Pl!tl1pe
[rank. 1 l884·f:!6£, a pamphlet giving "Expreaaiona of Appreciat on
aa arranged
tb.e order given at the memorial meeting for Philipp
Frank," Harvard University Memorial Church. (Pamphlet bears no
publisher, date of publication, or page numbers.) Oct. 25, 1966.
2Thos. E. Ht.Ll,_SC!ijRP211£! Iuoriea o(
Preas, N. Y., 1961, 444•

&>a&egg,

Ronald

v

As a citizen of Europe and America 1n a period racked by
two world wars. Frank felt k.eeALy the disintegrating influences on

our society.

Yet he never despaired of the power of reason. and

of scientific investigation as ita principal tool for guiding
human conduct.

Re would not succumb to the pressures of hysteria

wblch cast doubt on the efficacy of science.
for evil

e.nd••

If science ls used

he maintained• lt ls not the scientist !lY!. scien-

tist who is at fault, but the man who starts from faulty goals,
and justifies them through false ideologies, and unfounded metaphysics.

Now goals are the province of morality and religion, but

they are not a world apart from science.

integrate the two realms.
regard:

Sound education must

Frank liked to cite Einstein in this

"Religl.on without science is blind; science without

religion la lame.•3

Frank'• own words, spoken to the same Con-

ference on Science, Pbl1oaopby and Religion that Einstein wae
addressing, are almilar.

Be Said• "It must, then, be the task of

religion, according to the modern conception of aclence, to do
what science is unable to do 1 that 1a 1 set up certain goals for

both private and social buma.n llfe and influence the dlapoaltlon
of human beings in favor of these goala.n4
Frank argued against the thought that scientists can be,

3A. Einate1n 1 "Science and Religion,• in ;&:iense,
oso= yd ae1igiqn 1 A sf.'pof~• Conference on Science,
oso
and Religion, N. •t
• 211.
4nscience and Democracy 1 " in ii?.• ~·• 228.

f:ttt·.

-

vi
or should be 1 morally neutral.

Be deplored th• cloistered view

of acientiats who tend to accept the 1 aetaphya1ca of their child•
hood,' without crltlcia.

Sclentiats bave an obligation, as

teachers, to poiAt out the metaphysical a.nd moral overto.nes of
their findinga 1 rather than lgnor:ing auch pr:obl•• in the name of
objectivity.

l.ndeedt aclentlata ahould be particularly well•

suited, by reason of their train1Ag 1 to present such questions
fairly 1 and effectively.
Conalderlng the value of thia man'• ldeaa, thea 1 lt la
unfortunate, and aot: a·11ttle aurprlst.ag, that so little b.aa been
written about b.la life and peraoaallty.

Perhaps this is becauae

he lived too recently to admit of hlstorlcal perspective.
Another factor may be the relative newness of phlloaophy of
science aa a field of study.

lt vaa aot 1 for example, until 1931,

and then largely due to the prodding of Frank himself, that a
Chair of Natural Philosophy vaa created at Prague, to be filled
by R. carnap.

And as late aa 1938 1 vb.en Fra.ak came to America,

there vaa no similar position at Harvard.

lt may be only after

Frank'• contemporarlea, who joined hill in developl.ng thla field,
have all given over to a new generation, that Frank will be
recognised widely, and studied as a great philosopher of science.
lt la hoped that thia paper, if it la of •ll7 permanent value,
will help to bri.ng publicity to the man whose work it hopes to
clarify.

-
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I wish to thank four people who have patiently and thoQ&ht•
fully solved nay probl . .s in thla study.

Professor Edvard A.

MaZiarz haa directed this theala fr• the start, uaillg a subtle

combination of proddiag a11d encouragement for which I am grateful.
It ia, however, for the e.nlightening personal experience of work•

Dr. K.eADeth J. Thompson,

ing with him that l am aoat grateful.

also a faculty r91>resentative, haa posed any critical questions

and cOllllents • atwaya ill a constructive manner.
have effected cbaagea.
in their final fora.

Bia auggeationa

Rita lreAll&l'l baa put ray drafts together
Thia means she has had to decipher my hand•

writing, aa well as correct the many errors of form and mechanic•
she discovered iA the proceaa.

Finally, 1 cheerfully acknowledge

a debt to .., wife, Sheila, whe b.aa not only helped with the type•

script, but haa at the same time continued to care for three cblld•
ran and a huaband iA the Jd.ad way to 1'hich tbey are accustomed in
leas hectic daye.

J.

s.

GleAYiew, lllinoia
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PERSONAL HISTORY OF PHILIPP G. FRANK

Philipp G. Frank was born in Vienna, March. 20, 1884, and
died 1n Cambridge, Massachusetts, July 3 1 1966 1 in his eighty•

second year.

One

can assume th.at tb.e Fraftk family, which

included three children younger than Philipp, lived comfortably,
since Herr Frank was a textile mill owner in a period of rapid

industrial growth.

Also, the fact that Herr Frank was Jewish

suggests that the cb11dra.n experienced a high degree of academic
and artistic trainln.g.

The aucceaa of the family is attested to

by the fact that Philipp and his brother, Joseph, got 1ntetnltiona1
fame 1n their respective fields - the yOW'iger Frank as an architect
in Sweden.

Tb.at Herr Frank came from CZechoslovakia may in part
explain why Philipp chose to live in Prague after the completion
of his formal education 1n Vienna.

He would likely have remained

there• teaching at the Utd.veraity• had not the Nazi take-over of
Europe forced him to

C01ll9

to America iA 1938.

Of course another

reaaon for choosing Prague was that he bad been recoanended by
Einstein to succeed the latter, who had accepted another position.
Frank wae appointed Profeaaor of 'lhaoretical Physic• at the
1

-

2

German University of Prague 1 in 1912.

At age twenty•eigb.t 1 he

was the youngest profeaaor in the achoo1 1 &lld must surely bave
seen a better chance for development there tb.81l he would bave
expected at Vienna.
Frank never expressed a personal comad.tment to Judaism, or
any other re11g1oua creed.

1Adead 1 one of his 11fetime acquain-

tances suggested th.at he may have been an athelat.1

The fact that

thia acquaintance doe• aot know for sure attest• to the silence
Frank must ba.ve kept on the iasue.

Even ao, hia

lean•

b.~iatic

inga, and 1 in America, hi• active role in the Conferences on
Science, ftliloaoph)" and Religion, added to hla Jewish background,
give cause for wondering.

Certainly he must have been more than

normally aware of Judaism, for he exbt.bited a.n intimate knowledge
of the life of Jews in Prague, and a peracmal concern for bia
asaoclatea who experienced the H1t1er1te regime 1.n Europe.

Hope•

fully, more light on this subject remai.na to be abed 1 before all
of Frank'• peraoaal acquaintances have paaaed away.

It is

information that vlll help to clarify Fra.nk 1 a position with
respect to metapbJrsica and other non-aclentlf ic aapecta of human

endeavor.
2.

~qcial

and_rolltictl C&!!!f.tt in F:urop9

Through coamenta 1n his biography of Einstein, Frank
reveal a many of the cultural and political influences that weighed

1969.

lMnte. R. von

Mi••••

letter co Juetln Synneatvedt 1 April 10,

3

on Einstein and himself • influences which can account in part for
the depth of character and philosophical interests Frank displayed.
At the time Frank was completing his doctoral work at Vienna. 1
under Boltzmann, the Hapsburg emperor Franz Josef controlled the
large but shaky Austrian Empire including Austria 1 Hungary,
czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and parts of Poland, Rumania and

Germany.
zollern

To the north lay the German Empire, under the Hohen~izer

Wilhelm II, extending roughly from Russia to the

Atlantic, including Prussia as its most powerful state.2

The

whole of these two empires underwent unceasing turmoil which lastacl
throughout the nineteenth century, especially after 1848, and into
the twentieth century, and which led partially to the two world
wars.

Relative stability did not come until after 1948, and then

only because it was imposed by the rule of Russia in the East 1 and
the unifying fear of Russia in the West.
Racial and national prejudices added fuel to the political
fires.

In 1910 1 for example, when Einstein was asked to fill the

Chair of Theoretical Physics, "There was already•" Frank tells us,
"a group among the Germans who propagated the idea of the •master
race,• aad frowned upon any intercourse with 'inferior races.•3
Since 1888 1 when political quarrels had caused the Austriaa
gover.maent to divide Prague into two separate universities, there

N. Y. 1

2ct. Smith1 Muzzey and Lloyd, World History, Ginn and Co.,
1955, 355-387.
3Etnstein;

His Life and Timef 1 80.

4

had been little connection• and less goOd will, between the two
institutions.

Frank continue•• *'(T)he general attitude of

superiority and hostility agalnat the Ollech• waa quite evldeot
among the German profeaaora and t:helr familiea."4
The 1rratioaa11ty Of the aituation made a lasting imprea•

sion on Frank, who often• in Later work, used example• from.
Europeaia politic• to demonstrate Che da.agera of non•aclentlflc

thinkt..ng.

••one

of the cemarkable alld frequently cond.cal aspects

of thia hoetilityt 41 Frank. coanenta, "was that there was not even

the slightest difference betveeA the GeJ:t'Dana

&Ad the

Prague ao far as race and origin were concerned.

Csechs in

The question of

which nationality one belonged to vaa often a question of personal

taste and which offered opportunities for earning a living."S
Frank gives, as a.n example, the CAM of Anton Lamp&, who waa

instrumental in bringing Eiaatein to Prague.

Lampa 1 a C.ech by

birth, waa juat as b.oetile to tbe Cllecb.a ae were the Gerllan8 1 and

clloae to enter the Ger:man Utd..veraity S..O Prague, where he became a
student of Ernst Mach.6

It la intereating that Frank himaelf chose to remain in

Prague, although. hi.a pbiloaopblcal ldeu •tarted I.ta Vienna, and
contl.n.ued to center around Che VlaDrul Circle which he helped to
eatabliah there.

41.Ji!W.. t 8 0.

s1lU&,., s1.
61W,., 81.

He later started vb.at mi.ght be called the

s
•Prague segment• of the Vienna Circle.

He alao managed to inatl•

tute a <l'&air of Natural Philosophy at Prague, and to persuade
Rudolf car.nap to fill it.

Perhaps tbe geographical isolation from

Vienna was to Frank'• liking.

It ia certain that it added to his

sense of detachment from the activities of the Circle.

Cernap

supports this point, speaking of Ma own daya at Prague.

"My life

in Prague, without the Circle,• C&rnap tell• us, "was more aoli•
tary thaA it bad been in Vienna.

1 used moat of rq tlme for con•

centrated work, especially on the book on logical syntax.

.By

frequent visits I also stayed 1.n close contact with my philosoph•

ical fri.enda 1n Vlenna.•7
Re11giOA waa a.nother factor 1n the curtnoil.

Frank tells us

that Franz Josef refuaed to confirm Einstein'• appointment to

Prague, unleae the latter should expreaa his connection with a
•recognised cb.urdl. 1

Although Einstein bad bad no formal connec•

tions with Judaism since hie high amool days, he complied with
the Emperor•• wi.sht putting his religion down on the appointment
forms as "Monie," wbicb. waa the name given to Jews at that time.
lt was, incidentally, only after ha became acquainted with the

condition of the Jews during b.la days at Prague that Einstein

became personally
tion.

CO!llllitted

to a particular religious denomina-

His general taste was more for vb.at he called a 'co8Jlic

religion.•

71! '9~lo12R1&r
•
•

Court, 1

Rf

Ry.del.f QuMR, ed. P. A. Scb.ilPPt

Open

6

The poai.tion of the Jewa i.o the Pr:agua comnunity was paradoxical.

Frank, hi.Blaelf a Jew by birtb 1 notes that 1'More than

baLf of the German-speaking inhabitant• in Prague were Jewish, so
that their part among the Germana, who comprised only about five

per cent of the total popu1ati0ll was extraordinarily iaportant."8
To the Qaechs 1 there was no practical dif fere.nce between Jw and
German.

Botb.

wece to be a\i.at.ruatad aa agents of a f or:eigA power

which wae apparently bent on driving Chem lnto war.

Frank clar-

ifies tbis paradox.

an t.be other .band, the relation of the Jews to
the other GeJ:ID&na had already begun to assume a
problematical character. Former Ly the German mlnor1ty in Prague had befriended the Jews as allies
against Che upward•atriving Czecb.s 1 but tb.eae good
relations were breaki.ng down at the ti.me whe.n
Einatein • • in Pr:ague. Wb.en the racial theories
and tendencies that later cane to be known there aa
Ndi cceed were st:ill almost unknown in Germazay
itself, they had already become an lmportant influence among the Sudetan Germa.t:UI. Hence a somewhat
paradoxical situation existed for the Germana in
· Prague. They tried to live on good terms with tbe
Jews so as to have an ally against the Czechs. But
they also wanted to be regarded as thoroughly German
by the Sudetan Germans, and therefore manifested
b.ostilit:y agai.nat the Jewa.
Such idiocy within and with.out the academic community, as
Frank here outlines in regard to Einstein, must also have had much
influence on Frank h1mse1f 1 who was not only a close friend, but

also Einstetn•s moat able interpreter in the 1ntellectua1 com-

7

munit1'•

It was Ei.Aatelll who bad determined that Frank should

replace hlm, when the former left Prague lll 1912.

There can be no

question that Frank was greatl.7 affected by the abuse directed at
many of the men whom Frank ltnew and respected.

How much more must

have been b.is horror wb.eA hi• peraona.1 friends and he had to flee
Europe or be killed by the Naaia.

Morita Schlick was aaaasalnated

in 1936t by a fanatical student at Yieua.

Ludvig Berwald and

Georg Pick were killed ln concentration Cflllpa.

'?be

latter, who

vas Chairman of the liathematics Department, had been Einstein 1 s

closest colleague before Frank arrived.
3.

Kt'b.tBfH

Dt7t

Ma

V&MQA

Frank received hi.a Ph. D. fr• V:leml& University ill 1907.
The next f ev years, until bJ.a appolllt:ment to Prague, he spent in

fruitful r:eaearcb Aftd wt.ting.

Having ilab1bed EiAatei.rl•a theory

of 1905 more thoroughly tha.n any of his contemporaries, he must
also have seen it•' philosopbical implications more sharply, for
he began J.nmediate1y to write papera relating to the philosophy

of acie.n.ce.

He published "Kauaalgeseta W1d Erfatu:ung" in 1907 1

''Mechanismus oder Vitaliamua?• in 1908,

0

Gibt ea ei.ne abaolute

Bewegwigt" in 1910, and 11Daa .Re1atlv1t:atapri.nzip und di.a
Dllrstellung der physlkalisdlen Eracheinunge.n im vierdi.menslonalen
Raum" in 1911.

lb.e fl.rat paper, Oft causa11ty 1 waa ve11 received

with reservations by Einstein; it was sharply condemned by Lenin.

1ll his characterlatic modesty, Frank says of the paper that it

p
8

contained some raah ovaratataaenta.9 He cltea, as an example, the
thought that causa11ty "can be neither confirmed nor disproved by

experience; not, however, because 1.t la a truth known a priori,
but because lt ls a purely conventional definition."10
During this same per1odt Frank spent many enjoyable hours

eaeh week in informal discussions wb.S.eb. led eventually to the
founding of the Vienna Circle and Logical Positivism proper.
tells us. in the Introduction to tlo4!li!1 Sgiease AQd ltt

He

ftije~o,2bz.

I used to associate wltb a group of students wb.o
assembled every Thursday night in one of the old
Viennese coffee bouaea. We stayed until midnlght and
even later, discusaing problem• of science and phiLoaopbJ'. OUr i.nterfft was spread widely over many
fields, but we returned again and again to our central
probl•: How can we avol.d the tradi.tiona1 ambiguity
and obscurity of ph11osop!J.Y? ilow can we brlng about
the cloMat poaaib.Le E'Plf. . . .I betvee.n philosophy
and science? Sy •scieJ.'lce~ not mean •natural
aet.ence• only! but we included always social stud.lea
and tb.e hunan ties.

The broadness of scope indic:ated here waa not just an
academic openmlndednese.

Frank tells us that one of his asso-

ciates in the group, Otto Neurath• even joined a Theological
seminary for a year in order to learn more about the Catholic
faith.

Theirs was a real living coamitment to the advancement

9t.. N. Ridenour, Review of t1QSBQ Sc&~ l!lf~fil ~&L012oh1, in i:J.1$YJtdat Be:ln ti'. !:iS&ASY&'lt Juyo~
, ~
10c1.ted in ~ro ,SQtACS! yd 1;1 fh&l2101?b.Y• Cambridge•

Mass.• 194-9• 54.

p
9

of understa.ndi.ngl

We shall discuas the Vienna Circle movemeat

below, in Chapter 11.
4.

fraols'• lAfomaL §PLt
lt is important to etresa the l.nforma11ty of these coffee

house seaalons, for it is illustrative of the deaire Fra.alt had,
as a teacher and student, t:o make learnt.ng a delightful thing
instead of a drudge, and t:o laaure tbat ldeaa ehould relate to
the students• real experience outside the classroom situation.
In this attitude, P'r&nk waa advancing t:achnlques that are being
studied today in educational pqcb..oLogy.

Einstein and Frank held

similar views about the motivation to learn.

Frank says of

Einstein, "Tile charm of Illa lectures vaa due to his unusual
naturalneaa, the avoidance of every rhetorical effect and of all
exaggeration, forma11tyt and affectation.

He tried to reduce

every subject to its alanpleat logical fora and then to preaent

this simplest form artiatlcal.ly and psycbo1oglca11y ao tb.at: it
would lose every semblance Of ped&Atry, and to render it plastic
by means of appropriate, strik.1ng picturea.•11

These same traits were even stronger in Frank's own teaching style 1 as is evident from the c:onaenta made by many of his

students and colleagues.

la some reminiscences given 1n honor of

Frank. 1 prefacing the 1965 volume of l21t2n S%1!5"t!! 1n

the

10

na.101opb.Y of Scl:Mfiilt

.Raymond

Furth pictures his former teacher

and colleague thus.
tb.e flret leccure course he gave (in 1912) waa
Maxwell'• 1:1utoxy of electro-magaet1a 1 aod •Olle of
USt 1.ncludt.ng C2aarlea Loa'llOel." &ad the late Arthur
Wi.nterm.tz, had selected thi• courae although we were
only begiAnera. At f1rat Prank did net reallae tb.a.t
tba courae would be attended by ft.rat year atudenta,
who had .ao knowledge of partial derlvatt..vea• differ•
e.atial equat:iOAa and vectors; but Oil being told so
he took great trouble in helping WI to overcome these
difficulties.
His style of lecturlq was, on the face of lt,
rather eaay golng and slow, ud he normally devoted
the f 1rat quarter hour of each lecture to a repetl•
tlon of the ccmtenta of the preceding lecture. But
1n tlda _,. be made WI understand the subject
thoroughly, 1a spite of our iaexperience, and to
arouse our enthuaiasm for it. •••
frank alao 11ked to t•cb. apecl.al.ised and top•
lca1 IUbjecta by way of aemlnara, where tb.e more
aenin atudeata were given tbe task of reportlag 1n
turn oo cbaptei:a of book.a or papers. He did, of
courae, moat of the talking himself, interrupting the
students freque.ntl;y 1.n order to emphasize salient
pol..nta and to make c-.nta. 1 especially r:-.mlNtr
a aeud..nar on relatlvity theory, Frank's main field of
1.ntereet at that ttme. We found
•-i•r• moat
enjoyable because they were conducted in an informal
a.ad f rien.dl;y acmoapher:e and brought WI 1n closer
personal contact with Fra.nk..lZ
OA

the••

Another of Frank'• ex-students, Peter Bergmann, voices the
aame admiration for Frank'• manner, especially effective in the
pre-World•War•ll decade.

Bergmann had been forced to Leave his

native letlin 1A 1933, and took up his further studies at Prague

F
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b$cause it was nthe Least inexpensive by a considerable margin."13
In this overheated and jittery atmosphere there
was one fatherly figure who represented all that was
best at the University, Philipp Frank. As Einstein
once said of him: "His shirt migllt show grease spots,
but his mind was always in apple-pie order." Philipp
Frank never, in the three years I was at his Institute,
began a class on time; he might be late anywhere from
twenty minutes to over half an bour, and that for a
forty-five minute period. But he was full of sparkle,
fttl.1 of stimulus. After class he would drift into
the Institute library where wa11auachek and I took
care of the collection of book.a, and he would talk
about politics, about physics, about anyth1.n.g that he
might have picked up at the "Kaffeehaus." He encouraged all of ua students, and he gave WI the f ee11.n.g
of a wide-open intellectual window, open to things
that happened ln and out of physics, and open to
things that happened outside the country as well.
Philipp !'rank. saw to it that there was close contact
with philosophy of science, presided over by carnap,
with experimental physics at Furth's Institute downstairs, and with pure mathematics, which was taught
by Professors Berwald, Lowner and Winternitz.
Time and time again, the trait which aeems most to have

impressed Frank's students, friends and colleagues, was his
ability to accommodate and distill his great erudition into
Language that could be at once humorous, exact a.nd inspiring.

One is reminded of a comment Frank made about Einstein, which is
again equally applicable to himself.

Frank notes that the latter

seemed to look upon life with aft attitude of amusement, which
came not from any disdain, but from a confictence baaed on great
knowledge that what seems dreadfully important at present will
13"Philipp Fran..~ in Prague," in PJ:}.ilipe Frank 1 1884-1966.
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soon change in the great acheme of thlnga.14
Frank's acquaintances in America were equally impressed
with his humanistic manner as had been his European friends, even
a.f ter he was old enougb., and knowledgeable enough, to warrant a

certain degree of dogm.atiam.

Gerald Holton notes his "pursuit of

these diacuaaiona in a hwaane and deceptively informal setting,
rather than in a atuffy 1

ex

2•5.b.t!IEI maaner.ulS

come from another of hie Harvard friends, E.

c.

Slailar praises

Kemble.

Hia waa a gentle, unassuming spirit combined
with a Luminous mind and gif ta of simplicity and
humor that endeared b.im to all. He underat:ood the
nature of truth and the criteria that must be used
to separate truth from mythology. He was a humanist
aa well as a scientist and philosopher. He understood the predicament of modern man as men who
devote themselves to a single discipline cannot; he
understood because he was a reader as well as a
thinker, a historian aa well as a scientist, a co~
versationalist as well as a writer and Lecturer.16
Let o.ne more citation auff lce for now to demonatrate
Frank's effect aa a man upon hia atudenta• personal development.

Kurt Sitte recalls that FraAk 1 a iAitial lmpreaaiona were .not

14ct. ii1!1t1W!:

Hie Lif1 a.gd Ii.Mt•

150ne wonders why Professor Holton used these, and other,
identical worda to describe Frank on three separate formal occaaiona, one of them being before Fraok•a death. Fi.rat, in his
contribution to tb.e Preface, "In Honor of Philipp Frank," of
Bfatog ~tudi11, Vol. 11 1 1965. Second• 1n the Memorial MeetLng
c ted a ove, Note 12, and third, in an article entitled, "In
Memory of Philipp Frank, .. which was signed by Holton, E. C.Kemble,
w. v. Quine, s. s. Stevens, and M. G. White, and which appeared in
PQ&101opbz of SS\fACA 35, March, 1968, 1-5.

1884 _ 19 ~~~Pnilipp
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always good, especially for tbe aggreaaive atudenta.
(W}e thought him lazy at first, until a little
of bis wisdom 1 so generously and in good humor shared
out to us, had rubbed off to give us tile rudiments of
maturity. He uaed to come very late to bis lectures,
a.ad then to present the creu only while leaving all
the dirty details for us to work out. Again in bis
seminars on the then modern qua.Qtum theory he seemed
content to learn new tM.terlal through our poor efforts
• though. when we got stuck, it waa alwaya a sharp
remark of hi• which pointed the W&1' to ua. By that
time Philipp Frank had become deeply interested in the
philosophical problem• of science, and thla, of course,
accounted for what ve pb.11iatinea bad deemed hie 1 1aziaeaa.1 But we learned from him in this field, too,
almost without knowing it. I atill recall 1113' amasement when by his words auddaaly my eyea were opened
to perceive lnterrelatioaa which 1 bad never eve.n
vaguely auapected • and withouf hia help, mi.gh.t not
have realized for a long timt1. 7
Outside as well as in the classroom, Frank was entertaining
and friendly.

He and his wife, Hania, vere welcome guests on

social outings, among the students as well as with the faculty.
The Franks were forced by economic necessity to lead wh.at might be
caLLed a rather bohemia.n lif•t aside from th.air natural proclivity
for spontaneity and coffee house geniality.

They lived

in Pra.ak'a

office at the Ph.yaica Laboratory 1 during the early part of their
marriage.

Mra. Frank, who had little domestic training, was

forced to cook meals on a Bu.o88D burner.

Frank tell• an amuaiag

atory about this peri0d 1 wh.en Einstein paid th. . a vlait after a
number of years absence from Prague.

After touring some of their

p
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old cafe b.aunta, Frank aad Einstein went back to the apartment for
lunch, bearlng some meat that El.natein had purchased aa a kindness

to Mrs. Frank.
We came home (Prank relatea) brlftging some
calf 'a liver that ve bad purcbaaed. While my vife
bega.n to cook tbe liver o.ra the gaa burner, 1 aat

with Elnatei.A taUd.ng about all aorta of thiJlga.
Suddenly Einstein Looked apprehensively at the
liver and jumped at my wife: "What are you doing
t:heref Are you boillng the liver 1n water? You
certainly know that the bolliftg•point of water is
too low to be able to fry lives: 1n it. You muat use
a substance with a higher boilillg-poi.ftt such aa
butter or fat.". My wife had bee.a a college student
until th.en (1921) and knew little about cooking.
But Einatein'• advice aaved tbe lunch; a.ad we got a
source of amusement for all our married life,
because 'Whenever 1 E1nate1n 1 a theory• was ment1o.aed 1
my wlty remembered h1a theory about frying calf 'a
11ver. 8
5.

f,;fA\<.

ae

! §St\9L1;

In spite of all this apparent informality and good-natured•
neaa, Frank was a hard worker, and a profound thinker.

Oae reason

he was so effective as a teacher is that he knew all the background and ramifications of the problems he vas addressing, and
could pick out the clearest, most appropriate illustrations, and
acconmodate them in language suitable to the student.

One

of his

students at Harvard, Jeremy Bernstein, discusses Frank' a ••almost
incredible erudition, 0 and its effect on those who aaw it.

p
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He seemed to have read and digested the great
ph11oaophlcal• literary a.nd acientiflc works in an
e.normous vart.ety of languages. He 0t1ce told me that
he had studied Arabic, •• a young atudent, in order
to be able to read the great texts in that language
and, fifty years later, he r--bered it sharply
enough to be able to write out, micb 1 once saw him
do in a diacwsaio.n vi.th a.n Iranian. student, acne of
tbe paaaagee 1n Arabic that bad iAtrigued hlm. This
vaat general culture waa alao worn inatiACtlvely,
without prate.nae, and with the same maatery that
characterized hi• sc1e.nt1tic cultivation. lf aomeo.ne pressed him in diacuaalOA b.e would dig one Level
deeper 1n bis atore of k4ow1edge to reapo.nd. Aa a
atw:tent 1 bad the f eeliag tb.at Wbat he taught ua
repreaented Ollly §.b.e pure diati11atio.n of a vast
reaerve beAeath. 1
In his work, Fraok kep't pre'tty well to himself, not generally teaming up with other teachers or stud.ate to aolve problems,

or to eatabllah research projects.

Be waa cordial, and often

sb.art>...d ideas with his colleagues, but be preferred to think through
by

nimself the problems whic::b moat interested him.

Apparently he

b.ad no taste for experlmeAtal vorkt altbougb he recognlaed the
need for it, and actively supported it.

In this regard• he asked

Raymond Furth, wbo was OAe of his student•• to do some research

related to problems Frank vaa working on; and b.e put the Depart•
ment 1 a laboratory fac111tiea at the dispoaal of hi• young student.
Furth MY••
l was overjoyed by his offer, a.nd proposed to
investigate the phenomenon of critical opalescence

19"Ph1Lipp Frank as a Teacher in America, .. in l!!J.&i?S
Frank, 1884-1966.
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of bi..ouy liquid mixtures of which 1 bad read in
Perri.ft'• famous book the A1:91!f • Frank gave his
assent. and aalvely unaware~ tbe dlfficultiea of
this problem and my limited experience in experi•
mental work, 1 started cheerfully to assemble the
apparatus under Frank's admiring eyes. •••
For a short time in 1922 1:he 'black room•
(Furth. 1 s Laboratory) became a centre of attraction
for colleagues and friend• when, together with my
fiancee. vh.o too was one of Frank's students, I had
built a radio receiver, and there va• great excite•
ment 1.n the evenings, when we were able to pick up
f ragmenta of the experlmental broadcasts of some
European stations. As time went by the 'black room'
became more and more crowded with my experimeatal
research. students and their equipment, and Frank was
always interested la tbet.r work although be never
took a.n active part l.n lt.
Nevertheleaa 1 awtpeet that be was not too aorry
when, upon m;v appointment to the Cb.air of Experi•
Jl8Ata1 Pbyaica, in 1931, thie part of tb.e activity of
hia DepaJ:tment came to an end. ae vaa particularly
pleased When, on ray suggestion, we got peraiaalon to
exchan.ge the axperiaental equipment of tlle theoret•
lcal Department vltb. the books and journals of the
experimental Department. 'lb1s arrangement put a
very good library at his disposal which was accommodated 1A the vacated black room (after lt had
changed its co1ourl) 1 and from then on hla department
llNtcame Oll8• again entirely devoted to theoretical

phyaica.2

After World War 1 1 Frank ape.nt illcreaat.ng effort on quee•
tlona of generality and ph11oeophlcal import, aa the titles of his
publications lnd1cate 1 e.g. "Die Bedeutung der phyaik.alische.n
Erkenntniathaorle Macha fur daa Ge1atea1ebe.n der Gegenvart" ln
1917, and "Wiaaenscb.af t urad Theologie• 1n 1920.

20neaoa scucta..1.

vo1.

11,

xvt..

Peter G. Bergmann
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describes Fraak.'s work of this perioct.21

Frank lectured to

seminars at Prague and at the Urania• with other "diati.Aguiahed
visitors" such as Neuratb..
the second edition of

matical physics.

1

At the

Hll8

time, he vaa ft.aiahi.ng

Prank•aad•M1•••' encyclopedia of matb.e•

Re turned hia two-year course ill introductory

theoretical physics over to Walter Glaaer 1 who later unfortunately
became a tool of the Nazia 1 so that he might concentrate on
"frontier eubjecta.• like Dlrac•a theory of th• electro.n 1 and the
two

relativity theories.

summary statement:

Bergmann con.elude• b.ls homage wltb. tbia

"OUr att1tUdea toward acience and rsaearch

were formed by the attitude that pervaded all your taacb.i.Ag and
writing act1vltlea; the quest for understanding• and th• search
for unifying principles.•
6.

[.r!.{lJs goyes

Se th! United Stat11

In 1938 Frank came to give a series of lectures on a tour
of the United States.

That aame year CZechoalovakia vaa sacri•

ficed to tlle Nazis at the 1.nfamoua Munich Confere.nce.
sequent war in Europe prevented Frank from going home.
1ng

The sub•
Consider•

the long time be bad watched the build-up of Nazism, Frank.

could scarcely have been caught unawares.

Numbers of his profes-

sional associates bad already left Europe. especially those of

211tftoms.ge to Professor Phi.Lipp G. Frank, .. in Bot~2!.!

3iugi•lt Vol. 11 1 x.
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Jewish extraction• like Einstein and W1ttge.natein.

Nonetb.el••••

rra.ak was not able to take up his work 1n America without a hitch.

try1.t'lg first to get into Olicago University, he found that lnsti•

tutio.a to be already overloaded with refugee professors.
his lecture tour, he and his wife wnt to Boston.

After

Ba.rvard bad no

suitable chair for him to fill either, but with the support of
Harlow Shapley and Percy Bridgman• a position was made for him
temporarily as "research associate in physics a1ld philosophy."
Two yeara later he waa given a

peJ:'llalleAt

job at Harvard, with the

title of Lecturer on Pb7slca a.Ad Mathematica, on a b.alt•Cime
basis • oae semeater at HaJ:"Vard • the next away.

Thia arrangement

allowed him to teach at other universities around the country,
and added

to b.ia f1.Mnc1a1 support.

Frank filled this post until

1954 1 when he retired.22

The same year Frank came to the United Statea-1938--carnap
and Neurath, who had left Europe earlier, along with the American,

Charles Morris, publiahed the first part of their

LoC•£PttiQP!l

EnsxsLQR!s31a of U'!drf1&4 ssi!!1Rlt at Chicago. Frank contributed
Number 7 of Volume 1 1 t:9YIJd1tiqna of fb.Y•ic1 1 which was also
publiahed under separate covers 1a 1946.

Thia essay could be

called the culmination of Frank'• thougbta ill th.a strict vei.D of
Logical Positivism.

After thia ti.me, Frank seems to have

22cf. E. c. Kemble, 11Greetlnga to Pbilipp Frank,n in l21ton
Sg.e1, Vol. 11, and also E. C. Kemble' ttPb.111pp Frank's Years

at

rvard 1 " in

Nllc2R

F;W1

1884-19§ •
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moderated hia zeal for the unity of science movement, thus aetti.ag
himself apart from lta more enthuaiaatlc supporters in the Vienna
Circle• especially Neurat:.b..

Robert Cobell comments on Frank's

conception of 'unity of science• I.A memorial remarks of 1966,
asking rhetorically vb.at Frank t.bougbt of tbe "aclentif ic co.ncep•
tio.n of the world."

Did he believe he vaa part of a revolutionary
trendf or if .not
perhap• tbe uaity of
acie.nce movemea.t and the logical empiricist ohi1osophyT ••• (Neuratb. bad •struggled for it;l
carnap was 'toucb.iagly hopeful' of l t) the same
hope ahinea through Philipp Frank's papers, partic•
ularly I.A the selection iii ~ ~ciu,c,e a~
e'JroagQl'lY. Frank's life worwaa auccessfu, ~ut
was modest enough and intelligent enough, to see
that the unity of science waa not a directly public
affair. True, it was a public movement of some
scientists and philoaopbera for a decade or two,
but 1 believe Philipp cherished it more as an
international sa.mtnar and coffee-b.ouae. •••
Finally! unity of science meant unity of all forms
of know edge and awarenesa 1 and it was for Frank a
foundation for humane education.
Witb. good friend•• b.e brought the lnatitute
for the Unity of Sele.rice alive 1nto the American
philoaopbical world, with publications and witb.
meetings here in Boato.n and elaew.bere. The last
major aaaem.blage of the laatt.tute, at which he pre•
aided• was its joint meeting with the Amert.can Asao•
ciatioo for the Advancement of Science 14 Boaton in
1953.Z3

h•• •••

lg•

Ln certain reapecta, one might characterize Frank'• 1.lfe
in America as his pragmatic period, for it vaa here that: ha could

20

put to practice, in. a wide variety of writings and lectures, the
tb.eories he had developed in Europe.

He began to concern himself

more a.nd more with the philosophy of education, and the real
effects of science on society.

In his little book, Rtla£ivitv;

A BA:SMu& ]Fp.tt}J4 he defended scientific relativism as a healthy
attitude, and criticized the anti•scientific reactions of a warconscious public.

He wrote criticisms of sciencF< teaching, and

offered practical solutions to the faults be noted.

His own

teaching at Harvard became more and more popular, attracting many
students from non-scientific curricula to attend - often as many
as two hundred fifty per course.
ln addition to these strict academic efforts, Frank found

time to participate in a variety of organizational work.

He

became a director of the Conf erenee on Science, Philosophy and
Religion, which. met annually in New York from 1940 to 1950.

He

presided for ma.ny years over the Philoaoph.y of ScieAce Associa-

tion.

The Institute for t:b.e Unity of Science, co-founded by

Frank and some of his friends, also had bis services as president.
He addressed many international congresses in science and philosophy, including, for example, the 12th International Congress
of Philosophy in Venice, 1958, at which he gave the opening paper.
Tho Harvard Shop Club o.n the Science of Science often heard his
ideas, as did the frequent Boston Colloquia for the Philosophy of

21
science, at which he uas a regular,

a.nd

active, attendant.

The

American Academy of Arts and Sciences held a special conf crence
in 1958 on "Science and tho Modern World View," and dedicated it
i.n honor of Frank and Bridgman, who were reti:d.ng from active

teaching.

Similarly, the Proceedings of the 1962-1961.1 Bos ton

CoLloquiurn bears a preface containing

0

Greetings to Philipp Frank 0

from many friends tiho wished to do him ho.nor.

7.

f;apls's lnterest M1 fh3'l210Qb.Y
Aa has been said above 1 and illustrated by the papers he

wrote and the organizations he worked in, Frank had a llfelong
interest in philosophy.

Yet it waa not always expressed :Ln the

same way, or to the same intensity aa in later years.

He tells

us about an important change in bia approach that took place after
the end of World War 11.
ln a.11 my writing before 1947 l had stressed
the point that science gives no support to meta•
physical interpretations, of whatever type. I had
discussed these interpretations only as reflecting
the social environment of the philosopher. However,
after that timel as a result of my contact with my
students and fe low teachers, l became more and more
interested i.n the question of the actual meaning of
the metaphysical interpretations of science • ideal•
istic, materialistic, relativistic, and others. For
the fact that a great many aeientista and philosophers advance such interpretations and cherish them
ie aa firmly established, by our experience, as any
fact of physics.25

22
Frank's c:h.ange of view, mentioned here, wi!L be examined
more closely below, in Chapter Ill.
A few more passages are offered here, to complete this
general picture of Franlt and his usefulness.

First, Ernest Nagel

discusses philosophy of science, as Fra.nl< saw it ..

Indeed, he believed th.at his cudinal aim of
obtaining a stable perspective on Life can be best
achieved through. a persistent and aelf •conacioua use
of the critical intc1Lectua1 method of modern natural
science. •••
(T)he logical analysis of the language of
science, or the articulation of precise rules for
assesaing evidence in conducting scientific inquiry,
are undoubtedly centrally important tasks .... But
as he saw it, a philosophy of science that is limited
to the discussion of such matters ls incomplete; and
to be adequate, it must also include certain socio•
historical considerations. ••• Franlt was thus not a
purist in. his conception of the philosophy of
science, and did not hesitate to ..thicken" its con•
tent even tnough this disturbed some of his purist
friends.2 6
Joseph

~Lark,

a Jesuit, underscores Frank's difference from

the rest of his Vienna Circle companions, in rather emotional
terms.

Witelf:

For the violent revisionists of th.e
~ and the pontificating propagandists oft e

early issues of §.;k~tnif did .not, I thin.k. 1
deae::ve the substantl support of our dear
departed, gentle, genuine, and generous Professor
Frank. He vas too good, too gentle, too generous
26"Ph1.11pp Frank and the Ph.iLoeophy of Science•" in
Philipp F;f.915 1 1384-1266.

,
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and too gc..."lUine for th.t:!r trenchant• in1;!e,ed • but
traumatically truculen~ company. AnrI he knew it,

but never said a word.

7

Although these Last woxda seem too honeyed to be serious,
they are not out of keeping with the genuine respect and affection
which Frank inspired in his many atUdents, colleagues and friends.

R. Seeger, of

~·

National Science Foundation, described him as

"the ph.yaicist•s philosopher of physics.n28

G. Holton was

impressed by h.is "apparently paradoxical combination of serious
power and effortless style.•29
ness of his teachine.

E.

c.

t<emb1e praised the .natural•

"He has not been a victim of

th~

common

delusion that ideas expresi!ed in tf'c.hnical jargon are. in some way
more important an1 profound than those expressed in plain F.ngliah.
Nor did he ever subscribe to the notion that the difficulty which
a Lecture course presents to its students is a measure of its

va1ue.tt30

H. Margenau saw Frank aa

un.1que in his generation as

11

a philosopher of science who combines an expert knowledge of
modern physics with professional competence in philoaophy.•31

27•Pbi11pp Frank

and

Metaphysics," in F!U.11pp [;ank. 1§84·

28191ton St~~''• Vol. II, x.xvl.
29lJWi. • xviii.
J 0lll.W.· t x.vix.

31JJllsl. •

'°'.
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Finally,

:~iir,el

liken~:d

hi;n to the admirable carpentez: wb.om

Einstein onc..-e d$serib(Jc in a parabolic atory to Frank.

He is

the one who wouLd rather struggle 8Ad struggle to drill a single
nice hole i.n a rotten, knotty board, than to dr11l dozens of nice
holes in an easy board.32

32~ •• xxv.

CHAPTER 11
FRANK AND LOGICAL POSITIVISM

1.

in;rodyctiog
In order that the reader may aee Frank better in context,

this Chapter is devoted to a conaideratlon of the philosophical

environment with which he associated himaelf 1 and which he helped
to develop over some thirty years.

It is a movement which baa

come to be called Logical Positivism.

It should be emphasized at

the outaet that Logical Poaltiviam ia, in fact, a movement - an
effort at philosophical growth - rather than a fixed system of
thought.

It should also be remembered that Logical Positivism is

an openended phenomenon, historically speaking, without sharply
defined cut-off dates.

At one end, it represents a eontlnuatlo.n

of empirico-positlviam, stemming from the thought of men like Hume
and Mill ln F..ngland, and Ernst Mach in Germany.

At the otber end,

Logical Poaltlviam opens to some of the moat fruitful themes of
contemporary philosophy• especially Llnguiatlc Analysis, which
have continued to the present.

Nevertheless, we vlll concern our-

selves here oaLy with the main stream of this movement, from about
1910 to about 1940.

Thia represents the growth period of the

Vienna Circle • the center of organized Logical Poaltivlam • from
ita lnceptlon to its disruption by World War II.

25

26
One

wonders where to place Freak in this movement• if be

belongs at all.

In the firat place• tbe movement contained such a

wide variety of per:sona11t1ea and opiaiona that it is difficult to
define it ill more tb.aA broad-br:usb outlines.

Secondly, aa baa

been suggested above, Frank himself was not a static thinker; he
developed within and without tbe main thrust of the Vienna Circle,
wb11e managing always to keep a rather objective detachment from
it.

Especially with respect to metapbyalca, he gradually moved

away from the main drift of thia group - more ao after World
War 11 • when his contact with American teachers and students
widened his outlook on philosophy.

2. tJ.\! settiu: A Cr1•ii1

y

ss&.ep~ifi.s

thoygbt

Frank presents a short history of Logical Positivism ill his

book

zwg1ra kltnct

Md &ti

£hlL01om. There he tell• us that

the turn of the twentieth century waa characterized by feelings of

uneasiness over the apparent failure of science (!11,.. mechanistic
science) to give truth, or, in Frank'• words "a real understanding
of the world."

J.

c.

Maxwell's work in electromagnetic theory,

and the experiments of Michelson and Morley in optics had cast
doubt on the certainty of Newtonian laws. which bad theretofore
been accepted as the irrefutable pictus:e of the universe.

In

mathematics. great changes were brought about during the nineteenth century which added to the confusion.

David Hilbert• for

example• developed the vi.w that geometry 1• a purely formal
science, and has nothing to say about the real world.

The thought

,
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th.at mathematics haa exiate.ntial content goea back at least •• far
as the Greeks, yet Hilbert auggeated that the connections we

normally make between the axioms of geometry and the things of our
experience are only coave.a.tiona; aucb coaventiOAa in .a.o vay tell

ua that geometry la a true picture of reality.

In order to

establlllh thla idea, Hilbert widertook, aucceaafu1Ly 1 to build a
complete formalization of Euclidean geometry.

Without changing

the ayatem at all, be e11111nated every c:o.a..nect1on between the
atatementa of geometry and those of nature, auch as the process of
determining congruence which 1.nvolvea auperimpoaitag one figure
upon another to aee if they coincide.

Later mathematicians, sucb

as Richard von Miaea, were critical of thia effort toward purity,
which seemed unrealiatlcally extreme.

After all, aa Frank aug-

geata, if all m.atheaatica la truly tautological • i.e. baa nothing
to aay about reality • it would not be reasonable to apply terms

like point and triangle to empirical sciences legitimately, yet

tbia la done regularly with aucceaa.1
von

Mi••• auggeat,

fruitful reaul.ta.

there must, Frank and

be acne real connection, in order to yield such

At

an,y

race, Hilbert'• brilliant work left a

broad area of unanavered queationa that center around the relation
of aymbola to reality • ooe of the primary concerns of the Vienna
Circle.

l•eoncerning an Interpretation of Poaitlv1i:£; a review of
von.Miaea• jttW• Llbr)Nsb
bt1Siy1ayf• in
33• June,
1942, 683-6 •
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Albert EiAatein, publiahiAg b.ia Special a.nd General tbeodea
of Relat:Lv1ty 1 l.n 1905 a.nd 1916 rea.,.ctlvely, added to the growing

skept1c1• about reallty.

lt waa evident that hla two Principles,

of Relativity a.ad of Conatancy, were mutually contradictory, 1f
interpreted 1n the light of Nevto.ai.aa Mdl&nlca.

Yet if this

interpretation were disallowed, they led to observable results
that held up nicely under teat conditions.

O.ne of the moat spec•

tacu1ar of th.eae teats was Eddi.agton•a expedition which discovered

the bending of starlight by our aun, exactly ln keeping with
Einstein's predictions.

The question then waa:

"How are prin•

ciplea of high generality to be interpreted, if at a111•

"la the

only interpretation needed the confirmatory results of testing?"
Thia la what Moritz Schlick• Friedrich Walaman.n, Rudolf car.nap and
others of the Vienna Circle were to auggeat t..n their diacusalona
of the criteria for meaning.

W&lsmann'a version was, for example,

"'lbe meaning of a statement la the method of ita verificat1on.n2
Bridgman added the weight of hia work to this view, in a phase of
sc1ent:l.f1c method now termed

1

operat1onatiam.•

Max Pluck• wb.oae work led to Quantum Theory, initiated

still further ramiflcationa oa tbe question of rea1lty.
concern was in the poaalblllty of ft..ndi.ng any law at all.

cbaracteriaea the situation aa

2K.

w.

f

Here, the
Frank

ollowa,

Britton, in "Logical Positivism," !fCYSL2Q!dia
WaSJiiann. R. W.
A by,
.,,ogic•l Poaitiviam, 0 in A Q(lCical ii•torf of We1t1ra
Q11oaophx, ed. D. J. o•eonnor, attribute• it to Sch [ck.
B~!&!9t.r1.. 1966 1 attributes tb.ia statement to
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The .a.ew acience of quantum theory gave rise to a
repetition of the crisis that had been precipitated
about 1905 by the relativity tb.eoa:y, but with even
greater intensity. Again 1t vaa maintained that
acient1f 1c method had failed. 'J.'be new theories do
not even claim to give an 1 expla.nat1on 1 of the
physical phenomeaa. They claim only to offer math••
matical f ormulaa from which the observable phenomena
can be derived. ••• The ar:gmaent went mostly that
relativity as well as quantum theory gave mathemat•
1cal patterns without any causal juat1ficati.on.J

Frank says that such thoughts aa deacribed above in acien•
tific thought threatened to bring about a violent reaction against
science.

'I'his revolution was manif eat 1.n the tendency of certain

thinkers to return to the old metaphya1ca for answers.

To Frank

and his associates, raised in an empirical, positivistie environ•
ment, this would have seemed a disastrous setback.

They examined

critically the ideas of their predecessors, and their contemporaries, 1.n the hope of aavi.ng science from "going down the drain."
We shall look briefly now at some men • Ka.nt 1 Macht Boltama.nn 1
Poincare 1 Rey and Duhan - whose 1deaa were of major influence on
the young Frank and his Viennese friends.

3•
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la view of the poa1t1Vlata 1 reactloA to •tapb.yaica 1 men•

tioned above, it 1a interesting to find that Immanuel Kant certainly a aetaphyalctaa - bad an important effect on the early
thi.nking of Frank and his associates.

J(ant 1 s influence was both
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positive and negative.

Fr&n.k's group agreed witb Kant's powerful

presentation Of the active role that an obaerver playa on the
knowledge he •Mk•.

Even in the plainest of deacrlptiona, 'the

scient1at•obaerver b.as certain physical and mental qualitlea that
deternd.ne 1 in a sense, uh.at he diacovera.

To put it ln more con•

temporary torma 1 nature can no longer be considered as an isolated
and objective thi.t\g to be knowt.

Or, as Werner Heisenberg has

suggested, 1.n :rht fb.Ytt.S&.15 1 1 Cgagee!i2A !( NfSlH"tt which Fra.nk
reviewed favorably, ffMethod and object C&G no longer be aepar•
ated.n4
On the .negative aide, the Vienna group disagreed wt.th

Ka.nt'• conviction tbat tb• fona of experience are permanent.
Neo-1.afttlua, try"in.g to maintain this permanence, divorced meta•
physical pr1nc1pl.ea frGll acS.eace "1' making th.- out to be prior.
UatortunatelYt Frank auggeata, t:bla la a frultl••• effort.

Such.

a view aaeana 1 he H7'•, S that the ".metaphyalcal background has no

releva.nce for science

pr~;

it ia separated by airtight valla

from the domain of acientlflc dlacourae.

In tbi• vay, acie.nce

became aut0J1omoua vi.th re•peet to aetaphJ'aica, but the validity
of the metaphysical assertions in the background could not be
4c1ted 1A "Mall C0t1front• Blmaelt•"
41, Oct. 25 1 1958, 20-21.

~lSt;IQIEI

i&S»l"cJ!Y

5tioaera §slMSft Ind lJil DJ.'919phx, 24.

Rey,..,, Qf
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checked by any experimental teat."6
Ernst Mach, who held the chair of Pblloaopi:'q' of Inductive
science at Vienna, frcm 1895 to 1901• • • another intellectual
forebear of 1:be Vienna group.

ln a at:rang17 antlmetapllyaical

approach, he proposed that acientiflc

l•••t which claim to give an

"exp1anat10A,. of pbenwna are really juat ahortba.nd

tiona" of ll&D7 nut••

deacr1p•

11

?beoret1cal science, then, does not have

to be given ln tez:ma of ucha.n1ca, more t:baa in terms of any other
branch ot science.

nda meant, for Frank, tbat the i8N.ftent fall

of med\al'lica • at l.eaat Newtonlan mecb.aalca • need not drag the
rest of aclence down along with it.

Needless to say, Frank's

friends were relieved to discover this tl»ught as a possible way
out for science.

On tbe other band, aecor:ding to Macb., ao•called pure
scleacea, J.ike mathematics

a.nd

symbolic logic, are no aeurce of

truth eltber, because they are always true, and tell nothing about
the world.
good

Later poait1viata 1 differing from Mach, wished to make

use of 1:b.eae tautologoua ayatema, which they considered aa

their primary tools for re1at1ng tbeoq and observation.

6ct. ai&pter IX of ~~s Set.pee aM ltf ft!ilo102hz:t
where Frank praises Ernst ~~rer as one who tr!ed successfully
to bridge 1:be gap between traditional and modern philosophy in
the face of mode.rn science. Yet Casairer tends to couch his
th.oughts in terms that are too reminiscent of idealism.
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Mach wae, in Frank'• worda,

to ou.r actual worlr.."7

".not the moat poverfu.l stimulus

Mach did not give enough credit to matbe•

matics and logical reaaOAing to suit Frank and his friends.

some-

how, a scientist had to be more than a passive collector of facts.
Indeed• one had to admit the organl.zl.ng functions of tb.e human
mind; Kant had ab.awl this.

Yet Kant was to be avoided as a temp•

tation toward metaphysics.
Macb. 1 s successor at Vienna, Ludwig Boltzmann, filled his

chairmanship from 1902 to 1906 • the years during which Frank was
working on his Doctorate.

It is surprising that Boltzmann, under

whom Frank worked directly, apparently bad little influence,
although he was a great thinker.

True, Boltzmann was an atomiat,

rather than a poaitiviat proper, but this did not really set him
fundamentally apart.a

Boltzma.an•a apparent lack of influence

stems more from the way be aald things than from what he said.
Frank tells us,
1 remember the lectures of a great phyaiciat,
Boltzmann, on the philosophy of physics, which 1
attended ae a student. Despite the personal great•
ness of the lecturer, the effect of the course was
aligbt, because of a lack of a coherent approach.
We can noticep on the other hand, that scientists
who built tbes.r books around a central ldea have

7Mod5p Ssklast Md It•

fbi&oagz:, 7.

81.n ··~=140 1 Boltzmann,
Frank says,
"In realitY
e
~na
atl~Di,ommR:r•
a, Maxwell and
were
exactly of the aame opinion. concernl.ng the getJ.eral nature of a
physical theory as Hertz aftd Mach.•

o;fS'
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shaped the ml.Gd• of science students for decades.
I mention'9 just as examples, Mach, Po1ncare 1 and

Bridgman.

'lb.is must have been a good object lesson. for Frank., whose
great concern with clarity was mentioned above in Ol.apter I.
What was needed was a bridge between description of f acta

and general scientific principles.

Prank's group discovered part

of this bridge in 1:be ideaa of Henri Po1.acare, Who admitted the
function of mind, but not 1.a the 1Caftt1an a prlorlatt.c way.

For

Poincare, scientific lawa are COllVelltlOAa that are useful for

organtzlag and predicting evellta.

In 1:1'-.elvea, however, tbey

say nothl.ng about facts (and for that reason they caanot be
checked by experimentation), nor do they derive from the innate
form of the human ad.lld.
Frank canparea Mach and Poi.near• ln a single aentaru:e,

thus:

•According to Mach the general principles of science are

abbreviated economical descrlptloae of obHrVed facts; according

to Polacare t:b.ey are tree creatt.oaa of tile hUll&ll mlad which do .not
tell anything a~out observed facta.•10

Frank adds, "The attempt

to integrate the t:wo concepts into oae cob.erent ayat• • • the
orlg1A of wbat was later called logical emp1r1c1• ...
Abel Rey• a French historian and pbiloaopher of aclence,

9tmsl1rn sc&Mc•
10l.l?Jr.d_., 12.

yd

1g1 Pb;il,9•2Pb.tt 250.

-..
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seemed to present another element of the aougbt•f or Lntegratlon.
Bia wa• the cleareat view of tb.e •.aev poa1t1vlamt 1 aa tb.e Vienna
group 1!.ked to tbink Of it.
J.-11

RbnlaQl•ee goagwnpog91p1,

Hi• book, Le

Dw&e 41

m•icsme

cbll

publt..Mecl 1a 1907, bad co.naiderable

airing among Frank'• aaaociatea t.n tb.e coffee bouae meeti.ftga.

ln

this book, Rey writ•••
What waa lacking 1.n Cante•• or Mill's positivism
••• waa their ••• failure to bave eatabl.i.ahed ita a

new form a theory of categories.

Objective experience

are functloaa of each o1:her1 imply each other,
and exist by virtue of each other. To say that the
relations between ptv-alcal object• d•lve from the
nature of these objects and to say that these relations
are co.ostructed by OU&' ld.nda are two artlf lclal tbe•
ortea. ••• OUr experle.nce la a ayatem, • relation of
relations. 'Dle relation la the given. 1l
&nd m.1.nd

A

third element in 1.ntegrat1.ng the roles of observation

and theoretlzlng 1 was Pierre Duhem.

Dub.am emphasized the fact

that a structural 8)"stem tell• ua nothing about tb.e world of

observables.

this French Thoad.st, Frank saya 1 "exerted a atrong

influence upon our group, and, particularly, upon

ing."12

my

own think•

Part of this influence ia evident in Frank'• apparent

study of 1 and frequent citations from• the vorka of Thomas Aqulms.
This ls certainly not characteristic of the Logical Positlviata.

119Q..

RPJD:. 10.

au,.,

392, cited 1.n !iidern

sc&ma !S4

12t:155H9 SQit.f!S! qd &ti ftlilOfS?RUt lS.

lt• Mls>t•
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Duhe polnted out: that a acient1f ic thaoq t.s a ayat• ot
propoaitiou, wbicb at..m, i.n tb.e •illp1Ht poaalble way, to ax.plain

observables.

Because it is a complex qat•, it will .not stand

or fall on the baais of one so-called •crucial experiment.•

Also,

the fact that pbJ'al.cs tries to explala experimental law through

theory 1.nd1cataa the need tor a l:U.gber level orderlag process.
In Dub.em's opinion, "It Che object of pbyaical t:beoriea la to
explain experime.nta1 law•• 1*1'•1ca1 tlleorJ' la not an autonomous
scie.a.ce1 it is suborcU.nated to metapb.ysics. •13
Dubem

repreaenta the .neo-'1homlat or neo-Ariatotell.aa efttl:ta

to lAcorporate modern acleace lnto the older utapbJ'alca.

lut

more often, Pr&Dlt suggests, t:be Mt:aphyalclana, lncluding both

.neo-7.homiata and neo-Itantlana, tended to dlvor:ce science and meta•
physics, aqt.ng that tb.e science was autonomous.

Unfortunately,

as has been mentioned above, t:bia divorce meant tbat tbere • • no
way to teat the val.idlty of t:b.e metaphysics by experimentation.
Rather than hold aucb a diaaatiafylng truce as just des•
cribed, certain writers pceferred to make a complete break with
tradition.

These were tb.e real advocates of the new Logical Poa1•

tivism, of '1hom the leading representatives were Moritz Schlick,
Hans Relchan.bach• Ludwlg Wl.ttgenat:ain, and RUdolf Carnap.

'1\Jentieth•century positivi.am admita concepts, Frank says,
that-tan.not lte deduced from sensory raw material," and this
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admlea1on "1• exactly t:b.e point which dlatlnguiahea twentiethcentury 1og1ca1 empiricism from .nineteeAth century 1 poaitlvlsm 1

of men like Macb.."14

Such concepts, for example, as gravitational

field, are developec! in the 1mag1aat1on of the scientist, and
afterward confirmed by experience.

"Tb.ere la even the question,"

Frank adds, "whether Mach (himself), if pinned down, would not
have

agr~ed

that the general conceptions of science are not

'derived' fran sensory experience, but constructed by the human
imagination to derive observable facts logically from these con•
Or, as Rudolf C&rnap was to say, •The calculus ia first

cepts.nlS

constructed floating in the air, so to speak; the construction
begins at the top and then adda lower and lower levels.

Finally,

by the aemant1ca1 rules, the lowest level ls anchored at tbe solid

ground of the observable facta.n16

Whatever dif f erencea there may be between the older

newer positivlatic achoola 1 however, it is certain that

and

both were

agreed on the need, flrat, to ellmlnate metaphysics, a.n.d second,
to make philosophy ac1e.ntific.

Thia

ag~eement

brought about a

sense of unity that helps to explain why the movement was able to

14"!instein 1 Mach and Logical Positivism, .. in 6lbert
Ph\Lqsoeher•Sfientist, ed. P. A. Sch.ilpp, Chicago,

J~•teini

9,

~8

•

15.1.ll!!·

161Jll..s!., 276.
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accomplish so much work.17
4.

J.anguage AnaJ.x1ia 1p the VieMa Group
From the considerations above, one can see how the Vienna

Circle movement came to view philosophy as primarily the effort
to see wh.at statements mean.

Meaningful philosophy can find truth

only by the scientific critique of Language.

ln the introduction

to Modt£n Sgbence and lt1 fbiLoaophXt Frank describes aome of the
men wh.oae seminal ideas grew into the Vleana Circle.

Two of

these, Schlick and Ralchenbach 1 whose primary concern was the
Logical uae and metapb.yslcal abuae of language, came from Berlin
to make a lasting impression on the coffee house meetings they
attended.

Later these two came to be leading personalities in the

movement.

By way of introduction to the development of the Vienna
Circle proper, r·ra.nk writes about events in Vienna after he had
left to teach. at Prague,
At that time (after 1920) Bans Hahn waa profeaaor
of mathematics at the University of Vienna, /and/ Otto
New:ath atarted world.Jlg f cr the City of Vienna, organ•
izing adult education in the social aicences 1 •••
Hahn had started intenaive work with advanced atude.nta
in the field of symbolic logic and the foundations of

17K.

w.

Britton, in "Logical Positiviam, 0 in Eec;yclo21dl:f!
~''t.anlcat 1966, notes aome other points of difference 6etween
the old and new poaitiviata. He suggests that the Vienna Circle
dif f era from Hume and Mach in placing the baai• of knowledge in
public experiment - that la, in experiments which many persons can
verify - rather thaa 1n private personal experience. Here one
•••• the social criteria of truth 1 advocated by men like James and
Dewey.

38

matbematice. ln 1922, he choae aa a basis of their
discussions the new book by L. Wittgenstein, :rracta;ua
Logict::f9&l!t~1c!f • 1.'beee di•cussions were the germ
ol many utw:y8 eve opme.nta ln the philosophy of
science. •••
Frank continues,
Hahn became very entbuaiaatic, starting a close
cooperation of the new men with our Viennese group.
He envisaged the appoi.ntment of M. Schlick aa a pro•
fessor of philosophy at the University of Vienna. Re
met, of cour.. , a atiff real.atance among the adhere11ta
of traditional philoaopb.y. But the interest of the
acieatleta in the philoaopb.ical background of acieace
bas been traditionally high at the University of
Vienna. Ernst Mach bad wed bi.a appo1at:meat to tbia
predilection and Bahn succeeded in en.listing a sUf •
f icient number of acieatiata 1n a drive to carry
through Scb.11ck 1 s appointment in 1922. In this year
a close cooperation between Schlick and the old Vienna
group began. Thia common work gained a great deal in
1nte.na1ty a.nd momentum 11beo Sehli.ck persuaded R. carnap
to move to Vienna 1.n 1926.l 9

Morita Schlick waa a physicist vho had a personal acqualn•
ta.nee with Rilbut• Planck aAd Elnatein.

At the aame time, be was

a philoaopb.eJ: i.n an. environment vbich afforded the moat ecclectic
view of philoaopb.y in tbe region.

While moat

Garman.

universities

maintained their J.C&ntian ideanliam, Vienna offered at:u.diea in a

wide range of 1deaa • Brenta.a.o, Deacartea, Leib.t:U.zt and Hume
included.20 For tbia reaaon 1 Schlick waa well aulted to be the

1812QKA $SUAS! AAd It• r1\l.~1•RRbZ1 31.
191l!J:4. t 32.

20ct. Frank'• "Co.ncernlng an Interpretation of Posltiviam, 11

12£.

~·
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•first interpreter of mod.era sciel'lce.•21 publishing his book §HS!
pd

:f' N y C9GS'DR95"an:

&J1i91 1.n 1917 •

Ludvig Wl.ttge.a.ateil'l could be called a spiritual leader of
the Vienna Circle, although he did aot aeet wt.th the group per&Oft•
ally, due to his retiring cb.aract:er.

Many of WittgeAeteln'a ideas

developed il'l response to the work of hi• teacb.er 1 Bertra.ad RuaaeU,
who b.ad published, la 1910, the vuy important llil\slJlK H!l!!a•
ptica 1 collaborating wi.tb. A. N. tribiteb.ead.

Wlttge.neteln'• own

work, 1n • s1m11ar vein• il;•st&hl La1sa:ML9•9"1c;u, was published in 1922. ln tbia book., Wittgenatet.a. likened philosophical
problem• to flies trapped i.A 1tott1••·

<me baa only to see b.ow

they gO't in to k.Dov how tbey can get out again.

1.'he problems Of

traditional philosophy stem f ram a alaunderata.ndi.ag of language •
fram making the wa:ong llagulatlc turn l.nadvertently.

To put it in

Wittgenstein'• own worda 1 "Wl:leD Che answer cannot be put into
worda 1 neither can Cbe question be put 1.nto word••
does not exist.

lf a qu.eatioa can be framed at

au. 1

'l'be riddle
11: la poa•

alble to answer lt.a22
For t:be early Wittgenatela, language la a picture of real-

ity.

'1he structure of this language will correspoad to the

structure of the reality it pictures, if th.a language ls meaning-

2lct. Vi.ctor Kraft:, tU ~M'" Ql,;s;L1, transl. A. Pap 1
Ph11oaopb.1ca1 Library, N. Y., I
.

2 2 - · 3.

JAttar.•s=
:tranal.
day, • Y.,
•

cited in J. Hartnack,

M. Cranaton, Double-
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fu1.

Of

course the language may become distorted, la. which case

the resulting ideas will be nonaense.23
Schlick was la. agreanent with WU:tgenste:t.n i.n tbJ.s regard,

adding that language ls the form through. which experience ls
revealed.

Tb.is revelation of e:aperl•ce one calla knowledge.

J.C.nowledge 1 vb.icb. la vbat ia to be connunleated, constitutes the
form, tG.ile experlea.ce le the content.

COgn1tlon 1 or understand•

ing 1 for Schlick, la tb.e process of eatabliehing a

1

correapondenctl

between facts and •Jlllbola, or *4t la the . . . . , between the con•

tent and the form of experlence.24

To deteral.fte Che truth of a

proposition, one must reduce it to its c011ponenta, and elUUld.Ae
these sl.ngly.

They are true, 1n turn, if they ean be lanedlately

caapared with reality 1 1.e. wltb. the data of experience.

For the

empiricists of the Vienna Circle, the aimpleat possible aentenQ)te,
upon which scientific discourse can be f ounded 1 are those which

describe directly ae.n.ae perceptions like red, warm, deflected to

the left, etc.

Suell etatmaenta were called "protocol aeit.tences."

But it aoo.n became obvl.oua that there was always, even l.n such
simple protocol atatmranta, an element of subjective lnterpreta•
tion that waa bothersome to a strict emp1r1c1at.

Thia point

remained a source of contention 1n the Vienna group.
23wtttgenste1n' a lleaa are a'8Mr1zed 1n Hartnack • s book,
JAttgWSIWl MS MgdlfQ Pb.l.'21cmilYt .ia• Q.;,.

24ct. v. Kraft, i;ae YI.MAI

"*''-'•
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Rudolf carnap decided tbat it awat be a •tter of co.nventicm Where to draw tb.e line in tbi.a process of reducing language
to aense-data.

la

Carnap's worda 1 -There are no absolutely basic

sentence• in the construction of act.e.nce.•25 How far back ought
o.oe to go 1 in eatablial:U.ng tbe grouada for: ver1ficat1ont

Schlick

suggested that atateMDts wb.ich could '8 uaed to derive future

predictions of eventa are aatiafactorily certain, if they can be
contirmed by protocol atat..,.ts of the form,
occurring here and now. 1

1 Such

and

such is

'l'hla idea too•• promptly criticised

for I.ta appareAt au1>Ject1vi.ty.

Karl Popper, for example, asked

how one could hope to eatabli.ah a acientif lc law, if all certainty
involves the 'here and AOW 1 type of atateanen.t 1 w.hicb. muat be
repeated over and oves: for ner:y different experlmenter. Diacua•

ai.D.g this, Victor r.r:atc• ano'Cber member ot Che group, says,
All empirical knowledge consists 1.n the formula•
tioa of hypotheses wbicb. al.ways u. UJ:gad tile g1vu 1

always a.aaert more than the latter, even if they are

aiagular atatame.nt:a. H71>0Cbeaea are not verified
once and for all by obaervationa Mtecedent to their
formu.J.atioa 1 but tbey •l•Y•.have to be confirmed by
subsequent teats. Tb..elr verification depends upon
co~eapondence with !tteraubjectlvely acceptable
observation-reports.
lihat was needed waa a way of eatablisbJ.ng universal state•

ment•• such aa the laws of acie.nce, whicbt on the one band, are
2SIWNJ'8il 3 1 209 1 cited in

26tg YieAM Qi&slit• 131.

TAI YitmlA QU'sLth 119.
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not exbauated by a 'finite maber of caaea' of observation, but
d:licht on the other band, yield predictions about actual future

eventa.

Of courae tb.1• mean.a that there would be

their validity for all time.

It vaa

C&rtl&p

AO

way to prove

who worked to estab•

Lish the validity of such •unrestricted un1versals.•

One of

car.nap•a efforts in th.is respect was to clarify the mea.n1.ng of
induction, on the baaia of probabll.1ty.

'llli• topic will be d.is•

cussed below, la Q\apter: Vl.

Rudolf Car.nap moved to Vienna 1n 1926, under Schl1ck 1 s
perauaat.on.

He bad received hi.a Doctorate at Je.na ln 1921, after

a period of atud7 that was i.nterrupted by World war 1.
Carnap published

R& ld!ll.IW AUOl'I de Welt

tur:e of 1:b.e World).

(Tbe

lA 1928

Logical Struc:•

Frank eaya that the Vlenna group conaider:ed

tlU.• Mok to be the s;vntbeala of Mach ud Polncare for vb.leh they

•Y••

been searching. 0 carnap•" Frank
"gave the new phi~
ita 'claaaical sbape.• He col.ned many of I.ts terms and phrases

had

a.nd

endowed it with a aubtleq and ai.mplicity.

ln the form

created by car.nap it became a center of interest and a target of
attack on a large acale.•27

Perhaps the explanation of Carnap'• laportuce 1n the
Vl.enna movement is Che breadth of his vine.

He waa able to eyn•

tb.aai.Ze ideas that bad ae..ct to be at odd•• becauae his attitude
was baalcal.17 pragmatic.

Frank AOtea thla la several places.

lt
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tells ws that Frank. always recognilled Che probl•• attendallt upon

too pure a theoretical viev.

It: baa been not:ed above t:b.at Carnap

was willing t:o admit terms of unrestricted universality, so long
as they could lead to obaenabl••·
by Fraftkt

caraap•a view ia paraphrased

tbua,

'l'he world 1• to be described by statements that
may contat..n any ..,.-.Ol•t pro\'lded that fr• them
statements can be logically derived that contain noth•
lng but assertions about aimllarlt:y betweea sense
1mpreaa1ona. ••• When 1 read this book (Frank continues) it reminded • atrOAglJ' of WU11am Jamea•
pragmatic requirement that the mea.n!.ng of any statement la given by ita 1cash vatue,• t:b.at la, by wbat
lt means as a direction for human behavior. I wrote
lmnedlately to Carnap. •••
vaa aa aatoniahitlg
to him as it bad bean to me.

2lJ1•

The expreaalon •a dlrectloa for b.Ull&D behavior• 1n tb.e

clt:atlon abo¥e t.s Uluatratlve of the an direction th.at Pr&ftk. 1 a
tbougbt • • taking as be grew away frca the M1n body of Logical

Poeitlvlam.

Thia 11111 be developed furt:Aer below.

Another illustration of Caro.ap•a pragmatl• ls glven ln
Frank'• contr:Lbutlon to 1.hg DlliAlfPhZ pf R.uQQI,( '"8&Rt edited by

P. A. Scb.11pp.

C&rnap dlatlngulab.ed three components 1n any situ-

ation where language ls used:
and the logical.

the pragmatical. the semantical,

1.n. Frank's words• in "any complete theory of

language," there must be first "tb.e action, state and environment
of the speaker (1.e. pragmatical).
28112.W.·

••• Sec:ondly1 there are the
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,."Ord• as element• of a certain 1Lnguiatic ayatem ( sematitlcal) • and
thirdly, th• properties of tbl.ngs to '11b.ich tbe speaker refers when
he uaea a certal.n word (logical).n29
In keepiAg wlt:h their apirlt ot enthusiasm, which promised

the successful emplOJ'lle.Dt of •cientif lc aethod in all area• of

study, including the social and paycb.ological, the Vienna group
started a concerted push to eatabllsh a aingle l&AgUage • a
'thing•language• • to bring a greater sense of unity.

In a rather

extreme effort to keep •tapb.)"alcs from •ci:eeplag SA' to their
thi.nld.ng 1 they

even wat through a period of c1eut..ng out •l.l

terms that nd.gbt admit of 4ft7
idealism.

HA•• of

aubjectlvlty and Checa of

Neuratb 1 eapeclally, wbo did not &bare the same back•

ground 1 and thue Che aame

SJ'B'l>&tb.1'

toward ldeallatic thoup.t as,

say, Sch.lick and Carnap, joklngJ.7 suggestoo an 'index• of prohil:d.t'cl
words, to include uppermost on the list, 'essence,• 'thing,•
•reality,' and •mind.'

This strict view, Frank tells us, which

occurred around 1930 1 was mistakenly viewed by outsiders as a
whole new approach.

Actually, lt was only a 'ch.apter• in the

developmcn~ of logical empiric1sm.30

s. Plt Ynl:U

2(

ISl.IASI HR!IM1t

Frank tell• wa t:tlat Scb11ck &.Dd Carnap expanded the new
29"The Pragmatic Component la carnap•s El:lmination of

Metaphysics," i.n 2Jl•

~·•

160.

30cf. ''Einatei.A, Mach and Logical Positivism," .lr.2£•
276 a.nd Me4Fa isuca IN ' ' ' lAlla••ntD'• 35.

£J&.. •
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positivism into a system • a •general logical basis of human

t.11.ou,shc." '1."hese two came into personal contact with Fraak'a
cronies ot 1:b.e coffee house days, eapect.ally Hahn and Neuratb., but
that bi•

OVA

co.ntac:t• wce 11mlted to vacatiOtl periods.

Undet:

tbe

unifyi.ng leaderehi.p of SCb.llck, the group began to look upon iteelf

aa u agency tor change, eapecially through tbe build-up of a uni·
fied science that would embrace all sciences.

frank says,

ln 1929 1 we bad the feeling tbat from tbe c00pera•
tlo.n that was cencered in Vienna a definite new type
ot pbiloaophy had emerged. As every tather likes to
show photographs of hi• baby, we were loold.ng tor means
of coamwd.catlon. We wanted to present our &rain child
to the world at large, to find out its reaction, and to
receive 1'lew etimulatlo.n.
We decided f lt:'st to publiah a monograph about our
moveme.nc, next, to auaage a meeting, and eventually to
get CGD.t:rol of a philosophical journal so that we would
have a W§Y' of getting the contributions of our group
printed.:11

1n 192 9, a moaor;rapb oa tbe work Of the Vienna group was

written by carnap 1 Hahn and Neuraeb, to bet.rag tbelr tlloughts into

public camllWllcatlon.

1he title of thls work alone •

•s\Mf1ilnlsbl WtlaC11lfC•l'l!IS I

Rel IAMG llt11

(The

W1•119•

Vienna Circle:

lta Scientific WOC'ld-co.neeption) - gives an indication of the
global .nature of it• proponents• views.

(IJ.Ms ktl•) was

!b.e name Viea.na Circle

gi'Va.n t:o the group by Neurath• tlbo felt that it

wouJ.d add a little aa1ea appeal to t:be1r work, 1.n 1:be manner of
the Vienna Woods, or the Viennese Waltz.
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Ln Che same year, 1rl conjunction with a congress of physi•
cists a.nd nt.at:hemat1ctans lihich Frank bad organiaed in tbe .normal
course of his otfice 1 t:he Circle decS.ded to work acme of their

philosophy into the meeting lf poaa1ble.

Accordl.ngly, Frank gave

the ope.a.1.ng paper• on the subject• "Epia<temology of the Exact
Sciences." Connantlng on this debut 1 Prank aaya,
The German Physical Soc1ety 1 which was the
official aponaor of this meeting, did not partlc•
u1arly like the idea of comblning this serious
sci.Mtif ic meeting witb st.ICb. a f 0011.sh t:h1ng aa
philosophy. HOWe'Ver 1 I was the chairman of the
Local committee 1n Prague, and t:b.eq could not refuse my serious wish. ••• This meeting was to be
sponsored by the Ernst Mach Association, wbicb.
..,., the legal orpnl.zati.on of the Vienna Circle,
and the Society lor Empirical Philosophy, which
was organized 1n Berlin, and fo1loued 1A general
the line of B. Reicbenbach.3 2
1he paper wat well received, 1A aplte of acme trepidation

on Frank's part.

••After the meetlnth however," he tell• us,

0

our

ecmmlttee received a great man:r letters fran ac1ent1sts who
expressed their great satiafac:tion th.at an attempt b.as bee.a made

toward a cohere.at world conception Without contradictions between

science and pbilos~."33
The following year• the first volwne of a periodical was
publ1a..'1cd, edited by Carnap and Neurath.

Thia publication,

kiMASOl.lt became tbe mouthpiece of the Vienna 01.rcle until the
32DW,•• 39.
331W,•• 41.
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Frank cltes some of the optimistic lines which

war stopped it.

sc.'llick wrote for the firat 1saue, under: the title, "The Turn in

In t:hat article, Schlick aald, "1 am juat:t.fied, on

Pb.iloaopb.y."

good grounds, i.n regm::ding the sterile conflict of ayatema as
settled.

time, ao I claim 1 po•••••• al.ready the method.a by

OUr

which any co.nfllct of this kiAd i.a rendered auperfluous; vb.at

matters ls only to apply theae methods r:eaolutel.y. 0 34

How ironic

are these hopeful words, when o.oe recalls tbat three years later

Hitler roee to power, and three years after that Schlick was
murdered I
6.

ses:ui am

&'Cbirsat 1gftYtQC01

One of the most notable aspects of the Vienna Circle movement was its view of morality as a language of meaningless proscriptions.

carnap 1 for example, held that the specific content

of value judgments does not admit of theoretical formulation.

ln

&r"8n,G&I Vol. 11 (1931) he says, "The objective validity of a
value or a norm cannot (even 1n the opinion of axiologiata) be
empirically verified or deduced frca empirical propoaitiorua; hence
it cannot even be mea11logfu11.7 aaaerted.n3S

Siad.larly• A. J. A)w1

at Oxford• the leading lrit18h spokesman for Logical Poaitivism•
maintained that ethical etatemente ue .not acatementa at all, but

expressioiis of emotiOA, such as approval. or d1aguat 1 with no
34cited 1n

183.

JJ?.J.4. •

41.

35t:;k.e.n&!t&• 2. 237 1 cited 1A Kraft,

Ibl Viennl

9kcl11
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cognitive content.
Other thi.nkara felt more 8J1Dpathetlc to ethics, and tried
to see whether: they might: not c0tatrlbute eomet:hing to tb.e eatab-

lisbmeAt of a meaningful. moral dlacou:r:ae.

Generally, aucb efforts

have gone no f urtber than dlacOV'ea:ing what a apeaker means when he
make• an ethical atataaent.

That is, ethics among the Analysts

1.s, 1n the more acb.olarly lnataneea, a survey of popular language
usage, and in lase seholarly lnatancea, alllply atl opinion about
what a certain word means.

Schlick., 11.ke tbe otb.ara, felt that there are no criteria
for absolute values.

Nonetheless, he thought that ethics 1• able

to validate everyday ftOr.IDative statements, in scientific terms, by
comparing them to f undame.atal norms vhlcb are accepted by a partic-

ular group.

Of course th9 fund-tals Cbamaelves c:annot be

justified; they are given.

Yet, in Sch1lck1 s opt.n1oa1 eeb.ics CAn

explain theee .nor.as, from the •natural lava ot bebavior:.•36
Victor I.raft auanart.zea Schllck. 1 a ethics as follows,

Scbllck advocates an etht.ca of ld.ndness in con•
traat to an et:b.ica of duty. lt la an etbica of the
'beautiful soul' who deairea from inclination what
the society aeta up aa a duty. 1.'bt.a must be regarded
as a goal, to be approached by the process of evolu•
ti.cm, wlloae attainment la far off 1n the future., ln
the meantime an ethics of duty alone bas practical
algnifleance as tbe past •• well as the present ~ove •
••• ln my 1 theory of value' (Kraft goes on to add) 1
eAdeavor to ab.ow ln detail that bedordam is iaadequate
for the explanation and justification of values. • ••
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There •;• also other equally important aourcea of
value.3
Frank expressed few atatementa tllhich could be interpreted

as lodicating a moral system of hie own.

For tb.e moat part, lt

seems that be remained in the trad1t1on Of Logical Poalt1.v:l.sa With
respect to ethics.

1.'b.at ia to aay 1 it la reasonable to believe

that b.e looked upon moral lnjuactioaa flratt aa aubject1ve 1 and

not derivable fr• experience, and aecondl.y, aa tacts of cultural
llfe which have to be accounted for, and which. have a real effect
on the behavior of those who hold them.

Where Frank probably

differ• from the Vienna Circle is in the degree of recognition and

concern he gtvea t:o moral beliefs, eapecia.lly 1n their role of
directing scientific thought toward good ends.

Like Schlick,

Frank took moral belief a as being given, rather than derivable.

Ria interest was more in the reasonable derivation of behavior,
from the given moral foundation• than in the justification of the
foundation itself.

Rls interest, for example, in the moral

reasons for accepting scientific theories (which we shall exam1ne
more closely in Chapter Vl below) which lncreased to the end of

his life, does not neceaaar111' suggest that Frank had a particular
ethical viewpoint of hla ow.a.

lt seems rather to imply Frank's

bent for viewing all aspects of any issue, vi.th the dispassionate
involvement of a critical judge.

37n.w.•• 185.

Frank's view of morality, then,

so
seems to be cm Che order of a sc1eat1f1c and pb.11osopblca1 l.nves•
tigation of aocieq, rather than a personal caanitment.38
Thi• ls not to

••Yt of com:ae, t:bat Frank, or for that

matter, the rest of the Vt.e.nna group, • • dlaintereated in morality.

theirs was AOt a complete r:elattvl•, as might be auapected.

After a11, the rise of Nazi• between Che World Wars, vlth the
increasing alarm and disgust it inspired in the Vienna Circle
members, must have afforded all of tbet'.ll good cause to entertain

strong moral commitmenta.39
7.

fEMls'I PlrXBllACt frcg

Sat

Th;Hft

2'

L21'4stl f211t;1:y1,ra

Frank's differences with the Vienna Circle movement are not
so much over specific doctrines aa they are a matter of the genaal
approach to science and its meaning.

As

has been poiftted out

above, Frank was a thinker of broad scope, a.ad humani.stic bent.
True, he embraced the primary tenets of the Vienna Circle, namely
their interest t.n acience and logic; and their distaste for unf ou.n.ded

metaphysical spewlatlon.

But he aeems not to have felt

the same revolutionary attitude - the same degree of negativism
towards older thinkers th.at was expressed, for example, by the
writers of the 1929 moaograph 1 and the early lasuea ot Jgkepn1a1ia•
38 1kW·

39f or this reason, one can understand the attacks ai.med at

tb.e C1rcle 1 _*1ch frank MAtiOAs above• auch ••the comnent in
r;o~ci~*'t!'';ualst• 1966, by K. w. Britton, that the Logical

Pos t v ate
Ld to a general undercutting of all ethics but
their own, as being meanl.ngle•• because unverifiable."
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sch1S.ck had aaid 1 for example,

A1l cog.al.tion of the being ls

11

achieved, in principle, by the methOda of the special sciences;
every othe!: kind of ontology la

enapty

talk.n40

Prank does admit to being caugtlt up in the ap1r1t of the

"turn in phiLoaophy," 11blch Schlick bad described.

Tbu.s 1 Frank

writes•
this atroog optimistic feeling la paydlologically
You can ride in a car at high
speed and you do .not feel a.nyth1ng so long as the
•eloclty :.nat.na unchanged. But lf a turn or an acceleration takes place, you experience a strong reaction.
Today the fllO'V'elle{lt of logical poaltlvl• l.a no longer:
t:he f ee11ng of a turn.

so conaplcuoua.41

The degree of objective detachment • call it hiatorlc per•

spect1ve 1 perhaps .. which la evident 1n thia passage lndlcatea to
what degree Frank must have felt b.imaelf to be outside the Vien.aa

Circle movement,,

Of

course it ia difficult to say whether this is

a matter: of a ecte.ntiat•a power of observation, vhlch Frank bad to
a high degree• or truly a teeliftg of personal estrangement.

It

seems llkely that it shows ua a little of both.

Aside from t:h.1• or1gl..na.1 feeling of excitement, however,
Frank did not dew Logical Poaitlvt.• as the last: word to be said

i.n philosophy.

Eapecla111' after lMO, he tried to aynthealze the

new and old world views, just as he bad tr1ed 1 before the advent

4°t:t!!dtFa §S1Mse
41aw.•• 42.

apd '"'

ML212»1U't 41.
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of Schllclc., in the daya of bis coffee house diacuaalona.

tle.dtEG S<;ilAC'

!M

la

ltt ft!i,RIRQV,42 for example, Frau takea

pain• to point out the aim11aritiea among the advocate• of the

older aftd newer forms of positlvi• with which he waa acqualated.

ln diacusaing idea• of meaning and understanding, for inataace, he

suggests that Wittge.nateln, Schlick, Reichenbach, Carnap, and even
Mach are •essentially no differe.a.t 0 in their ideaa.

A suff1ci.ently

broad interpretatlOA 1 Frank goee on to uy, would also bring
Pierce and James into the same language camp wt.th the others.
What this bringa out i• Frank'• concern with ayntheaia, and hi.a

recoga:aition that aay philosophy which conaidera itself to be
totally

DeW 1 and

effort at beat.

totally autficient 1 ia a aalve and flippant
Tb.ere ia reaaon to believe that the early members

of the Vienna Circle proper bad a touch of just this sort of aver•
confidence.
The courses which Frank taught at Harvard are illustrative

of his synthetic approach.

He tells ua about them• thus,

I now put the greatest emphasis on presenting
pbyaica, and acience ifa general, as part of our general
pattern of thinking and acting. 1 presented it on one
hand as a logical syatem that haa to be checked by
physical experimeats and on the other band as one of
the means of expressing man's attitude towards the
wor1d 1 the small world of society &Del politic• and the
large world that is our astronomical wli.verae. Thia
more historical approach has been familiar to me alnce
my atudent: yea.rs from the meetings with my older fr.laada.
All. my paper a written after 1940 f o11ow this line. 43 ·

4211!1d,., 32, 33.
431W,., 51.
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The historical and synthetic viewpoint illustrated by thla
method of teaching distinguishes ita author from the mainstream of
Logical Positivism.

The same viewpoint is further confirmed vb.en

one compares Frank's accounts of the beginnings of the movement
with the accounts of other historians, sucb as R.

J.

o.

Urmson,45 or Victor IC.raft .. 46

w.

Aahby,44

These writers indicate, at

least indirectly by emphasis, that Logical Positivism began in
1922, primarily through the organizing effort of Schlick.
impression Frank gives,

Oft

The

the other hand, ia that Logical Poai•

tiviam developed out of, and was continuous with, the coffee house
meetings that he and his atudent friends started, way back in 1904

It was Frank, Hahn and Neurath who were, 1n. Fra.ok 1 a words, "the
moat active and regular members of our group."4.7

Schlick, Reichen·

bach and Carnap • who are normally associated with the movement -

were not even present at that time.
8..

12.,1.aruption

kl the Sec;;R.nd World

W1£

The Vienna Circle proper wa.s forced to disband suddenly, in
1938 1 although not to the great surprise of its members, some of

"Logie~l Positi~ism 11 in A {(ri;~11 ti£t2ltl of Wesi:em
'tboYIJ!Jit ed. D. J. o Connor, F·ree Press, N. • •
•

1

44ct.

45cf. "Logical Poaltivism" in A CPQq111 ff!!S!&l2ptsJl1 gf
rt11$er13 !1'!"o'flfi r:d PJilo10~0£1, ed. J. o. urmson, Hawthorn
Preas, N. .,
art cle uns gned).
46tbt Vj.MQa

Ci;s;IJt, .22.• Q.£.

47H2dern Sqiegce and 151 Ph~LosgpbY, 1.

whan had left Europe earlier.

Not only the Jews 1 but most llberal

t.ntellectuals as well• felt the pressure of Nazi hatred.

Herbert

Feigl had gone to the Unit•d States ln 1931, and carnap followed
in 1936 - the same year Schlick was murd•rnd in Vienna.

and

N~ur.a.th

Zilse1 1

went to England,

F~lix

"1hil~

Karl Menger 1

IC.urt'

Waiamann

Godel, Edgar

Kaufmann, Riche.re von Mises, Reichenbach and Frank

came to the United States.
'!hp

perio~ical,

~(kgnetn1§ 1

also

call~d

the Js>\!*B!L o(

:Qnif&ed Sclenci?t waa published at the Hague for a few years, but
was soon forced to discontinue altogether.

The lDttr!!!tigna1

!ffisx:cLopts!&a o( Yalt(j,ed §S1t.RSth edited by car.nap, Neurath, and
the American, Cb.arles Morris, which. vas published at Chicago in
1938, could be called a continuation of the

Er!Y¥M:!~il

work.

The members met wt.th a frieadly welcome in the areas they

chose for their new homes.
man,

v. c.

ln America, for instance, P.

w.

Bridg-

Qu.ine, E. Nagel, and Morris helped to bridge the gap

between the old world and the new.

Nevertheless, it must be said

that the movement did not continue in its flower after the War.

This, tor several reasons.

First, the War itself presented a

aiZable stumbling block for most international intellectual
efforts, as the meager number and size of publications during that
time can attest to.

Secondly, some of the basic theses of the

Vie.nna Circle, such as the 'criterion of verifiability,' were seen
by many

people to be untenable.

Thirdly, other Lines of ph1losqlv

were taking shape, p1ck1.ng up some of the leads the Circle had
pointed out.
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Some membera iJ:lclined toward language, some to mathematics
and Logic, some to science, and some to social studiea.48

With

this diversity of interests, it is surprising that the group helci
together as long aa it did.

Any weakening of the group's original

sense of unifying purpose could lead to the aeattering of the memb~rs.

One discovers juat such a loss by comparing the Circle's

earlier and later views on metaphysics.

The pri.ma.ry goal of posi-

tivists had always been to do battle with speculative philosophy.

For those who cair.e to feel metaphysics had been effectively clemo1ished - for example, A. J. Ayer - there was no need for further
d~struction.

Others, such as Frank, began to see in metaphysics

a new interest and meaning, especially in light of the War's moral
catastrophes.

ln either case, the original goal became vague.

Because of the Loss of single-minded purpose, the group of
men who had accomplished so much together became a group of
strong-minded individuals, with valuable and interesting ideas,
yes - but with widely diverse opinions.
of unity died, so did the Vienna Circle.
work, yet it had accomplished much.

When the original sense
It had not finished its

Summing up their contribu-

tion, Victor Kraft says,
The nature of logic and mathematics was clarified,
the relation of logic to language was even revealed for
the first time, and the methods and foundations of

48cf. Danto, A. c., and Harre 1 R., •'The Philosophy of
Science•" in .92• .£3..£•• Vol. VI, 289-~00.
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empirical knowledge were analyzed and clarified with
a thoroughness without precedent. It can.not be denied
that these accomplishments were accompanied by quite a
few oversimplifications and one-side, radical views
which have not yet been entirely superceded. • ••
Imaginative conceptual poetry is surely more interesting
for the average person, and the wisdom of a great personality surely has more significance for human life.
Yet they are subjective, matters of opinion, unverifi•
able. Lacking universal validity, they are matters
personal conviction, but do not represent knowledge.

ZS

ln the remaining Chapters we shall examine what Fr·ank
retained from the thoughts developed within the Vienna Circle, and
where he went beyond these early developments, especially in his
views toward metaphysics, and the sociologlcal aspects of science.

CHAPTF..R 111

FRANK AS A CRITIC OF METAPHYSICS
l.

lllt t1!Saph1sis:1L lnterpretatj,2n gf S5i.eru;e

It was mentioned above (in Chapter I) that Frank c:.onsidered
his post-war views to be distinctly different from his pre-War

views. in respect to metaphysics.

Whereas he had early and effec•

tively stressed that science proper does not support one meta•
physics over another• he became aware of the need to explain why
scientists do, in fact. frequently feel constrained to make such
interpretations.

Many great

scientists - Frank mentions Eddington.

Jeans and Whitehead• among others • have chosen to interpret the
metaphysical 'meaning' of their discoveries.

Although he dis•

agreed with most of these interpretations• Frank came to see them
as a fact of life, which was as real as any fact of physics, and
which theretore needed examination.

L. N. Ridenour summarized the earlier Frank in his reviewl
of

M9<!1;.a is&IASt 11!9 lta UU.&910QQY:,

suggesting that the thesis

of the book is to maintain "there are no significant 'questions
that are so profound that they cannot be solved by the exact
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sciellces.•n2

Ride.nour 1 s paraphrasing is oversimplified.

A

better

picture of Frank's earlier opinion, although perhaps it bad
changed by tb.e time Mode£n

SsJ&ii~I.

yd lta BQlo!!?J?hr was written,

is given in Ridenour 1 s words, frm the same review, "We can erect
a coherent system dealing with all aapacts of human knowledge and
behavior, by the refinement. extension, a.Ad continued application
of the methods which. have been so aucceaaful 1.n the exact sci•
ences."

It is doubtful that Frank ever felt

th~

by themselves, could solve all hum&ll problems.

exact sciences,
However, the

expression, the "application. of the methods" of the exact acienceua

is sufficiently broad to describe Frank'• earlier confiden.ce in
science as a way of thought.

Even so, it emphasizes too much. the

autonODIY' and self •sUfticienq of science as a source of truth.
'Whatever personal confidence Frank may have felt in the methods of
science, he was too DlOderata to use such irrevocable expressions.
In this Qi.apter, aa elsewhere, we ab.all see how Frank fits science

and •scientific method•' 1.nt:o a larger context of human endeavor,
llilhicb.

includes, among other thinga, metapl\7sics, aesthetics, and

religi.0t1.

2.

Mftaehfsics aa Copqgn §Mii
In his book,

Moge;n

~simce

and ltl lflllomhY, Frank aug•

gests there is a tendency, within science as well as without it,
2It is not clear why Mr. Ridenour puts quotes around the
latter half of t:bat sentence. lf it is a quote from Frank, which
1 have not found, it still says nothing about Frank's op1n1on,
since it is an incomplete sentence.
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to become so ac:custcmed to scient1f ic principles that one begins
to Look on them as part of conmotl experience - self-evident• we

might even say • and therefore above question, and beyond experi•
mental testing.

n1 regard metaphysica 1 tt Frank saya, "•• a direct

interpretation of acientif ic prtncip1ea in tei:ma of the language

of everyday life experience. 0 3

'!here ia, of course, a difference

between seeing a connection between the principles of science and
tb.e ideas of common sense, and considering that the former derive

from the latter.

It is our natural tendency - perhaps part and

parcel with the desire to integrate and generalize our knowledge -

to give the supremacy to caanon-aenae interpretatio.na, holding
t':le.m

to be 1ntu1tive 1 and beyond the grasp of experimentation.

,.'lb.is belief," Frank aaya 1 "is the very core of the metaphysical
interpretation of science."4
Two things become evident from this discussion.

First,

Frank's view of metaphysic• as a common•senae interpretation is a
rather narrow use of the word metaphysics.
this point below.

We shall return to

The second thing is that Frank seems to imply

that auch a common-sense approach is inexact, in the best cases,
and leads to dead ends in others.

The use of common-sense meta-

physics, he suggests, is especially

frustrat~d

by contemporary

developments in science, where theoretical principles seem to have

3Mode;n Sci~npe and lts PQiL0190nx, 290.
4DJ&..•• 289.
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retained little or no connection to everyday experience.
~xample,

For

in the case of such modern theories as relativity, quan-

tum mechanic• and the de Broglie wave theory, their only justification is their property of yielding observable facts by means of
chains of logical deductions.
betwc~n

In these cases, the connection

scienti.f ic idea and metaphysical idea is

~ada

by a sort of

correspo.ndence tech.niquo, whose c:ori:ect.nesa is a Uiat:te:: of opinion.
In Frank's words,
Metaphysics attempts a translation of the basic
principles of science, but not according to aatrictly
fixed dictionary; the univocal relation between a
term and lta translation haa been replaced by an an&•
logical relation. But we cannot tell !Y a.ny exact
criterion vb.at ls a •correct• analogy.
Although

thes~

comments, which are in the vein of straight

Logical Positivism• seem to disparage metaphysics for being unscientific, that is not to say that Frank feels metaphysics ghouLd
be scientific.

Whatever he thinks of metaphysics, he recognizes

that it is distinct from the exact sciences.
the 'truth' of metaphysicaL

state~ents

He points out that

could not be dotermined by

scientific methods - experimental criteria especially - or there
would be no difference between the two fields.
a

legitimat~ branc..~

more to support -

3.ills!·.

of

t~~n

290.

knowl~dge

If metaphysics is

• wi11ch view Frank

ca~G mor~

and

its criteria of truth must be, decidod on
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other than experimental grounds.

Frank comnents,

In metaphysics, a statement or a system of statement• is regarded as •true• t.f our coamon senae understands the validity of the principles immediately
without having to draw long chains of conclusions
from these principles and without checking some of
these conclusions against our observations.
Certainly• men like Einstein and Schrodinger
advanced their prl.ncip1ea by following acme require•
ments of simplicity or beauty which may also be
regarded as requirements of commo.n aenae. But they
would never claim that the validity of the prillciples
could be proved without checking the conclusions
c:
drawn from these principles by physical experiments.j

ln actual practice, the effort to find a common•aenae intEl'pretation for scientific principles consists usually in translat•
ing the ideas of current science into the lacguage of an older
science that bas become ao well established • such a common part
of everyday thought • that its truths are held to be intuitively
obvious.

This tb.eaia is developed further ln fhi&910RV 9f Sei•

tSSI • p!.e Link »ttxl!i!B

isleace •IS

l!Jlilo19PJJY, which lncorpor•

ates the ideas Frank. developed after writing

1;1 ftl11Ql2Pb.f.

HUSO

Sc1f:9S1 !QSl

In the later book 1 Frank contitmea toward the

goal he aet in the earlier work, namely, "to break through the
wall which bas separated acle.nce and philosophy for about one and
one•hal f centuries. •t6

5lJ?.1d• I 2 96 •

61.W.·. 6.
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3.

Sbi{; &n EraQls'a Y1!!fs

I~e

As Frank himself tells ua, hia work took a shift in emphasis after 1947, towards a more generoua attitude with regard to
metaphysics.

lf we compare some statements from t122•rn sca:eoce

yd It1 fb.!.Lo1gaz, vl'lich was written in the ma:Ln before 1947,
with other statements from eQl,l21ARbz 2( SSit!!St • T!le L!nk

Dttwe1n §S&MCI

yd

fbl.Luosmr, which was published in 1957,

we

shall get a clearer view of thia shift.
In addition to the ideas from Frank's earlier work, outlined in the section above, we add the following two statements
by

way of suanary.

Frank says, "What we call in a vague way

•common sense• is actually an older system of science which was
dropped because new discoveries demanded a new conceptual acheine,

a new language of science.n7

And again, from the final pages of

the same work, "The metaphysical interpretation ia actually a

particular kind of sema.ntlcaL approach.; it is a translation into
common.•aense 1anguage.n8

The tone of these statements is remin-

iacent of Logical Poeit1vism • the belief that ph1loaoph1cal problema are, at bottom, language problems; one need only express them
in more exact terma, and then analyze them by critical logical

means, in order to work them out.
In the later book, Frank takes a broader view of the phil•

71.W.·· 301.
8

iw.•• 300.

63

osophy of science, as well as expressing himself in more general
language.

The Vienna Circle terminology is no longer evident.

For example• in the preface to the book, Frank writes, **In this
book we attempt to start from the way in which science is under•
stood by the scientist in his most creative and critical moods.n9
Thtl\

term ttcraative" here is especially indicative of the author's

turn toward the subjective elements that characterizes his later
views.

No tonger do his ideas suggest the apparent fe$ling that

one can eliminate as meaningless all psychological and sociological factors that impinge on the scientist's life.
done

!o. vacQ!O.

Science is not

Th.ere is a context for scientific work• which must

be accounted for; pure theory - that ia, theory that has

D2 con-

nection with human needs - la as impossible aa lt is useless.
Underscoring this, Frank says,

•we

need to complement the science

of physical nature by the science of man.•10
science is not self-directing.

In other words,

It is a tool whose usefulness is

determined by the one who employs 1t.

lf science shows, for

example, how to destroy, it also shows how to preserve.

In

Frank's vords 1 "Bluntly speaking, science proper provides us with
tb.e technical means by which we can produce the weapons to def eat
tb.e enemy, but the philosophic interpretations of science can dir-

ect man in such a way that he makes actual use of the weapons.nil

012eax. ~~::~~~-~i. 5~!~::~od~c11ti! R~';Br~!;:01:.1.Qd
9

1o111Ml.. , xiv.
11~•• 19.

l:lliL-
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lt is clear, from all of these examples, that Frank does
not consider philosophy to be equated with logic, or reasoning

processes.

The Latter belong to science proper just as much as to

philosophy.

Rathert he is tryi.ng to emphasize the pragmatic• and

nwnanistic 1 use that science performs.

In a sense, this use

transcends the scientist qua scientist, placing him in a broader
perspective, in relation to all human endeavor.

Thia more human•

istic view tries especially to show the coanOA sea.ae .meaning of
science, not as a prostitution, but as a legitimate way of main•
taining goala.12
Frank has often been miaUAderstood, in respect to his
though.ta about philosophy ud its leg11:iaacy.
suffice here to illustrate.

OWe.n

One

example may

Potter, commenting on Frank's

paper of 1950 entitled "Metapb.yalcal Interpretations of Science,•
gives an utterly false 1.anpreasion by quoting Frank out of context.
Re claims that Frank considers philosophy to be the •metaphysical
interpretation of science.• This view, Potter says, "must partly
be ascribed to Frank's conviction that . .taphysics ia meani.ngleaa:
1

1f ve apply to metapb.yaica the criteria of truth which have been

generally accepted in modern science, ve ca.n conclude, on good
grounds, that tenet• of metaphysics ••• are neither true nor

falae 1 but me&Aingleaa.•

•it ia the purpose of thia

Note,~

Potter

continues, "to draw atteAtion once again to the fact that the

12"Rote oa Philipp Frank's Interpretation Of Sciencet"
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 2: 5, May 195 •

58-60.
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criterion of truth by which metaphyslca 1• reduced to meaningless-

ness is itself metaphysical, in wb.lcb. case Dr. Frank'• interpretation must be treated with some reserve."
In response to this cr1ticiam, one can do no better than to

cite Frank's comments in full.er form, and let the reader aee the
differe.nce.

F"ra..nk says,

If we apply to metaphysics the criteria of truth
wbicfl nave been accepted generally in modern science,

we can conclude• on good grounds, that tenets of metaphysics (e.g. reality of the external world, mental
character of the universe, etc.) are neither true nor
false, but meaningless. Although this argument can
hardly be refuted, the interest in metaphysics has
abated very little. It is claimed that the concept of
truth which has been accepted by science does not provide tile on.Ly valuable kind of truth. Metapl'lysica may
be meaningless for tl'le scientist •as a scientist•, but
may be of the high.est value for human life.13
Frank goes on 1 in this article, to give a brief history of
the relation between metaphysica and science.
:nany notable scientists favor metaphysics.

He points out that

Planck, for example,

was one who "believed sb:ongly in a metaphysical interpretation
of science. •14

F'rank suggests that there is a two-fold practical

use for metaphysics - as an interpretation of science into comnon
sense terms, and as a guide for human conduct.
there

hav~

He also notes that

been two ways of reuniting science and philosophy.

13"Metaphysical Interpretations of Science," friti11J ,zou;-

fo' th£ rn&1010P!'U: 2f
14Dis!,•• 62.

~s~eas@

1: 1,

May,

1950, 6 •
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Whitehead, Sartre, Heidegger and Bergaon represent the effort to
build a new metaphysics.

The pos1t1vista, on the other band, try

to jol.n metaphysics atld science by 1clentiflc method and. language.
Finally, Frank concludes, "If we regard metaphysics, as is suggested 1n th.is paper, as a short cut between science and common

sense, we acquire a new perspective of human thought in the. past
and the present. 0 15

Clearly there is no one-sided positivism in

these remarks.
The metaphysician mignt wish to look upon the subject of
nis studies as somehow more elevated than Frank's common-sensical
view suggests it is.

The metaphysician seeks to find .necessary

truth, as opposed to the temporal and co.ntlnge.nt sense-oriented
ideas of science.

Yet it muat be admitted that metaphysics ought

somehow to relate to human experience, or it ls, l.n fact, meaning•
Leas.

It is just this relation to experience which Frank points

out so nicely 1 as being primarily commonaens1cal or intuitive.
Metaphysical discussions start from ideas that are meant to
be self •evident.

Yet the very fact that such discussions seldom

resolve conflict suggests that self-evidence is not so easy to
attain.

It cannot Lie solely 1n observable empirical data 1 which

are the groundlng of science 1 nor can lt lie in the axioms of
Logic or mathanat1ca 1 which are purely formal, and therefore un•
related to reality.

1SU!1sl•t 90.

What is left, but common sense, or intuition?
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of course this foundation i• unsatiafyingly vague and difficult to
define.

But Frank is generous enough to point out that the faun•

dations of science, too• and even mathematical systems like geometry, are lik.ewiae vague.16
4.

Ihe gnaw

tha;

Link;1 sea.inst !!)d

rQi~osophY

Frank says there is a natural chain that links science to
philosophy • a chain that bas been broken a.nd needs reestablishment.

One end of this chain is anchored• as it veret to direct

observation of facts; the other to generalities called
gible principles.•

1

1ntelli·

Frank describes the chain• thus,

We have along tbe chain statements of various
degrees of generality. On the one hand, statements
of fact; on the other, general principles that are
clear and intelligible in themselves. Between these,
we have statements of intermediate generality - aun•s
Laws, Newton's law of gravitation, the laws of electrody.namics, Mendel'• 1awa of ber:edity - not intelli•
gible by themselves, but useful theories.
This distinction ia obviously connected with the
double criterion for belief. If we bave statements
of intermediate generality - laws of pb.yaica, for
instance - why do we believe that they are true? In
science we use the criterion of truth 1 which requires
that we ca.n derive from theae laws facta which are in
agreement with ex.perieAce. We say that the law is
confirmed by experience. As we have mentioned, S.t is
false to say tbat theae laws of intermediate generality are ever 'proved' by experiment, or worse, that
they can be 'derived from the facts.• one can derive
a statement only from a more ge.o7ral statement, never
from one vblch is leas general.I

16cf., for exampl.e 1 •Geometry, An Example of a Science, 0
Chapter 111 in Philosoph:r of Sclssmce: T!!t L~ 11£.Yeen sciencft.
and PhiL012Dhy.
17fq1Lq~ophr

of Sciegce, 22.
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Thi.a last sentence i.a of prim.a.ry importance,

It goes dir-

ectly against the popular conception of poaitivlsm, and ties Frank
into a broader tradition that includes Aristotle, Aquinas, and
Kant• among others, whom he studied at length, and frequently

one

cites in support of his ideas.

must add, however, that Frank

does not suggest Positivism is guilty of the view that general
theories derive strictly from observations.

He notes tht!t even

Comte knew that one must start from theories to observe order.

ln fact, Comte accepted the .need for religious prl..aciples to get
the ball rollt.ng.18

General statements are, Frank aaya, na pro-

duct of the human mind; this process may be called induction,
inductive guessing, imagination.

1.n any case, it is not logical

derlvatlon.nl9

As we noted above,
la baaed on 'facts•.

ODe

eftd of the phl.1osophy•sc1en.ce cl\ain

Frank notes, first of allt that what the

scientist actually observes are such tb.1.nge as scintillations on
a counter, deflections of a needle, and liquid levels in a tube.20
'What the scientist infers from these observations about the nature

of the W'ldorlying causes is another tl\1.ng altogether, and is ope.n
to question.

There is always a certain mental element in science,

18cf. "Einstein, Hach and Logical Poaltivlam,u in 6&.btES
r~~f!e:yu
Dll101opb.pr•St;Ja1Atl:s,, ed. P. A. SchilPPt Tudor, N. Y. t

19fb,10fOpbir 2f isitRC!t 22.
20.il!J.sl., 6.
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cvfzn at the most basic: level.

Kant tried to a.haw that one never

nas a direct knowledge of •reality•, even though he himself
believed th.at Newtonian science was true - in fact 1 necessarily
true.

What one observes 1 Kant suggested, is determined by the

innate ordering capability of the human mind - not by the thingin-itaelf which is the underlying cause of our sense-experience.
The Latter is beyond the reach. of human knowledge.
Another point that Frank frequently makes against the •pure
empiricists' is this:

If the best scientific theory were the one

which ahoutd confirm all observations, then a simple catalogue of

data - a List of observables - would constitute the most perfect
sc:ience.21

But clearly such. a view would be no science at all.

Theories of this form would be as complex as what they purported
to explain; they would be useless.
simplicity in science.

There must be an element of

This idea will be considered again in

Ch.apter Vl, under the topic of acceptance of theories.

Modern science has come more and more to

disr~gard

the

question of 'rea11ty 1 1 calling it an. irrelevant metaphysical consideration.

Frank comments on this, as follows:

The other end of the chain comes from the longing
to know 1why'. Science does not telt us 'why'; it only
answers questions concerning what happens, not 1why 1 it
happens. This longing to find out 'why' is nothing
more than the Longing to derive scientific statements
from general principle• th.at are plawd.ble and intelli•
gible. Such a Longing stems from the belief that there

70
are euch prl.nciples. There have been., of course, a
great many opinions about tne criteria for what is
plausible and intcllig1ble.2Z
How was the sclence-philoaophy chain ruptured?

ln ancient

and medieval times, science was an off-shoot of philosophy.

Thus,

for example, a philosopher such aa Aristotle might aay that all
matter seeks its natural place, whlch is down, so that bodies fall,

while fire, which is immaterial, seeks its natural place in heaven,
and thua rises.

Or one might believe, for another example, that

the moat perfect motion, because the simplest, is a circle, so the

planets, which are perfect, must d$acrlbe circular orbits.
With this ancient kind of •science•, there was little con•
cern with testing hypotheses by careful measurement.

Not that

careful measurement was beyond the reach of scientists.
measurement and

~ata

Rather,

gathering was thought to be the work of

artisans and mechanics • beneath the station of philosopherscientists who constructed theories.

In this regard, Frank cites

A. N. Whitehead, thus,

All the world over (tiltlitehead says) and at all
times there have been practical. men, absorbed in
irreducible and stubborn facts; all the world over
and at all times there have been men of philosophic
temperament, who have brn absorbed in the weaving
of general prlnciplea.2

22.lJ!W., 23.
23s~ilnce and th' l:loderg World, ~1acmillan, 1925, cited in

fb.1Losopni

o seienc1,!:
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Frank expands this idea of Whitehead, in these words,
We might say that the 'lower' strata collected
facts while the 1 higher-ups 1 advanced principles.
Contact between the two types of knowledge was discow:aged by aoc:i.al cu.atom. If a man of high social
statue atte.mpted to apply his 'philosophy' or 'science'
to technical problems, he was aeverly cr1t1zed.
Experimental testing of general principles requires
manual labor, which wae regarded by the ancient Greeks
as the appropriate occupation of slaves but not of
free men.24

However, the people at the technical end became interested
in deriving their own theories to e..xplain their observations.
They were unwilling to take a back place with respect to the phil•
osophers.

Frank continues,

From about the year 1600, however, science became
more pretentious; it wanted to derive practical mechanics from theoretical mechanics. Then the chain split
in the middle. From the principles of intermediate
generality, the physical laws, observed facts could be
derived. 11ScientistaH were no longer interested
whether the physical laws ~Qu.ld be derived from prin•
ciples of high generality.2'
Because they have discovered that science can proceed directly, for the most part, from these principles of intermediate
generality to observables, many scientists have come to feel that
it is useless to bother looki.ng for a>•ca.lled 'first principles•.

Yet, as Frank points out, there is always the hope to find the

24tni12s2ahx of ssience, 26.
25~•• 28.
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most universal law - tb& ovei:all ge.neral1ty - that explains the
world.

"The dream of science ia to derive all facts from one

principle. tt26

From the purely acie.ntif ic poi.at of v1ew, one may not care
whether or not the principles one uaea are

1

ia.te111g1ble 1 , but

only whether from them one can derive obeer:vablea, by meana of
suitable semantical rules, o.r: 'operational definition•'• aa they
are commo.o.ly called.

However, Frank wazne, 11.By taking this gen-

eral scielltific pol.nt of vtev, we have disregarded a large part of
our chaln.u

Thia philosophical part of the chain 1.nvolvea state-

ment• that cannot be checked by direct observation, but vb.lch
should not, nevertheless, be dlaregarded.

"Such statement• have

just as practical reaulta aa the scientific onea; they have a
direct effect on buma.n beb.avior.•27

6.

'lllt

~HI

2( MeS1ar11i21

There is a danger in the desire to interpret scientif lc
statements by means of philosophical ones, even though the latter
seem to come closer: to coanon sense.

ln Cb.apter• IV and V below,

we sh.all dlscuas some of the abuses tb.at thia effort has p11ed
onto modern science.

\!hi.le it is true, as Frank says, that "in a

way, philosophy ls nearer to common aense than science," and that
"the more science had advanced into the theoretical field, the

26JJ!Jr.s!.. ' 42 •
27~•• 37.
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more remote from common aenae ita ge.neral principle• bave be•
come,u28 science must often free itself from its metaphysical context in order to advance.

"lt la a matter of fact,• Frank notes,

"that tbe advance 1n science haa consisted to a large extent in

the replacement of the common•aeaae world by a world of abstract
symbols."

He continues, "If

we vant to

formulate general prin•

ciples from which a wide range of observable facts can be derived,
we

muat discard the language of

COBIDOA

sense, and make use of a

more abstract terminology.*'29
Metaphysical ayatema can retard science by claiming that
new ideas are foreign to what is accepted as true in common experience.

One can aee the groundlessness of this view 1 if one con-

siders that ac1entif ic theories which at OAe time were considered
to be revolutionary, from tbe philosophical or common-aenaical
viewpoint, have become so well established by use that they come
to be looked o.n: themselves as common-senaical.

Then they, in tum,

are held up as criteria by Which to judge newer theories.

Newtm's

laws, for instance, are widely regarded today as intuitively ob-

vious.

However, at tbe time when organism.le cosmology vaa popular,

Newton's laws were considered to be totally contrary to intuition.
Similarly, it ia the appare.nt: aelf•evide.ace of Newton'• laws today
which male.ea it difficult for one to f ee1 com.f ortabte about con28~•• 44.

29,lW.•• 45.
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temporary scientific theories like 1·elativ1ty, and quantum mech•
anica.
Bearing these tblAgs ln mind 1 OAe can appreciate why Frank

seems to view metaphysics as a mixed blessing.

On

the .negative

side 1 it causes sluggishness in pure aciance; on the positive side,
it helps to direct and stabilize the work that acience does.

What-

ever may be the personal tastes of a particular scientist for
metaphysics, metapbyaics is a fact of human life, and tells some•
thing about human nature.

For tbt.a reason, no dignified scientist

can fall to take note of it.
7.

lb.!, Y•L\W

2' Httapb.lsts1

Frank does not make an explicit judgment about the value of
the two•f old science-metaphysics chain of human endeavor that he
describes.

Instead, be clarifies it, ln the following summary

statement,
The scientific way (via mathematical derivation
and experimental verification) is often a very long one.
Therefore man requires a way by which these principles
become directly plausible; this means a way by which
they can be connected with common sense by a 1 short
c1reuit 1 ••• Philosophy introduces into science some•
thing in which the sc:l.entist •as a scientist• h.as no
interest. As a matter of fact, the scientist is also
human and has his weaknesses. 1f one may call this
requiring that tbe general principles of science be
plausible in themselves a weakness.30

30~ •• 47.
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In this Chapter, it h.as been shown in what way Frank's
vietfs on metaphysics and common sense have developed after the
second World War.

Che may say that they represent a Liberalizing

of the strictly positivistie faith in science alone to snow the
way to hut&an aC.va_l"lcement, and that uaetaphysics, because it is

beyond direct co11firmation, is •me.aningless• at best, and harmful

at worst.

This is not to say, by any stretch of the imagination,

that Franl<. became

sOiile:

sort of .myatic 1 or even romantic.

He never

gives the impression that intuitive thinking is to be exalted
above the methodology of experimental sciemce.

However, it does

show ua how Frank as a philosopher Lncreased in scope, and to that
degree how he came much cloaer to a true picture of the part science plays 1n human endeavors generally.

The following chapters

undertake to examine what ia perhaps Frank'• greatest forte:

his

ability to see through the metaphysical miainterpretationsof scientific theory, to the real meaning and nature of science itself.

Ml:>lNTERPRETATlONS OF QUANI'UM fHEORY

I.

Q~tum

Mechanic1

Although quantum mechanics postdates relativity theory by
two decades, it developed from work which was done in electromagnetic theory before the end of the nineteenth centw.:·y.

Max-

well 1 s theories to describe electromagnetic phenomena wert"' originally

exp~cted

to support Newtonian mechanics, although he employed

a wholly different mathematical technique.
to link his theories to

N~wtonian

models.

Maxwell himself tried
But it was soon dis-

covered that the two areas failed to jibe well with respect to
experimental evidence.

H. Hertz said outright that there was no

sense in trying to justify Maxwell's equations in terms of other
theories; the laws of electrodynamics~ Maxwell's equations.l

Frank points this out as one of the breaking points of th.e strong
belief in Newtonian science.

He adds that ther:e was a period dur-

ing which a dual interpretation was allowed - a mechanical world,
explained by Newton's Laws, and a world of ether phenomena, including Maxwell's descriptions of electro-magnetism.

But this

could not last.

let. Philosophy of Science;
PhilosoRhY, l~O.
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The Link Between Scieece and

77
In 1890, J. J. Thomson showed tnat a particle of very small
m~chanical

mass might possess a tremendous inertia. if its spp,ed

or electrical charge were sufficiently Large.
continuf>s,

0

"Later on. u F'rank

one ventured the hypothesis that there might not be

any real mass at all, and that inertia was a phenomenon of the
electromagnetic field.

From this hypothesis the great Dutch phy-

sicist, Hendrik A. Lorentz, derived that the apparent mass of a
particle increases with its speed and increases beyond all limits
if the speed approaches the speed of light."2
This idea, that the apparent mass of a particle seemed to
change, was an upsetting idea for those who were completely sold
on the validity of Newtonian mechanics - especially those who gave
the latter the. support of common-sensical or even metaphysical

necessity.
~xperimental

Yet the theories indicating such a mass change led to
derivatives more in accord with observation than

those which held for the constancy of mass.

This does not mean

that it is true to say mass changes, and false to say it does not.
Physical theories do not speak of truth• in the
strating the natw::e of •reality•.

s~nse

of demon-

Frank puts it this way,

The correct way of describing the situation is
approximately as follows: The operational definition
of mass which nas been used in Newtonian mechanics loses
its usefulness and must be dropped. In order to keep
up the continuity of physical science, we introduce
2~ •• 131.

I'
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again a term

1 inass,'

which is defined by an opera-

tional definition which cannot be identical wi~h the
definition of tnass used in Newton's .mechanics.
Besides the problems of very small masses changing, quanttun
theory al.so involves a view of th.€1 motion of small bodies that is
called the 'uncet'tainty principle', which was first given a formulation by Werne.:r: Heisenberg, in 1927.4

He maintained that the

product of the uncertainties for coordinate and

mom~ntum

of a

particle is a constant:
A 1C. • .6p • h.

We shall discuss this theory further below.

However, for the

present, we would note t:hat the constant (h) in the formulation
above is the sa.rne constant that Hails Bohr discovered in relation

to the permissible orbits of electrons in the so-called Bohr atom,5
and the same constant that enters into the quantized picture of
black-body radiation, and the photo-electric effect studied by
Philipp Lenard,6 i.n which Light appears to radiate in packets of
discrete energy (E)• of the form:
frequency).

E • hf (where

'f'

is the light

The constant {h) bears the name P1.anck 1 s Constant•

3l.J2.is!.. 146.
4cf. Zeitschfift fw; !:,hv1rd·!s 43 • 1927.

Set. f!liLosofhicai ~~=~ 26, 1913, in t..~ree papers
(Frank's r~ferencen Pfi
Sciepce, 373, Chapter 8,
Note 18).

i<(o

of

6cf. Annalen de' fbY•i~ 8, 1902 for Lenard's experiment
(Frank's reference ln fb\LosoRl}y of Scienc1 1 373, Chapter 8,
Note 14).
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after Max Planck. 1 who proposed what Frank calls "the most revolutionary hypothesis of the twentiety century".7

It was Planck who

suggested, in 1901 1 the •quantum b.ypotb.ee1a 1 1 namely, tbat there
is a minimum quantity of energy.a
Bohr himaelf developed an idea similar to the uncertainty
principle, which ls somewhat broader

i..n.

application.

Noting that

one can set up experimental conditions in order to determine
either the position of a particle, or it• momentum 1 but not both
in the same experiment, Bohr gaaerali.zed Heisenberg's principle
thus:

"Evidence obtained under different experimental conditions

cannot be comprehended within a a1ngle p1cture 1 but must be

regarded aa COCl2).f!1.1At1£X in the aenae th.at only the totality of
the phenomena exh.auate the possible information about the ob•

jects."9

The problems of language abuse is one that has been of

paramount concern, among the positivists of the Vienna Circle, and
more recently among the so-called Analysts, especially in Engtand
and

America.

Wittgenstein had early auggeated that moat philos-

ophical problems are paeudo-problema which would disappear aa soon

7EBito12pbx 2£ s51ense. 153.
8cf. ~iii d& w1~4, 1901 1 553 (Frank's reference in

fbi1010PbY gSC~~

; C pter 6 1 Note S),

9ctted in AlbfE; Ej..npte1n:

Schilpp, 220.

Ph1\01gph1r-sc11n5iftt ed.

80
as their origin was discovered to lie 1.n the inappropriate use of
words.

Following this up, Neurath and carnap pus'1ed for the em-

ployment of a

1 phyalcalist 1

language to eliminate confusion and to

unify a11 the sciences, including the social.

Carnap, for example,

held that the confusion that haa surrOW'lded the meaning of quantum
theory

11

alwaya arises from the material mode of speech.•

One such

point of confuslo.n occurred, for inatance, ln J. J. Thomson's dis•
cuaaiona about electron charges, which included the terms "real
mass" and "apparent mass".

Frank suggests, "(T)he miainterpreta•

tion can therefore be avoided only if one tries to set up a direct
short circuit between the physical principle and the moral prln•
cipLe,nlO which might be done through the u•e of a consistent
1

phya1ca1iat 1 language.
Frank discuaaea the tendeJtcy - an "unfulfilled longing", he

calla lt - to bring back the old unity between science and philosophy.
Through the work of Galileo and Newton, anthropomorphic medieval phyaica • • expelled from conacioue
intellectual life. There rema1ned 1 however, an unfulfilled longing to bring about the unity of animate and
inanimate nature which had been present in medieval
physics but was missing in the newer physlca. There
was left only one problem, for vhich no satisfactory
solution could be envisaged: to understand the processes of life in terms of phyaics. For that was the
necessary condition for a unified conception of phy-
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sics, which had fitted in ao well with the vitaliat
conception of Life.11
One manifestat1on of this longing to unify physical an.d
animate nature 1s the effort to see in quantum mechanics certain
proofs of the underlying spirituality of nature.
to note at the

It is important

same time that Frank does not recognize

any cor-

responding effort to develop a purely materialistic metapb.yslcs.
That ls, if materialism is considered aa "the belief that all
processes of nature can be reduced to the 1awa of Newtonian mech•
anica, then this ia not a philosophic principle, but a physical
hypotbesia.•12
lf science ls to advance, and avoid. the linguistic pitfalls

of traditional metaphysics, l.t must maintain the moat exact and
unambiguious terminology possible.
psychology and a

1

To this end, "A 'soulless'

matterless 1 physics have been established as

parts of 'Unified Science•.

Words like •matter' a.ad

1

mind 1 are

left to the language ot everyday life where they have their legit•
imate place and are underatood by the famous •man in the street•
unambiguoualy.•13

lf 1 as experiments confirm, masa can seem to disappear,

11JJ!.Wi., 159.
12~ •• 160.
~

13cf. "Man Confronts FU..mself," s1i;urday geview of \.i;e&:a•
41, October 25, 1958, 20-21.
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does this not indicate that the mater1alS.atie view of .nature ia
false?

Does one not aee strOAg evidence that reality is ianater•

ial - that it :ls energy and apir:ltf

Frank says no.

He warns that

such anti-ma.terialiat:lc i.nterpretat:lona are not from science, but
from what he calls the "humanized or popularized formulation of
these resulta. 0 13
Frank discusses several men vb.o hold to the views that he

criticizes here.

Bernard Bavink. 1 for instance, wrote a book in

1933 whose title alone, ti!J!Ykl& §gj,ence on 5bft P1Q tg &tla&aion•
suggests the view in question.

Another phyaici•t· J.

bas put forth aimil.ar ideaa 1 1n his books,
and

IM litm llSWW!¥1

fi'....Ss:;lata£t.

Iat

a.

Jeana,

tJ.Yt5fii2P! YQiYIR't

He suggests that "Today there

is a wide meaeure of agreement, wh1cb.

Oft

the physical side of sci•

ence approaches almost to unanimity 1 that the atJ:eam of knowledge
is headi.ng towarda a .oomoecbanica.L rulity; the universe begi.n.a to
look more like a great thOUgb.t than 11.ke a great mac:hintt.

Mind no

Longer appears a.a an accidental intruder into the realm of mat•
ter.ul4

Still another physicist. A.

s.

Eddington, has voiced com•

parable opi.nions, in hia book1 TQ.! l!U!Ee o( 1iQe fl\Y1jgc41

H2£ld·

Tb.ese men al1 seem to feel that the twe.clt1eth century has
destroyed the mechanistic model of the world 1.n favor of a math•
ematica.1 1 and therefore a more

numan 1

model.

But a clear look at

the historical de'\relopme.nt of the old mechanics will show the

r
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error of th.ls belief.

Frank reminds his readers frequently that

11 wton•s Laws are also a mathematical system.

lt is only because

tney deal with events that are close to everyday experie.nce that
th.eY have received such. a high degree of acceptance.

These laws

certainly \lere never• nor can they bet "read off" the events 'they
claim to describe.

Newton's second law, for example. Which atates

that a body's acceleration is proportional to the force actillg on
it 11 and inversely proportional :o its ma.as (P • ma). does not

follow automat1cal17 from OAe 1 s observations of tides, falling
bodies, and celestial orbits. evftft though it does predict these
events well.

Both Leibniz and Deacartea atudt.ed the same universe

trust Newton stUdied,

their mathematical descriptions of motion

yet

were different: from Newton's formulation.
lt should be noted, a1so, that a mathematical. mechanics has
not al.ways been thought to be closer to spirituality, or Divine
Oun.iscience, than non-mathematical mechanics.
by 1:he C.thoLic <llurcb 1a

a caae 1n point.

Copernicus' censure

Hie ayst:• of celes•

ti.al motions was upheld as being •mathematically true'• at the
same time as lt was condemned for being

1 ph1loaophically

abaurd•.15

Frank calls the distLnction between mathematical and mechanical
models "inappropriate"•

Re says•

We kn0tf today that the motions of bodies with
velocities comparable to that of light can be de••

lSct. :"'tetaph.yeical Interpretatio.na of Science, u 22.·
Chapter t I I , 1"lote 13.

£ll..,
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cribed only with the help of the reLativity theory of
Rinstein, the motions of the smallest particles in the
atoms only with the help of quantum and wave mechanics •
••• If we understand by mechanics the doctrine of the
motion of 1 bodles of average alze with moderate velocities,• then we can rightly say that modern physics
has established tbe impoasibility of a mechanical basia
for the processes of nature. lf we say, however, that
the mechanical foundation has been replaced by a math•
ematical one, it is, in my opinion, a very inappropriate
mode of expression. We ought to ••Yt rather, that the
place of a special. mathematical theory, th.at of newton,
has been taken by mory seneral theories, the relativity
and quantum theories. 6

From the time of Newton, there has been a dispute over the
nature of Light.

Some held th.at light was a wave phenomenon,

whereby the propagations wer:e due to disturbances moving in a
medium, like ripples moving through a liquid.

Huyghena developed

the idea of interference and reinforcement between waves, to explain the common optical phenomenon of interference patterns.

lf

two waves have their crests 'lined up•, the light will be intensified or reinforced, while if the crest of one wave coincides with
the trough of another, the waves will interfere.
Although this wave picture was adequate to explain many of
the common optical phenomena, it had some basic set-backs.
example, all attempts to discover what the
light waves travel have failed.

1

For

medium 1 is in which.

lf this medium, called

1

ether'

exists, some very sophisticated experiments have not been able to

16J:12S!l(n Science 4Qd lS! PAi1012ph7, 131.
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detect it.

One of the moat conclusive in the series of such tests

was the famous Michelson-Morley experiment of 1881.

this experiment will be described in some detail.

In Chapter V

For now, we

simply point out that the failure to discover ether might be explained by assuming that the ether alters the very instruments
which are used to detect it, in such a vey that it remains undis•
coverable.

'!bat is, if, in accordance with Maxwell's theory of

electro-magnetic radiation, all lnatrumenta undergo certain forces
from light that tend to contract them in the direction of light
propagation, they will yield one and the same reading for two dif •
ferent events.

Thia contraction hypothesis which was suggested,

and formulated mathematically by Lorentz, has been strengthened by
experiment, although it was originally suggested only as a very
unlikely explanation for the negative reauLta of Michelson and
Morley's work.

ln any caae. the relativity theory, which will be

described below, assumes that whatever ether may bet if anything,
it cannot be discovered.
Another problem which the wave theory tacea la the explanation of so-called

1

black•body radiation•.

The wave hypothesis

would suggest that a light sow:ce emits light uniformly in all
directlo.ns in a 1pherical wave that loaea its intensity aa the
inverse square of the distance from the aow:ce.

One might expect

thus to find that the intensity of light energy falling upon a
detector, such as a screen, would diminish along a continuum, and
that no matter how far the detector were placed from the source,
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some light energy would always be found falling on it.
this ia not the case, experimentally.

However,

lt is discovered that the

intensity of detected light does not fall off smoothly and contin•
uously, but by discrete increments, so that at a sufficiently
great distance from the source, the detector records only distinct

bursts of intermittent energy, with a certain discrete, Least
a.mount of intensity, or else none at all.

Thia experiment, car:ried

out by Lenard in 1902, was interpreted to mean that light is
emitted in small packages, called photons, rather than in a continuous undulation.

The discreteness of these packages is the

origin of the term •quantum•, or 'definite amount•.

lt is obvious that the wave model, unaltered, cannot account
for this phenomenon.

Yet it ia equally clear that the wave theory

is useful for moat optical phenomena, which Newton'• laws for
particle motion cannot explain.

Frank tells us of Einstein's

efforts to keep the moat fruitful aspects of the wave idea.

"In

order to alter the undulation theory as little as possible,
F.instein assumed th.at light should remain a propagation of waves,
now electromagnetic waves, but that the energy shouLd not be distributed evenly in the wave homogeneously.

'Ihere should be con-

densation of energy that will propagate like parcels 1n such a way
that the screen can never be hit by leas than one parcet. 0 17

Another area in which the quantum idea was confirmed deals
17~ •• 199.

,.....-
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with the orbits of electrons around the nucle11 of atoma.
~n.~

Accord-

to claaalcal mechanical analya1a, one should observe orbits

with a range of energies that ia theoretically infinite.

Yet

spectral analysis shows that atoms actually have only a limited
numbei:- of orbits, with veey definite '4•rgy levels that occur over
and over.

In h.ydroge.o, wb1cb is the

•~lest

atom, Bohr discovered

that only those orbit• are fouad wboae angular mcmentum i• an
integral multiple of
above,

~

h/2~

(where h ia Planck'• Constant, described

which also enters 1nto the discrete energy levels found

in the radiation of light from black•bodiea.)
It 1a well to remark again that this quantised view of
orbiting electrons la only a JBathematical model which can Lead to
appropriate obaervatioaal results.

No one knows for aure that

particular orbits are actually excluded, since it ia not certain
that electrons are really orbiting, ln the sense that pla.neta
orbit the sun.

Indeed, it is not ••ea certain that electrons may

legitlllately be conaidered as little pieces of charge, nor that
they act the sue in atoms aa they do in radiation, or 1a a con•
ductor.
Noting these dlacrepancies v1th respect to light phenomena,
and the failure of the wave theory to explain th• 1

~de

Broglie

tried.to justify, or modify, !lewtoniaA . .chanics in order to
account for all the known obaervablea.

He decided, in effect, to

•iev all auch phenomena, &lld also those of particle aotion on the
larger acale 1 as part of the aaae general behavior.

Thia behavior
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can be described• accordlag to de Broglie• by wave mathematics,
which involves second•order differential equations.

Frank tells us•
To make this generalization1 de Broglie assumed
that a type ef wave could be introduced (called by l11m
"matter waves,• later Broglie waves) that accounts for
the trajectorlea of material puticlea by a theory of
undulation accounts for the paths of light rays •••
De Broglie's b.ypotheaia waa simply that a pacticle'a
motioa vaa deterai.ned by a radiation, the photo.na of
which had the aaae moaentum aa the particle. Thia
means that the wave length A of thia radiatioA ls
determined bya

P •

llV •

hv/c • h/A 1 or, )\ • b./mv 1

known aa 1 de Broglie's equation.• De Broglie'• law
for the motion of particles th.en was: If small
particlea of maaa m and the speed v are moving
through alita in the diaphragm or around obstacles,
they behave llke photon• of a wave length h/mv, the
1 de Broglie wave length.• 18
ln these examples, there seems to be little justification
in holdi.ng that light, or for that matter, particles either, are

wave phenomena any more than they are particle phanome.na, follow•
ing the common•senae use of those terms.

One does aot really know

what the underlying nature of these eve.nta is; but o.ne can use
theoretical models to describe

t:h•.

The models which Newton em•

ployed are close to one 1 a daily experience, because they describe
things that are close to our daily experience.

The de Broglie

wave theory 1a far from satisfying to cOBDOA sense, yet lt seems

1so1101opl)r gf §clegco, 204·205.
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more adequate than the older theory for deriving confirmatory experiment, about events which are far from one's daily experience.
It should be noted that the de Broglie 'waves' are not three-dimensional waves; they are a matluunatical picture.

By the same token,

one must look critically at the idea that wave theory supports
metaphysical idealism.

As Frank states, rather bluntly,

"It is

hardly more plausible to regard beauty and mystical communion with
God as de Broglie waves than to regard them aa material masses.
All the mental entities, beauty, religious experience, etc., are
no more a part of quantum mecha.rd.ca than they are of Newtonian
ph.ysica. 0 19

5. I!!t Qasm:;ttiQSY

fElQC~Pit

As has been stated above, it is found, in confirmation of
de Broglie's hypothesis, that beams of small particles undergo the
same sort of scattering and diffraction phenomena as light beams
undergo.

That is, if one beams electron•• for example, through a

slit onto a screen, aome electrons wi.11 be bent out of their
straight path to form a aeriea of light and dark bands or fringes
to the sides of a central bright band that Lies directly in line
with the beam's path before it passes the slit.
of these bands wi11 follow the typical
in probability theory.

1

The distribution

bel1 curve• that is common

Thia is to say that some of the electrons

will apparently receive a component of momentum perpendicular to
19~•• 239.

, I
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the original path, when they interact with the al1t.

:I

If one nar•

rows down the slit, thus hoping to define the position of the beam

more precisely, this sideways component of momentum will increase
proportionately.

There is no way to determine the final path of

any single electron.

However, with a large number of electrons,

it is possible to determine with great accuracy the fins.1 distri-

bution of bright and dark bands on the target screen.
From the wave equation, it is found that the uncertainty of
original position, that is, in tbJ.a case, the width of the slit,
is related to the sideways component of momentum imparted by the
slit, by this equation:
6x~p•h

This principle, which states that there is no way experimentally
to determine simultaneously the exact position and momentum of a
particle, bears the name Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.
Frank explains tho principle in

i~O\Hldati2n1

of ft+Isics.

We must alway• declde in what reault we are in•
terested: in the position of the particle passing the
diaphragm, or in the momentum of this particle. In
each case we ca.n make a prediction. ln the first case
we can predict the dif fraetion pattern on the screen.
ln the aecond case we know the momentum which the dia•
phragm gets from the particle, and we ca.a make predic•
tions by means of Newton's mechanics. We can predict
the motion of bodies which are hit by the diaphragm.20

I

!

20foundationa of Phfaics, Vol. 1, No. 7, of Encys\92ed\f of
Unif!eg §clen;1, Cfilcago, 938, 473.

'

I
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Again, in the same article, Frank continues,
If we consider a great number of particles passing the slit of the width A'X, most of them have a
momentum Fix, • h/ ~-x. parallel to the screen. But also
all smaller and greater momenta will occur with a car•
tain frequency according to the Gauaaian distribution
of errors.

As a result of theae expeximental and mathematical findings,
interpreted by metaphysically oriented persona, it has been suggested that there exiata, ln tbe pb.yaical universe as in the mental
universe, a bui.lt•in indeterminacy, that is akin to 'free will'.

H•tYE:•

Rddington, for example, in bis book It!!

2f

~ht

Ph)!sicaL

Hot:Ld, 1928 1 suggested that only after 1927 (the year Heisenberg
proposed his Uncertainty Principle) waa it possible for thoughtful
scientists to feel justified in their religious beliefs.21

later book,

Dlt fD&L21ephr

of .ft!.l'1is1L

~S~!BSI

In a

(1949), Eddington

denied that one c&n support the belief in free will by Heiaed:erg'a
principle.22

Nevertheless, according to Frank, it ls Fddington'a

earlier idea that bas remained popular.

0

'I'he philoaopbers and

theologians vb.o advocate tbia belief, .. Frank. tells us, uare not
intereated in advocating indeterminism in physic•, but in claiming

21Ib.I ~£YE• of fh! ~rslctl
W2fLS, 350, cited in fb.ilosq::hy
Cf. a so 7rank1 s rev ew of Heisenberg's I.b.£.
11iciftfi•
t?lt:Y£!'h under the heading, "Man con-

~

2fl1eose, 2 •

fronts

rfni'm2°:£fi
•
•

ae f,

22cf. fbiL010PAX of Ssieacg, 255.
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that there are events and phenomena that follow laws that are different from the physical laws.n23
Arguing against the 'ftee wi11 1 intexpretation of the
Heisenberg principle, Frank uses the thoughts of Nalim K. Brahma,
a Hindu philosopher, who is favorable to metaphysics, but who
realiz~s

its inappropriateness in this context.

Brahma says,

If future experiments reveal to us that the in·
determinism supposed to exist in the movements of the
electron is really nonexistent, philosophy would find
itself helpless to prove its position if it now accepts
the argument of Professor Eddington ••• Freedom and
other metap~ysicaL truths cannot be proved in the
sphere of phenomena where space time and causality are
the only categories that rule.z 4

'l'he ideaa of Eddington 1 s earlier book are echoed by another
British phyaiclstt James Jeans, in his book of 1943• f!!ttiS! !Qd

{>h&,Losoetq.

In Jeans• opinion. "'the cLass1caL physics seemed to

bolt and bar the door leading to all freedom of will; the new
physics hardly does this; lt almost seems to suggest th.at the door
may be unlocked if we could only find the handle..

The old physics

showed us a universe which looked more like a prison.n2S
At an early period, Frank warned against such overstatements as Jeans makes here.

ln the EnCXS12Pft9i! of

tor instance, he wrote•

231l?J:s!.

24c1ted in !l!i:4·

25c1ted in llU.lo12eh1 o( sc1ens1, 240.

ygif~$d

Sc!@t!s;e,
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We muat carefully avoid the misunderatandlng
which has been caue~d by the way s01ne physicists have
discuased the relation of uncertainty. One hears
sometimes the statement: "lt is impossible to measure almultaneously the position and the momentum of a
small partic:Le. 0 This sounds as if there would be
small particles which possess certain positions and
certain momenta. We are told that we can measure
either of them but that nature is so diabolic as to
preve.nt us from measuring both aimu1ta.neoua1y. This
statement is rather misleading. The expression "•
particle with a certain poaitlon and a certain momentum" has no operati9.oal meaning if de Broglie's hypothesis is accepted.26

Twenty years later, Frank had much the same thing to say,

'lheae laws for the behavior of particles are, of
course, very different from the Newtonian laws and
very different from our COt11Don•aense ideas about
particles. As Bohr pointed out• we muat avoid ascrib•
iAg to an atomic object (auch as an electron) tradi•
tional properties of a particle. Aa we have tearned,
"position and velocity of a particle., la an expression
wlthout ~ratio.nal meaning if applied to small particles. 2

1.

~sgpLemegtar~tv

1n keeping with the findings about indeterminacy, as out-

lined above, Neils Bohr put forth a more general idea that appU.ea
to other fields of knowledge in science.

In a paper entitled ttnls•

cussions with Einstein on Epistemological Problems in Atomic Phy•
sics," Bohr said, .,Evidence obtai.Aed under different experimental
conditio.na cannot be comprehended wichin a single picture, but

26.Qa.• .Qt,•• 474

27fh1Los2ph1 o' Ssi111c1, 243.
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must be regarded as compllf9lntf'X• in the senee that only the
totality of the phenomena exhausts the poas1b1e information about
the objects.«28

Frank bas put the principle of complementarity thua,

Under.: certain circumstances, the lanfuage of
•positions of particles' or •point events must be
used; in other circumstances, excluding the ones
above mentioned, we speak of •momenta of particles•
or •impulse events.• lf we make use of all possible
infoxmation about the present atate of the world, we
must use both Languages. Then we can predict a11
events which our actual science enable& us to predict.29
A similar idea vaa proposed by Heisenberg in
Qgpception ot, f';1turt•

Tb.t

JllYl\si.st~

There he suggests that whereas nineteenth•

century scientists looked for knowledge of the world as something
Lawlike and permanent apart from the knower, modern science is
characterized by a more "modest 51 view, ill which. the role of the
scientist is exa;:nined too.

One no longer looks for atoms

themselves' but as the scientist experiences them.

1 1.n

In other wcrds,

"Hetb.od and object can no longer be separated.n30
'lb.e point these authoi:a make• and Frank agrees, is that the
scientist's knowledge of the world depends in large measure upon
the language he uses to describe it, especially with respect to
the operational <lefinitions he gives in order that the theories
28Cited in fb:ilOSOQb;[ gf SS~fBCCe 220.

29touruitk12QI o,_fbXsics, 476.
30cf. Frank•• review• J'Man Confronts Himself, n

.Ls.£. si.£.
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may be teated.

Metaphysical mialnterpretations, Frank aaya over

a.nd over again, stem from the m1suae a.ad confusion of the language
which describes scientific work.

In one of his last publications,

in 1958, Frank put the idea 1.n these words:
not teach us anything about •matter• and

semantics. 0 31
said:

"the new physics does

1 sp1rit 1 ,

but much about

Similarly, in another paper of the same year, he

"I believe th.at the advances in philosophy which have been

stimulated by twentieth-century physics, like relativity and quantum theory, are not advances in metaphysics, but advances in semantica. u32

Robert Oppenheimer expressed a certain disagreement with
Frank in relation to the origin and meaning of complementarity,
which ls we11 to point out, in cLos1.ng this Chapter.

Oppenheimer

said that wh.ereas Frank feela that science seems to lead the way
toward cultural advancement, while philosophical interpretations
follow up with their support, lt must be admitted that Bohr's
complementarity idea dld not develop in this way.

In fact, it did

not come from science at all, but from Bohr's rather metaphysical
leanings.

Complementarity, according to Oppenheimer, sprang from

Bohr's ttea:r:ly interests i.n the complementary character of the
introspective and the behavioral description of man, in the complementary character of dealing with experience in the light of
31°The Present Role of Scie,nce," 1.'h• Htl!HUl1f5 19, 1959, 8.
32°eo.ntemporary Science and tbe Contemporary World View, ..
Daed1&u1 87, 1958, 63.
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Love and in the light of justice, and from t:he ••• tensions of
c01nprehending in one description causal explanation of behavior
and moral condemn.ation of behavior. ,,33

33ct. "The Growth of Science and the Structure of CUlture:
Comments on Dr. Frank's Paper,*' Da19tly.4 87, 1958• 67-76.

CHAPTER V

MlSlNTERPRETATlONS OP Itll..AtlVlTY THEORY

1.

&el•tlvitr i.q Conte;
As has been pointed out above, Frank demonstrated a partic-

ular ability for placing the advances of science in their historical perspective.

This is especially true vith respect to rela-

tivity theory, because Frank was a student and personal friend of
Einstein, from the time of the latter's first impact upon the
scientific world, in 1905 • the year he pub1iab.ed his Special
Theory of Relativity.

As waa pointed out in Chapter l above,

Frank was the man whom Einatein chose to replace him at Prague.
Relativity theory developed as an effort to synthesize
older theories that seemed at first to be incompatible - theories
which had been presented ln order to explain separate areas of
observable phenomena.

Specifically, Newton's laws for the motion

of particles, which had such great aucceaa in their proper realm
of middle-sized objects, and moderate velocities, failed to ex•
plain experimental results when they were applied to the behavior
of light.

Light phenomena were observed to upnold, instead,

Newton's Theorem of Relativity.

In effect, thla law says that it

is impossible to determine the motion of a reference system, such
as the world, by examining the motion of bodies relative to this
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system, if the system in question is not Wldergoi.ng acceleration.
The same holds for the motion of Light, as will be explained below.
Newton's Theorem of Relativity is described by Frank• thus.
'nle positive formulation ts: By knowing the
relative initial condition of maaaea 1n a vehicle• we
can predict their future relative motion without knowiag the speed q of the vehicle itself. The negative
formulation aaya: By observing the motions relative
to a vehicle• we cannot find out the constant speed
of this vehicle, provided it is moving in a straight
line relative to an inertial system. We can also aay:
a vehicle moving with uniform motion relative to the
inertial system (S) is itaeLf an inertial system that
may be called (S 1 ). From these considerations it
clearly follows that the speed q of (S 1 ) relative to
the inertial system, or, according to Newton to absolute space cannot be derived from any pnysica1 experi•
ment. This speed q has no operational meaning in
physics and was givyn a meaning by Newton witnitl the
system of theology.

2.

The tu.ch.tLson•Ho;11x

Eytrwns

The Michelaoo•Morl.ey experiJDent of 1881 waa an effort to

confirm the presence of a medium• called ether. in whicb light
might travel as a wave disturbance.

Such a medium had long been

assumed• aince light phenomena had been derivable geometrically if
they were Looked upon as the propagation of waves.

Since Huyghens,

at Least, the wave explanation jibed well with the optical experi•

menta known• such aa image formation, and diffraction patterns.
the experiment was baaed on reasoning that goes aa follows:

lf there la an ether, which is fixed 1 or absolute with respect to

osoph.r.

lftg&R@ORhY Q( Scien;1;
•
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bodies, then the earth wi11 travel through the ether, and any
Light propagation which originates on the earth will feel, as it
were, the effect of an 'ether wind'.

lf the light ia travelling

with the ether, it will be speeded up t>y the etber.

lf it is

i

, I

travelli.ng perpendicular to the ether, it will be pushed aside,
but not affected in the direction of its propagation.

Analysed

algebraica1ly 1 two identical light rays, travelling through the
ether at rigbt angles to each other might thua be expected to take
different times to travel the same measured distance on the earth's
surface.
J.Ceeping this analysis in miad. 1 the

tvo

experimentera,

Michelson and Morley, built an apparatus which aent two beams of
light out at right angles to each other.

The beams were reflected

by a aeries of mirrors and b.alf•nd.rrors back to a single fln1ah

point which was a telescope.

'D1e two paths were made identical in

length and optical qualities, to the best at&ndards available.

lt

was expected, from principles of interference, that if either beam
were slowed dovn in its path more than the other beam travelling
at right angles to it, one ahould expect to see destructive
interference, to the extent that the beams were out of phase.

The

whole apparatus was mounted on a heavy atone table vbich could be
rotated.

In this way, either beam could be di.reeted in any sense

relative to the points of tbe compaaa, to insure that they might
be oriented appropriately to the ether wind, wherever it might be

produced.

Also, the rotation of the table could allow one to
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check on the length of the two light paths.

lf one path were

Longer, through an error in the apparatus, light would obviously
take a longer time to traverse it th.a.ft tbe second path, regardless
of ether wind.

But by rotating the table, one would observe the

same inequity in. the new position.
When the experiment was carried out, no change was noticed
that could be called interfere.nce, at any position of the apparatus, at an.y ti.me of year.

This lack of result could easily have

beeA explained simply by assuming that ether does not exist; yet
the belief in ether was so well entrenched that other explanations
were offered instead.

'lbese reasons are summarized in J. A.

Coleman's little book, &tllSiv&~l (qr taa..1azmta•2 which may be
paraphrased as follows.
First, the earth might be fixed ln the ether, with everything else moving relative to the earth and the etber.

Of course

it was not seriously considered that the earthsb:>uld occupy such a
unique position.
Second, an ether wind would not appear, if the earth

drageerl

the ether along with lt, but thia sugg•st1on had problem.•• too.
Ether dragged along with the earth would drag incoming starlight
with it, causing us t:o observe all. light to come from the sair.e
direction, which clearly is not the case.

Also, studies of the

FreBAel drag coefficient indicated that the earth could not manage

22Q.. ill,•• 37-41.
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a total drag. which waa required to explain this phenomenon.
Third, if the light velocity was always constant with
respect to its source, the velocity would vary with respect to the
The ether would not be detected, since the two light beams

ether.

would have the same velocity relative to the interferometer.

Tb.at

the light might vary with respect to the ether. of course, went

against tbe whole tradition of wave motion in media, and, for that
matter, made the whole subject almost irrelevant.

Also, astro-

nomical observations, especially those concerning double stars,
made it highly unlikely that light velocity depends on the velocl.t¥

of its source.
Fourth, and now most acceptable was an explanation concocted almost as a logical exercise, to explain the experimental
results.

At first it was hardly thought feasible.

In 1893 1

Fitzgerald suggested that all objects moving th.rough ether contract in the direction of their motion.

This contraction would

occur in whichever arm of the interferometer was parallel to the
motion of the instrument, relative to the ether.

Thia means that

the light trave.lling along that arm would go on a shorter path,

but because it would be slowed down proportionately, also, the
effect could not be seen.

The two beams - one travelling at

normal speed over the normal distance, and the other travelling at
a slower pace, over a foreshortened distance - would arrive at the
finish point simultaneously.

tern to aee.

lbere would be no interference pat•

Although this hypothesis - called the Fitzgerald-

!,orentz contraction hypothesis - seemed fantastic at first, it
received considerable support in 1895 1 when Lorentz presented his
theory about the electron composition of matter.

Einstein'• work

of 1905 added further to the feaaibi11ty of this hypothesis.
In Frank's words, the Micb.elaon experiment .. showed that
Newton's theorem of relativity holds also for the phenomena of
light propagation in moving vehicles, although according to New•

tonian mechanics and optics this abouLd not be the case.

F.i.nstein

ventured, therefore, the hypothesis that the principle of relativ•
ity might be a principle of higher generality than Newton's laws
of motion and the ether theory of light."3

3.

F.in1te'n's Special Tgeor.I. of

itLativiSX

Frank describes the ell.mate which these findings produced the climate in which Einstein proposed the Special Theory of 1905.
Frank says,
During a certain period, physicists gave a 'dual•
iatic' presentation of their science. One part waa
regarded as 'physics of matter;' mechanics, acoustics,
heat; the other part, the 'physic• of the ether• con•
tained electricity, magnetism, and optics. Very soon
lt became apparent that auch a clear-cut division did
not yield a aatisf actory derivation of all experiences
about the interaction between tbe motion of material
bodies and electromag.netic wave propagation.4
Very soon after the

Mlchelson~Morley

lf1!,Lo102bt of Sctencs, 134.
4,bid., 131.

results were published,
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start1ng with Hertz in 1889, pbyaicists began to drop the idea
th.at all phenomena

lhould

be reducible to Newtonian mechanics,

because the latter simply could not account for •11 the observ•
ablea.

the thought of dropping Newton's system was not a comfort-

able one; it went counter to generations of thought.

As Frank

says,
Maxwell's equation• for the electromagnetic
field and Lorentz's hypothesis about the distribution
of electric charges in •material' particles were accepted only because the observed fact• about the motion of bod1ea and the propagation of light could be
derived. Thomas Aquinas• criterion for the 'inferior'
type of truth, tb.e 1 ac1entific 1 , not the 1 Dhllosoph1cal1 truth, became the decisive criter1on:5
Einstein's goal, Frank. tells us, was to set up principles
from which the interaction between light propagation and the motlal
of material particles could be derived, in tbe simplest possible

way, without recourse to the ether hypothesis, which had proved so

fruitless, or to Lorents•a ideas of the distribution of electric
charges 1.n bodiea.6

It ahoul.d be noted that the principle of sim-

plicity, about which more will be said in Cb.apter Vl, is one cri•

terion for choosing a certain hypothesis over another, especially
if a theory is to have a high degree of generality.

lt was Ein-

stein's hope to find a most general Field 'theory which could be
used to derive

IJJ.

the phenomena of electromagnetism, mechanics,

51.JzJ&.. t 133.
6cf. PQilosoebY of Sc\enS•t 134.
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and gravity.

lf he bad not

a deep conviction of the unity of

~1.ad

tlle universe, in a ph11osoph:Lcal sense, it is doubtful that he
would have pushed h1a idea as far aa he did 1 or that he would have
influenced the work of contemporary science so greatly.
Ii •

ginsts;i.n' 1 Tuo fl:S.ncipl.t§
From. observations about the ether theory, Einstein general•

ized the Principle of Constancy.

'nl.is can be stated as follows:

Tb.ere is a system of reference (F) 1n the world 1
with respect to which light is propagated through
vacuum with a constant speed c, whatever the speed of
the source of light With respect to (F) may be.
SecOl.'ld.17 1 from the laws of motion, Elnatein took the

Prin-

ciple of Relativity, '1h1ch can be stated aa follows:
A vehicle system (F) may move with a constant

speed along a straight line wt.th respect to (F 1 ).

We start any optical or mechanical experiment with
given initial co.ndltlona relative to (F 1 ) . Then our
principle says that the outcome of the experiment ls
not dependent upon q, or, 1n other words 1 if the
initial conditions relative to (F') are given, the
further motion and light propagation with respe~t to
(F 1 ) are determined; they do not depend upon q.
Immediately, one might well object that the last principle
seems to lead to absurdities.

If the two systems (S) and (S 1 ) are

moving relative to each other, say, with a velocity of v, and
light travels with a constant velocity c with respect to
velocity with respect to

s•

s,

its

must be c•v, or c+v, depending 'Whether

~

-{f\1

105

s

is moving faster or slower than

s•.

To aay that the velocity of

Light is c with respect to !!2Sh syatema is to say that c-v, (or
c+v) is equal to c, while v is not zero.

This is impossible,

mathematically speaking, if not also logically contradictory.

. .:.1. 1
1'1r

'
)

But

it must be remembered that the argument against re1at1vlty a11wpes

that one can measure c with respect to both
time.

s

and

s•

at the same

Actually, thia la impossible; our measurements are all

operationally def!..ned in their relation to earth (S).

Since one

cannot check this principle directly by observation, it is safe
from refutation.

That is not to say the theory la in acme aenae

metaphysical, more than any other physical bypotheala which claims
to be more general than a liat of simple observations.

The only

refutation of !a!. theory is th.at it fails to lead to observables;
the only proof of any theory is that it can be confirmed by the
observables derived from it.

lt must be noted that Einateln's

principles have led to hypoth•••• that do jibe with experimental
results• and which b.ave vary practical c0t1aequences in the kind of
physics which goes beyond daily experience, auch aa nuclear reac•

tiona, and apace travel.a
5.

Non-~usL&di19

Glgaetry IQd

~§&g.

SQISI

lt can safely be said that one of the prerequisites for the

advent of modern physics was a certain softaning up of the principles of the older science.

The developments in measuring the

i

I
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speed of light, a.ad the search for ether worked to help prepare
the ground.

Maxwell's equations also helped to break down the

belief that theories must be intuitively obvious.

way, the development• in logic and pure mathematics

ln a similar
dw:i.ng tb.e

nineteenth. century greatly influenced co.atemporary views of epis•
temology• and the relations between theory and observation.

Among

the moat important mathematical developments in this respect are

those of non-Euclidean geometry, especially the work of Lobacbevslcyt
Hilbert and Minkowski.
According to the i.deaa of relativity theory, rigid bodies
cease to have their normal rigidity in certain circumstances Where

high apeeda are involved.

'Ihua, for example, yardsticks and cltlcks

will be respectively slowed down, and ahortftlled 1 along the di.rec•
tion of their motion, but not in the direction perpendicular to
their motion.

Thia idea waa p:r:opoaed in order to ex.plain the

apparent constancy of 1igb.t velocity, in all referen.ce ayatems; it
cannot be proven directLy 1 aa baa frequently been stated.
Rotating bodies such aa phonogi:aph. turn-tables, or the

Milky way Galaxy, muat be distorted, since the peripheral speed of
such bodies is greater than that close to their center of rotation.
Of course no point on the phonograph turn-table ever reaches rela•

tivistic speeds, ao for all practical purpoaea 1 it remains rigid
in the normal sense of tbe term.

But in th.e case of our Galaxy

there might be noticeable variations from Euclidean geometry.
Consider, for example, a Large triangle whose vertex points away
from the center of rotation, and whose base is near the center.

r

Be.cause of its relativistic motion, the vertex angle would be leas

I

than it would be at rest, while the other
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two

almost unaltered, since they move little.
produce a

1 defect 1

angles would remain

In effect, this would

in the sum of the interior angles; they would

add up to leas than 180 degrees.

lt would also tend to curve the

lines formi.ng the vertex inward, so th.at the vertex vould appear to
be closer to the base than it really ••·

Of couree there seems to

be no way to determi..ne vb.ere the vertex •really t.a•.
ln a long chapter from fhl:12•StPIU' gf SSl:•SA!

Tb.a Lisnl.\

kg,t?en Sc&t.0c1 yd PQ1&21omz, an "Geometry as an Example of a
Science,• Frank discusses the relation of Euclidean geometry to
physical things.9

His main argument ls that mathematical geometry

in its purest form bas nothing to do with •reality•.
axiomatic system of an

1

lt ls an

if 1 then' character, which is consistent

within itself• and is not sf uted by measurement of thin.gs in the

world.

Thus Hilbert, for example, tried to make a strict formal•

ization of geometry, 1n which. there • • .no intuitive meaning
applicable to any of the term•• such as point, straight lt.ne, or
coincideaee.10

On the other hand, there bave been geometers, e.g.

Reimann a.nd Helmholtz,

mo

held that the axiaaaa of geometry "were

result• of physical observation, and that, therefore, the theorems
were of no greater certainty than any statements of phyaics.~1
9cf. Chapter lll Of l!B~l910eAZ 0, S~\ta!CI•

lOcf. FgYS9at~gnp pf gegpatgr, 1899.
llFrank, fbiL01opllf gf

§s&swse,

84.
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There have also been attempts to coordinate the physical and
mathematical real.ms of geometry.

Here the work of Polncare• Ein-

stein and Bridgman has been most influential.

"According to Poin-

care," Prank state••
••• the terms which are defined by a system like
Hilbert's are physical things. • •• lf we want to cheek
whether a triangle of Light rays in empty space actually has an a.ngl•·•um of two right
ve face a
particular difficulty. lf we find that the sum in question la dlffer•t from two rigb.t angle•, we can alao
interpret the result by saying that the 'defect• is not
due to the AOA•validity Of Euclidean geometry, but to
the fact that the rays have been deflected by some
hitherto unsuspected law of pbyaics. • •• PoiAcare con•
eluded that we can check whether or not light rays fulfill the Euclidean axioms only if we know all the
physical laws about light rays.12

&Agl•••

Einstein felt that one could, in a practical sen••• test
the validity of Euclidean geometry.

He says, in a paper "Geometry

and Experience, .. in 1921 1
According to axiomatic geometry, only the Logicalformal ls the object of mathematicaJ but not the 1ntu1•
t1ve content th.at ia connected with the logical-formal.
••• The sta~ements about physical objects are obtained
by coordinating with tbe empty concepts of axiomatic
geometry observable objects of physical reality. ln
particular: solid bodies behave according to the theorems of three-dlmenaional Euclidean geometry.13

One way of relating phyeical. and geometrical axioms was developed by Percy Bridgman, whose ideas of •operational definition•

12nw•• s6.
13cited 1tl

l'l!iL01gPAz: of SSl:IQS!h 87.
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nave been one of the primary bre&k•throughs in modern science.
Bridgman saya, for example• n'I'he concept of Length is• therefore.
fixed when the operations by which length is measured are fixed.
That s.a. the concept of length involves as much aa a.ad nothing
more than the set of operations by which Length is detemined.nl4

lt muat be noted that the conventional nature Of geometry does not
1Han it is just whimsically arbitrary.

lf there were no bodies in

the world which obeyed Euclidean geometry• for example, it xo914
be only a logical exercise.

O.ne recalls that geometry was first

developed by Egyptians and Greeks trying to solve practical problems about the world they observed.
Recall that Ei.natein 1 s ideas showed a cloae connection be•
tween distance and time.

Tb.us• one cau talk about a point eve.nt

alternately in space at time ti and 4llother point event at time t2.
One can talk about an event as bavi..ag four coordinates, three of
which are spatial, and oue of which is temporal.

To W'lify this

process, and make it simpler. Mink.owski suggested in 1908 that one
can construct a four•diz.nension.a.l space to describe events.
ing in this

Think•

way. one couJ.d describe motion as a static curve in

the four-dimensional space.

In this syateD'lt each event might have

one set of four coordinates relative to one reference system (S),
say x, Yt z and t; while relative to another reference system (S')
it would have another set of coordinates,

87.

x•, y•,

z' and t

1•
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'lb.ere is no way to determine wbich ref erenee system is
truer• and by this argument, there is no way of saying one time
(e.g. t as opposed to t•) is abst.\!ute.

For this reason• some per-

sons nave suggested that the world is 'really' four-dimensional,
and that all events in time are really already established.

The

apparent progression of events is ju.st due to one's taking up different •positions• i.n the time (t equal• a constant) plane.

Yet

Frank points out that this 'deterministic' view is really nd.aleac1Ag1 for in actuality. men deal only in the •now• pla11e (where t

equals t 0 ).

As Frank says, u.sy •now' we mean th.e crQss section of

the four-dimensional ap&ce•time continuum that i ! defined by tmt 0 •

Theref ore 1 it is self-contradictory that any future instant of
time t•to can exis't •now'. olS

'lbe four-dinlel'lsional way of speak-

ing is a useful tool, but it does not tell us about •reality'.

6. BcL•t1v1tx

o;

BeA1;1v1sm1

lt baa often bee.n suggested, by acne favorably, and by
others unfavorably, that relativity supports the belief that there

is no perma.n.ent: truth • nothing upon which men can count 1 as the
basis for their human beb.avior.

Trutb. 1 it is aa1d 1 ha• became

completely subjective, under tbe iafl.W!ltlce of modern science.

It

is only a matter of viewpoint • of the position of th• observer,
as some have said.
Frank has addressed himself to this criticism 1n much of

--·--""-...---·-·..-·____.

_...,.......,_

15Pbilosolt>:r. of Science, 162.
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his writing; 1.ncreasi.ngly so in his later work.

answer has always been of th.ls form:

In general, his

Sci.ent1sts 1 aa scientists,

are never coacer.ned with the underlying reality of the world.

What they undertake to do is develop theories which ca.n lead
logically to tile events that are observed.
that any theory is true 1n any absolute way.
that there is no truth.

They are never certain
This is not to say

lt is to say that the scientist wants to

have practical consequences from his ideas, but not metaphysical
interpretations.

Thus, for example, Frank says,

lbe physicist in his own acientif ic activity baa
never employed any other concept of truth than that of
pragmatism. The •agreement of thoughts with tlleir ob•
ject,• as the school philosophy requires, cannot be es•
tab11abed by any concrete experiment. In practice we
encounter only experieacea, never an object; he.nee nothi.o.g ca.a be compared with an object. Actually, the
physicist compares only experiences with other experiences. He teats the truth of a theory rirough what
one is accustomed to call •agreements.• 1
l.n earlier work, Frank puts the idea Chia ways
If the statement 1 le.agth is relative• is under•
stood 1.n its operational meaning• it is a statement
about the fact that certain procedures of measurement
yield different resu1ta 1 wb.ereaa it bad formerly been
believed that they yield identical results. But if we
transplant the statement 'length is relative' without
its operational mean1nf into psychology or sociology
or medicine, the word relative' is interpreted, of
course, 1.n the way in which this word has been tradi•
tionally used in these fields of knowledge. lt has
meant there ~hat all knowledge is subjective or
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hlstorieally and ethtdcally conditioned. • ••
What we can Learn from these examples is simply
the fact that a presentation of physic• i• fit to be
a part of the unified sciences only if the operational
saeaning of every statemeiat ls explicitly formulated
and carefully carried alon& when the stat~.ment is
applied to other sciences.I 7
This is not to say that tb.cre should be a strict dichotomy
between facts and values. or experience of subjectivity• and
belief in certainty.
value.
0

Such an ostrich view can have no practical

l'"'urther 1 it is historically abort•aighted, since it

ignores the close ties which have always and everywhere e.xiated

between ma.n's picture of the physical universe and his picture of

an ideal human aociety.nl8

Always Frank triea to differentiate

between these two realms without trying to destroy either.

In

another address, he says, ••The work of the scientist is probably
not fundamentally differe.nt from the work of 'the poet.

'Reality

in its fullness• can be grasped neither by the scientist nor by

the poet.

Reality can only be experienced, never represented; •••

F.very presentation, scientific or poetic, proceeds from creating
symbols.n19
Science is not an effort to discover reality, so much as
it is an effort to describe man's experience of it.

caaairer,

following Kant, suggeated tb.at reality ls somehow determined by

17r;OM9i~&oo1

e' ftll•is:e. 12£.

sU,.,

18"The Present Role of Science,"

12£.

soo.
sJ.,£., 21.

19"Contamporary Sele.nee and tb.e Contemporary World View,"

sa.;.•• 65.

~
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the laws developed toward such a description.

"".t'b.ere is

1

objec•

tivity• or 'objective reality'•" he e&7•• "becauee and in so far
as, there are laws •not conver:aely.n20

this view like Kantian

idealism, places lawfulness in the procesaea of human reaaoning•
rather than in an outalde world.

ln Frank'• oplnion, caaalrer

represents an effort to work a middle ground between acience and
traditional philosophy.

He does not, in aplte of hi• idealistic

language• f ael that modern physic• 1• a eonf irmation of lantian
idealism.

Freedom, tor example, is not proveA by the discovery of

areas of uncertainty in nature, such as the incompatlbillty of
e.xact momentum and exact position of particles.

Cassirer says in

this regard, "In itself it would be very bad for ethics and its

dignity if it could not maintain authority except by watching for
gaps 1n the scientific elucidation of nature and, so to apeak 1

creeping into these gapa.u21
Einstein's own views about the relation between theory and
object are enlightening.

He apparently did not think that his

relativity theory eliminated the possibility of transcendent laws.
ln an argument concerning chance happenings, he once said, "The
Lord God does not throw dice."

Einstein upheld the existence of

laws in nature as a basic tenet of his faith.

He said• for

example, "'nle most incomprehens1b1e thing about the world is that

20ctted 1.n Hpge;p ssi!QCt ADG..l~ .£biL01~Rb!:1 178.
cited

i!l=~~t~a::Jr!i::lttt:Jh~oifi~

DfliS!t 1937,
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it ls comprehenalble.•22

Similarly, to the Conference on Science, Philosophy and
Religion i.n 1940, Einstein tried to show a connection between
faith and the i.dea of cosmic order.
the faith in the poaalbility that

~he

nTo tbls th.ere also belongs

regulations valid for the

world of existence are rational, that ta comprehensible to reason.
1 cannot conceive Of a genuine scientist Without that profound

falth.

The situation may be expressed by an image:

science with•

out religion ls lame, religion without science is b11nd.n23

7.

Divegggp.t

Y&n•

2' BeLiSlin£t

Frank poiata out 1 against the metapbyaical. mia1.nterpretationa of Relativity, that almoat every conceivable ideology bas
used Ein8tein 1 a ideas to auppoct it, although the conclusions
reached by each of the various ideologues have been in many cases
altogether i.ftcompat!.ble with those of the others.

There are as

maA.Y people who decry modern science for supporting materialism as
there are those who uphold it for returnl.ng an element of idealism
and Divine purpose to the world.

The Soviets• for example, start•

ing with Lenin. 1 have lambasted relativity, on two points which, i.n

their estimation, are a.nt1material1atic.

Their first objection is

that the abandonment of ether a• a material medium for light prop•
agatio.n is lnconalate.nt with aense-perception and logic.

Their

22no.n ffl7aica1 Reality," 1936, cited in 8Einste1n, Mach an<l
Logical Positivism, .. 12£. s!.£•, 284.

231n "£1.nstei..n,

Mach and Logical

Positivism,• 285.

115
second object10A at.ma at the atatementa whicb. try to ab.ow that one
cannot aay the earth ia 'really' moving, or that the Ptolemaic
syatem is 'really•

wrong~

If the Soviet• have criticized !inatein'• theories as being
inillical to materlalia, a raft of writers have welcCllled them for
brl.nging the ian.aterial back into a state of respectability 1 aa&lnat

the dogmatic mechanism of traditional science.

Fra.nk citea Llncoln

Barnett, who has helped to popularize Relativity, to illustrate
the latter view:
Physicists have been forced to abandon the ordln•
ary world of our experience, the world of sense perception. ••• !Yen space and time are forms of intul•
tion whicb. can no more be divorced from conaclouaneas
than our concepts of color, shape, or size. Space has
no objective reality except aa an order or arrangeaent
of the objects we pttrceive in it, a.ftd time has no
independent existence apart froa the order of events
by which we measure it.,24
Similar ideas are suggested, and cited by Frank, in writ•

inga of British Philosopher H.

w.

Carr, Franch Philosopher Henri

Bergson, Sociologist P. Sorokin from Barvard 1 Yale Biologist E.

w.

Sinnott, the British As1tmoraers J. Jeans and A. Eddington, and, to
a leaser extent, by A. N. Wbltehead.
On

the other side• there have been suggestions that rela•

tivity theory supports materialism..

For example, the Naais, who

were very conscious of gaining scientific support for their ldeas 1
opposed Einstein because he vaa a Jew and a materialist.

Simi•
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1ar1y 1 aome aspects of Einstein's theory have been upheld by

soviet writer• for their effect against the static metaphysics of
Newton, against which dialectical materialism struggles.
In all these conflicting ideas, Frank poillta out, there is

an element that ls common.

'the misinterpretations all stem from

the f alae appllcation of scientific statements by ignoring their

context and their operational definitions.

Using the coi:r.mon sense

meaning of terms like •relativity'• \:onstant'1
'simultaneity' can. only lead to confueion.

1 eonaervation•

and

For example, some per-

sons argue that relativity baa shown that the md.verse is realty
four-dimensional; yet the use of •1a• in this aentence ia widely
different from the
dimensional."
f orelgn

"l• 11

in the sentence, "The universe 1a three-

The first "is" involves time in a way that ls

to commoo usage.

Jtour-dimellalonality is only a tool - not

a description of reality.

Other persons argue that the convertibility of mass to
radiant energy militates against materialism, yet the matter and
the energy can both be described by the current theories which
employ operational definitions th.at involve earthly manipulation •
just as much for the one as for the other.
relativity to be more

1menta1 1

Again those who hold

than traditional mechanics should

bear ln mind the criticisms which were brought against the latter

when they were introduced.

As Frank points out, all scientific

theories are ln effect •mentat•.25
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Fi.aa11y 1 the •subjective' element 11\ Relativity bears com•

me,nt.

Frank states•
The appearance of subjectivity has only been introduced in attempts to formulate the propositions of rela•
tivity theory by some analogy to camnon-aense statements.
lnatead of saying 'length with respect to a aystma of
reference,' wl\ich is not an expression from our conuonaenae language 1 we have used the e:xpreaaion

1 1e.ngth

.W.

an observer 11l the system (s).
Tb.en we could say th.at
the table bas a 'different length '-. different obaer•
vers.• This expression •tor an observer' is formed by
analogy to the way in Vhicb. we express 1.n common•aense
Language the fact that an object may look different to
different obae.rvers for reasons of different perapac•
t1ve 1 or optical illusion or weakness of the eyes. • ••
However, then analogies become harmful if we forget
that they are analogies and regard them as strictly
scientific statements. ••• The'obaerver• will, for
example, disappea~ complete1y or be replaced by a yardstick or a clock.z 6
1

In closing this Chapter, one should remark that in 1950
Frank wrote a book entitled B.,eLatix\!l', - A

Msbm;

T~h.

This

work will bear a look more closely in Chapter VII, as it is prim•
arily an effort to vindicate modern science in the face of cr1tic1ams that deal with its alleged degrading effe.ct on society.

It

is we11 to point out here, however, that the title itself shows
there are some metaphysical overtones to relativity which Frank
thinks are legitimate.
It is Frank's contention in the book mentioned that relativism is both the most characteristic attitude of .modern science
and a most useful quality to cultivate.

This may at first appear
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contradict the 1dea 1 so often repeated throughout Frank's work.st

that metaphysical interpretations of scientific theories are in

fact misinterpretations.

Hovever, the question disappears when

one sees that Frank is not here using relativity to support a

metaphysical view, but rather is starting from a metaphysical
principle • in this case, what he calls 'relativism' among scien•
tists - and developing its useful connection to political and
social attitudes.

Hie express purpose in this book is to 'inter•

pret the spirit of modern science•, and specifically to make an
attack. on the 'enemies of relativism•.

It 1• Frank's feeling that

relativism "has not th.e slightest thiAg to do with agnosticism or
skepticie, that 1.k 11

in e2

we

bP1;ue ;o l:b.f

nLu,. M! ..etbJ.cal

or democratic va1uea 1 that it is accompanying every advance in
science and is nothi.ng but a signJ.ticant representation of human
expresaion -..hich. is iaaeparably connected with our· gradual Ly
increasing experience."27

CHAP'l'ER Vl

SCIENTIFIC METHODa..OGY
i.

le.!rrc2suctj.oo

In thia Chapter we will present Frank's ideas on what might
be called the philosophy of science proper • the methods and
reasoning processes that are involved in the 'science of science•.
We shall examine, as well, what seems to comprise a scientific
attitude toward knowledge. including the conception of causality
as the basis for scie.ntif ic prediction, as it has developed during
the past century.

Frank summarized his conviction about the need

for this overview of science, in the article he contributed to the
:&.isrc\oeedia of lJeified Sciegce.

Th.ere, we read,

Physics has been for centuries the spearhead of
advance in human thought. ln a unified science it
ahould keep lta role aa a description of the phyeical
universe and should not deteriorate idto an incoherent,
and somehow mysterious, aggLomeratiOll of symbols, rules,
and recipes. ln this situation quite a few physicists
have tried to avoid all these difficulties by •stick·
ins strictly to the facts• and by keeping away from the
dangerous enterprise of logical and critical analysis.
There is no doubt that this attempt is doomed to failure. Scientists who looked at the world from such
different angles as Ernst Mach and A. N. Whitehead have
agreed on one point: a phyalclat who detdgea all logical analysis and tries to be a 'physicist and only a
physicist• will imbue the presentation of his subject
with some 'chance philosophy,• usually a very obsolete
one.l
ltntroductlon to Fouqd1£ion1 of fb.1sic1,
119

12£. sJ:S..,

428.
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Besides this 'involvement• in critical analysis which Frank
considered to be part of a worthy scientist's role, Frank came
Later to include an even broader perspective.

Ernst Nagel bas

described Frank's view of the philosophy of science as a "catholic
one. 0

Nagel says,
Thua, on bis view, the logical analysis of the
language of science, or the articulation of precise
rules for assessing evidence in conducting scientific
inquiry, are undoubtedly centrally important tasks that
fall into its province. But as he aaw 1t 1 a philosophy
of science that is limited to the discussion of such
matters ia incomplete; and to be adequate, it must also
include certain socio-historical considerations. • •• 2

over and over again, Frank talks of the need to look at the
history of science in order to understand the sources for the many
misinterpretations it supports.

The criticism that tnodern science

is mental, and unnecessarily abstruse, for example, is often

bolstered by comparing, say, Einstein's idea of relativity with
Newton's laws of motion, which latter are held to be intuitively
evident.

Yet a cursory glance at history would reveal that Newton

himself was criticized for being abstruse and mathematical, at a
time when the organismic views of Aristotle were believed to be

intuitively evident.

Thia confuaion stems from the fact, often

pointed out in Frank's works, that a scientific system will eventually be incorporated in.to daily thinking, and as it were, will

2"Phi1ipp Frank and the Philosophy of Science," in fhilil?&?
Frank. 1884-1966, J..2£. sit•
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become petrified into a metaphysical view of life.

Frank aaya,

tor example, uNewton•a scientific theory became a 'phlLoaophicat
system• • ..3

Again• elaewbere, he aaya.

Aristotle's philosophy of pbysics is a petrification of a pbya1cal theory which covered the experiences
of Greek and oriental arttaans about physical phenamna.
Kant's HtS•Dht•lc•t J!Ei~'Qllf o( RatP.&'•1 Scienc9 is a
petrification of E nate~ s relativity and iohr's quantum theory.4
lf nothing else were to be accomplished by the bistory of
science• as a study, it would at least tend to instill in scientists and those who look at science in relation to the whole

culture, an attitude of modesty.

Suc:b. a.n attitude has been des-

cribed by Heisenberg as characteristic of modern science.5

The

cause for such modesty is the recognition of so many major rever•
sala in scientific world theories, and the realization that each
theory had been tb.e foundation of a large and unyielding superstructure of philosopbical vieva about the world, as it 'really
1s 1 •

Nowadays. there may at Least be le•• tendency, among firstrate scientists, to go so far.

Tbis modesty is evident in the

behavioral sciences, wblclt have reacted, for a time• against the

t.beorizing of Freud.

Of course Freud was not just an interpreter

3aittoaopby of §Si!ftClt 35.

4f2uodation•

of Ph11~c1, 428.

Set. Frank's "Man Confronts Himself," a review of Reisen•

berg's

lb!

fbX1isl1~'1 £9ncention oi 8!tYJ:t.

122
of science; he was a firat•rate scientist himself.

But many have

argued that hia generalizations were too broad, and too far removed from observation to be validated.

After a period of strict,

almost picayune, experimentation and obaervation, th.ere has been a
gradual resurgence of theory-making among psychologists.
The need for historical perspective is also seen in the
desire to understand oldex ideas more explicitly and thoroughly.

One is able to see more clearly the correct application of an outmoded theory after it has been replaced, threatened or modified by

a newer one.

In mathematics, for example, Euclidean geometry was

so well entrenched before tb.e nineteenth century that one coulc'!.
not see its Limitations.

With the rise of non-Euclidean axioms,

as, for instance, in Riemann's work, the former system came into
sharper focus, and therefore 1ts application could be better
defined, with practical benefits.
The Copernican revolution is an older example of the same
broadening of perspective.

Of it, Frank says,

To understand a phenomenon means to interpret our
present experience as the repetition of a similar phen•
omenon of the paat. Thia is true in science, but it
is true as well 1.n history. Today ••• we understand

the Coper.aica.n revolutlon better thaAJ.'11.neteenth•century

scientists did because we are contemporaries of the
Einsteinian ravolution.6

Frank suggests that a proper view of the Copernican revolu-
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eion can give us a key to 'the central problem of all philosophy

of science,• that la, to relate the world of aenee observations
t:o that of general principles.

It can help us also, he adds, "to

appreciate the immense gap between these tvo worlds.•7
3.

~utaliliJ':

A)aolut;e 9' f.E•SMJij.ct

In spite of Hume 1 s criticism, it baa been felt in tradi•
tiona1 philosophy and aaau.med by acieAtiats generally that caus•

ality is somehow basic to all scientific tb.ough.t, if not to all
reasoning.

'l'he

discovery of laws, and their use in predicting

events, presupposes the concept of causality.

It 1• evident, how-

ever, that in spite of its ancient and wide-ranging roots in
western thought, st.nee the Greek.a, and its almost universal uae in
ever:yday language, the idea of causality ia a difficult one to pin
down.

Frank baa bad much to say about cauaality, in his earliest

writings, and down to hia last.

the first major paper he pub-

lished, after his doctoral work. was completed, was "Kausalgeaetz
Wld Erfahrung• in 1907.

ttogerg §£i&SI !ed

&t•

This paper appears aa Chapter l of

PQi&9so9Qz:.

Frank remark• that the paper was kindly received by Ein•
stein• although the latter criticized some of it• overstatements.

Frank's purpose 1.n the paper was to preaent causality as another
of tbe principles along with t.nertia 1 and the c21lservatio.n of
energy, which are neither empirical nor !. nrioElt but rather are
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"purely conventional definitions depending on human arbitzariness. 0 8
the argument runa Like this.
of causaU.ty is the following:

'l'b.e

moat general lormu.1at1on

lf a state A of the universe ls OAce

foil.owed by a state B, then whenever A occurs B will follow it.
It is important to understand (Frank notes} that
the Law can be applied only to the whole universe and
not to a part of it. 11\is, however, makes it impossible to test the law empirically. ln the first place,
one can never know the state of the whole universe,
and 1.n the second place, it ia l.n general not certain
whet..~er it is possible for a state A of the Universe
ever to return.'i
How does one know that state A has in fact returned, even
in a limited region of the universe?

One might uy that i.f all

the perceptible properties were the same, the state would be the
same.

But what of the :Lmperceptible properties, auch as the in-

ternal structure of a magnetized piece of iron, which might outwardly appear the same as a non-magnetic one?

One

would have to

include these, too, even if he did not know what all of the imperceptible properties were.

In this case, one could always justify

causality by saying that, in cases where it appeared to fail, he
had not accounted for some relevant property.

Thus, Frank con-

cluded, "The principles of pure science, of which the foremost

i~

the Law of causality, are certain because they are only disguised
definition."10

However, Frank concludes, this argument holds only

s~•• 53.

91JW1.' 54.

io.aw.,., s1.
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tor science.

*'With the queation of world conception in the

eth.ical•religioua sense• all this bas nothing vhataoever to do. 0
ln some later writing•• Frank modified this early presentation

soo.·ttawb.at, or rather 1 one ahould say he took a different view

of what: should be called the law of causality.

For example, 1n

one chapter of MqS!Hn SSie;e last Ill fb.11Uaeb'lt written in 1930,
he discuasea the relation of school philosophy to twent1eth•C81tur:y

physics, allow!.Dg for a statistical interpretation of causality.
He says,

11

lf the aymbola conform to tb.e experiences in a very de-

tailed manner we speak of causal laws; if the correspondence la of
a broader sort we call the laws atatistical."11
An

example of atat1at1ca1 causality is seen in the effort

to predict the behavior of a airlgle electron 1n a beam.

One can

state the general distribution of electrons 1n cases where a great
ma.ny of them are concerned, but cannot predict the single event.
Frank points out, too 1 that even in so-called single eventa 1 such
aa the st:rild.Ag of a target vith a large projectile, one ta limited

as to accuracy of prediction, geaera117 talking about tbe •mean•

behavior of a number of sucb. projectllea.

He cloaea this diacua-

aion vitb. the observation th.at it 1a AOt necessary, "beside the

thriving tree of science to assume a sterile region in which reside
the eternally lnaoluble problems."

lnatead the enlightened sci-

entist will gradually clarify such problems as space, time, and
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causality 1n the same way that he perfecta bis observations.
There are no boundariea between science and philosophy, Frank concludes, if one sees science the way Mach suggested one should -

•to order the perceptions systematically and from present perceptions to draw concluaiona about perceptioAa to be expected.'
In 1938, Frank viewed Caaa1rer 1 • thoughts about causality
to be akin to his own, a.ad therefore praised the latter for bring•
itll about a •disintegration•• of the classical metaphysical views

of this law.12

ln tb.e same year, Frank restated bis thoughts

about cauaaU.ty in the EQcz:s;LoetsUrl Stf \JA1(led SQISSI• in much

the aw way as in the 1930 article.

la the

F.Q,szs;~ogtdj,a

he sug-

gested, under the section heading "Physical Reality and causal•

ity," that "One must not exaggerate the gap between the new mecb•
anica of small masses and the Newt:onlan mecha.nlca."

To aay that

causality bolds more strictly in the latter would be "a very
inadequate description of the new mechanics," because the two
systems ca.nnot be compared fairly.
ables to describe physical reality.

They uae different state variIn Newtonian mechanics, one

speaks of position and momentum; ln quantum theory, one cannot
give an operational defi.nitioa for botb of these i.n the same description.
Frank re-examined causality twenty years later, in atapters

12cf. "Bemerkun.ge.n zu Ernst Cassirer: Determinismus und
lndeterminlamus in der modernen Pbysik, 11 which is translated in
Chapter IX of tlRde&:Q Scienct fYld lt1 f1U:Losgpn1.
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X.I and XII of Ma r.b1LosgphY of sc;19s;1, which are entitled, res•
pectively, "Causal Laws", and

0

The Principle Of causality."

ideas do not differ fundamentally in the two places.

Ria

According to

Frank the idea of eauaality stems from the .Judaeo•Chriatian belief
in an Qnnisciellt Intelligence 1.n whose mind the future is "pre•
determined" by all past and present events.
"W'hat matters ia not

lAfl.

But for science,

the future I.a determined, but !\21. it is

determined."13
One of the primary dlffleultiea of the principle of caus-

ality ls that one cannot find, with any certainty, wh.ich variables
in an initial state (A) are relevant, so as to know when tbls state

(A) returns again.

Th.is is even more true in field physics th.an

it ls in Newtonian mechanics, since ln the former, variables are

co.nti.nuoua fuactions, rather than discrete.
number of state variables, .. Frank polnta out,

"The greater the
0

the smaller ls the

factual content of the principle of causallty ...14
One can never know if b.e baa left out
able.

•OIDe

important vari-

lf the .number of variable• becomes inflnit•• as the original

view of causality might suggest, then the principle become• tautlOL•
ogous.

For practical purposes, of course, one aa8URlea a small

number of state variables, e.g. a few ld.nda of force like gravity

13f!!ilosgpb.Y of ss&tu!Ci!h 262.
14~•• 274.

128
and electromagnetiam.

•we have a choice,• Frank concludes, •be-

tween makiag the principle of causality precise and tautological
or vague and factua1.•15
simply as fo11owa:

Tb.• tautological form can be formulated

lf A recurs then B recurs also, •• la the

principle of causality.

lut if A never recurs, then the principle

is valld whatever happens.

lt is obvious, according to FraJlk. 1 that "tb.e world process
has happened only o.nce.
of sequences, it makea

lf we regard causality as the recurrence
AO

difference whether we say that the world

process as a whole obeys or diaobeya the principle of eauaa11ty.•16
For thia reason 1 it is practical, and true of acience 1 to consider
only

1

aubcyc1es 1 and •approximate' recurrences.
Tb.ere is another point that one must con.sider, 1n eumi.ning

this subject.

lt has to do with the way in which one determi.nes

or not that the original state (A) has recurred.

ln the example

mentioned above about the outward appearances of magnetised and
no.n•magnetized pieces of iron, it was assumed that one could 1 by
teats 1 eatablish whether or not the iron was magnetized.
NY•t

As Frank

1.hua we can learn that if a certain group of experillenta

11

perfomed with a piece of 1roa ylelda certain specific effects 1
the iron will alao have the effect of a mag.net.a17

151!?14·

16.llll:1l,., 285.

1711W!.•t 187.
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Yet here oae sees that be has inadvertently ••!Wiid the
principle of causality with respect to bia teata.

Thia ia, in

effect, the argumeAt wbicb Kant put forth, while trying to refute
t:be disastrous crltici•a Hume leveled at the notion of eauae.

In

other words, aa Frank aays, "We must take the validity of the
causality principle for granted if we wish to be entitled to say
that a certain experiment reveals to us a certain property of a
body; we must assume that the resuJ.t of our experiment is the

'effect• of this properey.ul8
Frank makes a final point that is important.

Laws, as such,

are distinct from the phenomena tney purport to explain.

The con•

nections between the Laws and the observables are never perfect.
Thus, although the mathematical statement of a law may be exact,
its confirmation can only be approximate, and needs many repeti•
tiona to see the Limit which. it approaches.

In Frank'• words,

"lf we speak in terms of observable phenomena. all laws are stat•
iatica1. 11 19
Certain statistical lawa, 11.ke the firing of a projectile,
admit of limits.

These Frank calls •causal laws.•

also statistical laws which approach no such limit.
of a coin is an example.

But there are
The tossing

Although one can formulate the atatisti•

cal law that the frequency of beads and tails will tend

~o

be

130

equal as the number of tries increases, he can never say wnat tbe
physical behavior of the coin will be on any specific toss.
To sum up, Frank holds that the law of causality can have
no meaningful. place in acience unless it is couched in terms
can be operationally defined.

ti.'1.at

Even in such casea, it is a vague

law• and does not apply equally to all phenomena.
4•

1ndus:tj,pe yd I.,ogiac

IA

§r;Mmtif ic

t1eth22

ti\at is tt'l'he Scientific Method"?

Sometimes it is suggested

that science differs from non-science by proceeding from particu•
Lars to generals, 1n a process called induction.

Th.is is in con-

tradistinction to the derivation of particulars from general prin•
ciples - the method of mathematics and theology called deduction.
However, Fri.I.Ilk has shown that such a distinction is a one-sided
picture.

Both inductive and deductive phases belong in science -

perhaps simultaneously, although they are analyzed separately for
the sake of description.
Briefly put, the aclentiflc method is a full circle, which
may be described as follows:

the scientist observes nature; then

he suggests a theory which may explain what he sees; from this
theory he deduces hypotheses wh1ch are testable; finally, he experiments to validate or refute the hypotheses.

If the tests bear

out the hypotheses, he says the theory ia confirmed; if not, he
repeats the cycle again, making modifications along the line,
where necessary.
'l'he deductive phases of the cycle present tb.e least prob-
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tems.

They follow the rules of syllogistic reasoning that have

been known from at least as far back as Socrates.

lt is the in-

ductive pbases which are the most i11trigui.ng, because they do not

easily Lend themselves to rules. or even to ex.act description.
For this reason. the philosophy of science c&.n be called ths eff crt
to discover the meaning of induction.
When it comes right down to cases of scientific theorizing,
onn is hard put to describe just what the scientist does to derive
his theory.

There seems to be a certain openness involved - a gap

between the facts and the theoretical description - which the scientist must bridge in his mind; it is a gap that allows of intui•
tion and artistry, more than exact method.

Frank notes this in

uiany places, and cites, for example, Einstein and Ca.rnilp as two
famous scie,ntists who are in accord with the idea.

J.

n.

Woodger• on the other band, seems to fault Frank for

taking a.n unnecessarily 1.nf orma.L view of scientific method.
review of Frank's

M@tm Scil!J&e 1nd

l~s

ln a

Phi=Lo12Rlll• Woodger dis-

cusses F'rank 1 s views on what• exactly t physicists observe t and how

the things they observe are related to the statements they make in
their notes.

He seems to suggest that a proper logical analysis

of scientific methodology would in fact Lead to a precise formula
wb.ich one might go about in order to find acientific truth.
Woodger says,

The problems vill never be properly cleared up
until someone carrl.ea out the laborious task of making
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a complete f ormalizatioA and ax1omatiaatlon of a small
part of physical theory, showing in minute and convincing detail every step of the procedure from the labora toey bench to the fully elaborated theory.. The Polish
methodologists bave shown us how this ia to be don.e.
But one curious feature of this book 1.s the complete
absence of any meation of the great Pollsb school of
methodology wb.icb. f lourish.ed between the two world wars
and contributed so much to the clarlf lcation of the
problems discussed 1n these essays and greatly inf luenced some members of the Vienna Circle. The namea of
Kotarbinski, t.esniew1~, Lukasiewica and Tarski do not
appear 1.n its pagea.z
'lb.is criticism is typical of the comments which Frank's
works receive, faulting him for an apparent oversight, when in
reality, Frank simply does not agree with what the critic says ..

Tlle article is also typical in misconstruing Frank's informal
style and Lack of minutia for a shallowness of knowledge of his
field, which Woodger, and other critics, are easer to supplement.
The truth is, .as has been pointed out above, Frank's knowledge of
these subjects is encyclopedic, and his broadly general presen-

tations represent a distillation of a thorough scholarship - the
77

cream 0 , as one of Frank's students called 1t.
With regard to the place of the scientist's personality in

bridging the gap between facts and theories, Frank cites Ernst
Mach, who described induction in these words:

0

Above all, it is

not a logical process although such processes can be inserted as
intermediary and aux1U.iary links.

The principal effort that
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Leads to tb.e discovery of new knowledge is due to

11!•5r•st1.911

and

Yl!&inaSisM•u21
Ae noted earlier, it is clear that the scientist doea not
simply 'read off 1 his theory from the facts he observes.

A theory

which is a simple enumeration of observations ts not a theory at

all; it is a catalogue.

Such a Listing could have no use, because

it would be just as complicated as the world it

1

described.•22

Instead of this approach, there must be, on the part of the acien•
tist 1 an intelligent guess as to a simple a.nd exact symbolic rep-

resentation of things which are neither: simple nor exactly knowable.

In th.is sort of enterprise, the greatest scientists are

necessarily aJ.ao tb.e greatest simplifiers of nature.

?bat is,

they are those wb.o cu symbolize a.a. infi.Aiteiy various nature, of
which they have observed a ama11 piece, ltt language that can be

grasped

by

a finite miad.

Newton was able to synthesize into
moving

OJle

system the realms of

bodies, the celestial gyrations, and the changing tides.

All of these bad been carefully described tor hundreds of years
before him; it was hi• special contribution to see their inter•
coanectedneaa.

Such an ability indicates a strong conviction on

Newton'• part th.at there was indeed an order to be discovered.

It

is the same conviction which one finds in Einstein's words, cited

21fbi12•smbl of sstsrnse, 319.
220ne wonders, in light of thia, what u•e is to be pex:fo.umd
by various governmental agencies which gather •statistics•, on subjects which are not yet under study, on the assumption th.at they
may soon be.
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by Frank, "The most incomprehensible thing about the world is that
it is comprehe.nslble.•23
Such an overri.ew, or synthesizing approach, is the area in

which philosophy aAd aclence meet appropriately.
what Frank calls metaphysics.

It belongs to

Philosophy in this aenae deals with

more than the search for goals to guide scientific knowledge.

It

also influences science proper by entering into the psychological

make-up of the sciMtist, and coloring his choice of theories,
coloring the experimental teats he deduces from the theories, and

even coloring the very observations he makes.
Frank has addressed b.imself to the subjective element in
science, in m.&n7' places.

In apaper of 1954, for example, entitled

unie Variety of Reasons for the Acceptance of Scientific 'lheor•

ies,n24 he speaks of some scientists having a 'double standard' of

truth, including the 'bard facts• of their work, and the metaphysical or religious beliefa they carry outside their work.

Tb.is

duplicity is bound to arise it one co.nsidera science to be a
'picture of realiey 1 1 or a

1 co1Lection

of facts•.

Actually, no

theory is 1n full agreement with facts, let alone a complete pic•

ture.

lnstead 1 as Frank aays 1

.. several

theories that are in par-

tial agreement (present themsel ve~ , and we have to determine the

23cf. *Einstein, Mach and Logical Positivism, u

24Appearing i.ll 1A.I v•&~<li!;&gn

Fra.nlt, 1956.

o:

12£. W,.

ssiaJD~i,i; Ib~. ed.

r
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final theory by a compromise.u25

Thia campromiae always takes into

account the use to which the theory vi.11 be put.

ln Frank's words,

"Science actually la an instrument that serves the purpose of con•
necting present events wltb future events and deliberately util•
izea this knowledge to shape future physical events as they are
desired."

s. v;1L4atisa

9£ Ihto;iet

Frank discuasee in several places the cha.Ages that have

occurred hiatorically in the reasons for accepti.ng scientific
theories.
deduction.

:the ucienta are salc:l to have proceeded primarily by
For example, it is said that Aristotle started with

principles of phl1oaopb.lca1 generality, such aa the idea of
•natural place' to which bodies like earth

OJ:

fire, tend.

However,

practical science bas always u&ed both i.Aduction and deduction.
As Frank points out• "Aristotle

did not find his genera.l principles

ln hi.a dreams, but advanced them on the baala of experience that

cOJlslated in the sum of the individual facts that had been observed. "26 He continues,

"Tb.•

difference between ancient and mod·

ern science was not the use of induction - ancient science was
based on induction aa is modern science - but the criteria by
which a discovered pr:i.Aclple vaa recognized to be valid."

252u,. si&· t 13.
26&J.&i121$X 2' §s~ID.S!b 298 •
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"How are theories validated?"

"Why are they accepted?"

These questions have two different answers, and one should consider
them separately.

With respect to validation, one might at first

think that any theory which can lead by logical steps to statements

confirm.able by experiment could be called valid.

Thia ia not so,

as Frank points out, with a bizarre example from Russel.

We start from the assumptions that 'bread is made
of stone,• and that •atone is nourishing.• Then it
follows logically that 'bread is nourishing.• This
statement can be confirmed by experiments. If someone
claims for this reason that we have confirmed our
aaaumptiona, he would certainly be ridiculous. Accord•
1.ng to Russel, a great many ~gnfirmations of physical
hypotheses are of this type.21
It has sometimes been felt that the calculus of probabil•
ities, a branch of mathematics, can be employed to establish the
validity of physical theories.

The process would be to establish

the degree to which the theory is borne out by experlmentation
that aims to test it.

Frank presents at some length different

theories of probability which nave been argued in the last ge.neration, including especially the ideas of Reichenbach, Carnap, and
Bronowski.
Reichenbach, and Richard von Mises, for instance, have been
strict adherents to the *'relative frequencyu view, which can be
explained as follows:
ing probability.

Reic.i.~enbacb.

proposes two methods of comput-

ln tb.e "probability of the first kind," one may

27foupdatiopf! 2' Phx1ic1, 431.

r
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regard as the basic collective all facts wh.1cb can be logically
derived from the theory.

If there were 'n' of these facts, and

'm' of them were actually observed in experiments, the probability
of the theory would be given by 'm/n'.

In the nprobability of the

second kind," the basic collective is the realm of observables
which have been explained by a group of theories.

Let ua say th.at

there are 'n 1 observables, e.g. the behavior patterns of light in
a certain optical system; and the theories proposed are the

Huygnens Wave theory, and NewtOfti.an mechanics.
were to account for

1

If the first tbecry

m1 of these observables, and the second to

account for 'k' of them, the probability of the former would be
1m/n',

~

while that of the latter would be 'k/n'.

Actually, these

kinds of probablllty d1ff er only 1n the operational cleflni·

tions which describe their application.
There are problems in trying how to decide which application of the calculus of probabilities is appropriate.

For example,

one might suggest that t.f he threw a switch to turn on a light one

thousand time•• and the light went on in all but the last trial.
th.en the probability of the llght 1 a going on the next time would
be

999/1000.

Obviously• on the contrary, one would expect the

light to fail the next time.
Hilda Geirlnger suggests another example agalnet the
tive frequency• JIOdel.

1

W'ritl.ng 1n a paper of 1938, ahe says.

Let us assume that someone advance the hypothesis
H that •every triangle has a.a obtuse angle.• ln order

rela-
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to test bis aesertion 1 we picked out a hundred triangle• at random and measured them. The result may
be that H is right in seventy cases and wrong in
thirty cases. Then the scientist would obviously
say that "H ia wrong 1 " 1'1d not that it is •valid with
a probability of 7()4J. 1 2
Carnap presented yet another view of probability, which bas
been called 'logical probability• and 'inductive probability.•

It

ia to be used in caaea where the relative frequency concept cannot
be applied.

It ia logical rather than empirical, because it con•

sidera not the truth of actual observations, but the logical ties
between these observations aa evidence (e) 1 and the hypothesis (h)
which purports to derive them.

Thus, for example, one Dligbt exam•

ine the realm of Kepler'• hypothesis about the elliptical orbits
of planets.

By Carnap's analyai•, one should expect that any

planet would lie between. two ellipses whose separation depends
upon the range of error one might foreaee.

The area between these

two ellipses Carnap would call the measure of the hypothesis
~(h~ •

Each observation of a planet would yield its position

within a certain range of error, which would constitute a small
circle on the atar map.

lf one added up all such little circular

areas that correspond to the observed positions of the planet in
question, he would have a measure of the evidence (m(e)J •

The

areas which are held in cOllllOn by the observed &Ad the theoretical
positions is m(e&b.).

Rf

Carnap'• thesis then may be stated thus:

28•o.n the Probability of Hypotbeaea,• cited in PQiloaop9Y
Sci•nc•• 326.
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The inductive probability of Kepler's hypothesis ls

mC~)

me

•

'l'h.ere are many cases, as carnap himself was quick to point
out, which cAAL'lot be described so simply.

°For instance," he

says, "we can.not expect to apply inductive logic to Einsetin's
general theory of relat1vity.n29 However, as Frank is quick to
remind us, this lack of universal application does not destroy the
usefulness of Carnap's idea; it just makes it another case, Like

the law of causality, where the applicability depends upon the
kind of phenomenon we are trying to describe.
In spite of the differences between Reichenbach 1 s and

Carnap's approach to probability, 1.n many cases of actual application, both methods come to the same result, and the arguments
raised against the former apply equally to the latter.
Jacob Bronowskit 1n 1953, brought in another criterion for
validity, in order to avoid such problems.

plicity or economy, applied in a new way.

lt is the idea of aim•
In cases where two

theories have the same degree of statistical or inductive probability, Bronowsld 1 a suggestion is that the simplest theory is the

most probable.

As an exatnple• one might compare the ideas of

Copernicus and Ptolemy.

Both theories lead logically to the ob-

servables, but Copernicus• theory is more acceptable, because it
is more economical.
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6.

t\scsmt!P&t of

lh1o;les

1he:e are a variety of reasons which Frank puts forward for
~Y

scientific theories are accepted in pr.sct1ce 1 not all of which

are strictly scientific or logical.

The deairea and convictions

of the scientist ptay their roles too.

One might think at first

that scientists would accept or reject a theory Eolety on the
basis of its ability to support observable evidence, anrl that any
so-called •countertactual case' would be grou."tds for eliminating a
theory.

But an honest look at any number of actual theories in

practice will reveal that this is not always true.
For example, it has been suggested that the earth was
thrown off the surfece of the sun while the latter was still in a
molten state• in tth.at hae been called the

0

Tida1 Crest Theory'.

Considering the forces of gravity on tb.e earth, and the liquidity

ot its original state, one would expect that the earth would have
assumed a perfectly

~teal

shape, approximately spherical.

However, the careful observations accrued during the recent Inter•
.national Geophysical Year (lGY) showed that the earth la 1n fact
plum-shaped.

This has not killed the Tidal Crest 'lb.eory, but it

has caused it to be modified ..
One might also, as a mental exercise• imagine th.at one day
it is observed tbat a body thrown up from the surface of the

earth does not come down again, but continues on up out of sight.
Such a happening is inconceivable because the law of gravity is
so well established

b7 experience. ln an event of this sort, one
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might undertake aay amount of reaearch to discover another reason
for the unexpected behavior of the body than the failure of gravi•
tational law.

And if• after this research, one should fail to

fi.nd a suitable exp1aaation 1 he would give it up as an anomaly,
without ever doubting the law of gravity.

Thi•• in spite of the

general rule of logical analysis that atatea, 'If p lmplies q 1 and
not q is the caae 1 theA .not p is the caae 1 1 which ia the form of
all auch cou.nterfactuals.

Even i.n caaea that are leas unlikely 1 acientiata are apt to
refuse to change their vieva about a theory, unless argument•
other tha.n purely logical ones are proposed.
neceaaarily illogical.

Nor ia thl.a attitude

Frank has polated out that "we never have

one theory that la in full agreement [with

obaervatio~

but

several theories that are in partial agreeme.nt 1 and we have to
determi.ne the final theory by a cOllproaiae.•29
Because theories are always 1.ncomplete as well aa very
complex, o.ne cannot refute them simply by pointing to one area in
which they fall to explaia the facts.

fraalr. uya thla 1 i.n effect,

when he diacuaaea tb.e poaaibility of a ao•called •crucial experi•
ment•.

ln Fraak'• word••
A single experiment can only refute a 'theory' if
ve ua.n by 'theory' a ayat• of specific atat. .nta with
no allowance for modification. But what is actually
called a 'theory' ill science ia .never audl a ayat•. lf

29ct.

'th• Vali;!jatioa of IS&•Sific IJHoa;, 14.
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we speak of the 'ether theory' or the •corpuscular
theory• of light, or of the 'theory of evolution' in
biology, each of these names covers a great variety of
possible systems. Therefore no crucial experiment can
refute any such theories. A famous example was the
•crucial experiment' which Arago proposed in 1850 to
test the corpuac:ular theory of light. Thia theory was
refuted in 1855, but in 1905 Einstein again made use
of this theory in a greatly modified form known as the
hypothesis of 'Light quanta• or 'photona,•30
Two criteria for the acceptance of theories were mentioned

above, namely, agreement with facts, and simplicity.

At times

these two are mutually exclusive, i.n which case a compromise
between them becomes necessary.

'l'hat: which make.1 a scientist lean

toward one theory or another is a complex matter.

Th~

concept of

simplicity, for example, involves a whole univ8rae of cliseourse •
not just a mathematical dtgonst!:'ation.

Prank suggests s:t
in the acceptance of a
as, for example, a
ophy of the day•

or fertile

Aaturf> '-'

generate other i.

th't'l~:·~,1:

bf·~...:.~,f

s1~cl:.

''".:tF.;

1<..~st

the following '.;ort• c,t.

co1.1~t( •.en:atiai

Conformity with religiou"' Delief •

1.l'! airacles; conformity with the philos-

·) 1 A;..'"istotelian view of nature; the dynamic
-c··;~:

tbeory, as demonstrated by its ability to

the compatibility of the theory with common

sense or intuit.&.vP< feeli.ng, su dewtonian mechanics exhibits for
most people today; and lastly• the support of desired moral behavkr.

By way of analogy, Frank gives an effective, if somewhat
oversimplified, example of such a compromise.

o;hy of Sciegce;

In his book ft!:ilos•

U!:• LJ.ek lebf!tD Science and lhilosophft as well

30fhilossmsr o( S;iapcg, 31.
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as 1n an earlier paper, "the variety of reasons for the acceptance
of scientific theorle•t"31 Frank liltena the problem to "the choice
of an airplane." He suggests, for l.nata.nce, that one can •enjoy
~he beauty and elegance 0 32 of the plane, as well as that of the

One cannot speak of the truth or tb.e perfection of tha

theory.
theory
0

or the plane• in any absolute ••••·

Rather, Frank says,

We can only ask. Whether it 1a •good•or •perfect' for a certain

purpose.•

ln the p1ane 1 a caae, aucb a purpose may be speed, or

en.durance, or safety, or fun, or •convenie.nce for reading or
aleept.ng.•

"lt is l.mposaible," Frank notes, "to construct an air-

plane which fulfills all Cb.ese purposes in a maximal way; we mu.st
achieve some ccaapromise.

In order to

d.Carmi..ne Che kind

of com-

promise which 'should' be achieved, we must decide which is more

important.

••• 'l'he

a.tU'nHJr

to this question can cer:tai.aly not be

derived from &JV' physical or engineering science."
lt is interesting to note that this analogy of finding a
useful airplane s.-s to have upset one crU:ic of Frank.

C. W.

Kegley labeled Frank's compromise between the technological and

soclologt.cal value of a theory aa "1.ncredible.• He eald• "It
underscores Che confusion of acceptaace by the general public and
by scientists, and confuses the grounrla of accept&Ace by scien-

tists. "33 He also called "aatonlah1ng•, what he interpreted as
31In

11Jt Valisl.lt10Q

Qf

Asill&!i1(iG

'I'hegg:x.

32fbl\!!cmht of SciMS!h 356.
33"Philipp Frank on Scientific 'l'heory and its Relation to
other Inquiries,• 1.n 6tt1 del
'9!H'~!7 1DtKM•l2!11Lt <Ji
fi1oaoti• 1 Vol. 11. Florence,

fii o;

• •
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Frank'• dem&.Qd that acientists criticize and determine the 'human

value• of thelr diacoveriea or tbeorles.
hi• criticism, Keg1.,. quoted Frank

OU1:

Finally, in support of

of context, thus:

"He

(Frank) writes that 1 tb.e ultimate fouadatiOAa of all science• are
strongly lftfluenced by sociology end antb.J:epology.•• Frank's
actual idea was aa fo11owa:

"fb.iloaopb.era of aclmtlfic backgt'ound

who have attepted to consider the m.an enterprt.ae •• a wbole ba'\e

clalmed repeatedly that the u1t:Lmate foundations of all sciences
are strongly influenced by sociology and anthropology.

••• I sub-

mit that there may be much truth I.A it" •34

Perhaps the f artbeat Kegley strayed from a valld inter:•
pretation of Frank's idea• 1• when he auggeated Cbat the latter

took.a upon induct10A aa a process of "derlvln.g scientific statements from general prt.nciplea.n35 That Chis is false bas been

ahown.

a~e,

ln. Cb.apter: 111 1 Section 4.

9?tliEl!!!~-:t~~~=•~tfii~:Rii1!~~~ef~ ~~!'t2~tlt

Ill

35r.eg1ey cites this idea from Frank's "Principles of
Science,• p. 23. Pei=haps he means to say "Philosophy of Sci~nce,"
p. 23., lbere, Frank discusses the chain betwee.n science and
ph1loaopby1 eayt.ng, ln part• "Tbla longing to find out • • • is
nothing more than the longing to derive scientific statements from
general principle• that are p1au.s1b1e and 1.ntelllglble.•

the same criticllll'ft8 whlcb. Kegley raises in thi• article he
raised earlier, in an article entitled 0 Ref1ections on Pb.111pp
Frank'• l'hilosopb.y Of SClencel• i.n ~ If lsiJ.MSI 26, 1959,
35-40. '1.his article la sharp 7 con~T. J. Rutherford, in
his art1cle1 "Frank's Plllloaopb.y of Science RAW'lalted,• l'J!il~
1fy§s1~ce z7 1 1960 1 183-186. Rutherford call• Keg1ey 1 s artcf;
ater cal."
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7.

scient~fis

Lang914g9

Scientific language has been mentioned in passing, several
tlmea above, with respect to operational definitions.

appropriate here to discuss it more specifically.

It is

How does Frank

view the way 1n which scientists put thil\ga verbally, and especially how does he see that scientific language can lead to .mis•
understandings?

It is well to comment first on the language which.

Frank himself used.
As was noted above, in Chapter I, one of Frank's moat
frequently-noted characteriatic• waa his concern for clarity.

He

wrote in terms that were the moat economical and simple he could
find, without doing injustice to tbe complex topics he undertook
to discuss.

For this reason, one finds it all too eaay to over-

look the depth of Frank's thoughts.

It is only after sufficient

time for ref Lection that one begins to appreciate the import of
hia statements.

Bia style of preaentation has been called decep-

tively t..nformal, and, as one etudent noted,36 hla

1

phi1liatine•

listener• were sometime• disappointed, and apt to accuse him of
being lazy.
Frank liked to gear diacusalons to the specific mood of his
,listeners, using contemporary, even mundane illuatratioaa, rather
than preacb.ing from the authoritative position which he obviously
held.

In cases vb.ere hi• sturlenta were unprepared for the intri-

cacies of theoretical mathematics, for instance, he modified his

36cf. Chapter 1, above.
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presentations in Language vhicb was familiar to them.

One atu•

dent•s comment • that Frank liked to atart eaeb class with a
resume • point• out a characteristic that la evident in all his
writing aLao.

His major idea• occur over and over again, being

couched in easy, comfortable Language, developed each time by many
example• fr0tn his own experience, as well ae from the writings of

men he bad studied.
ln these traits, Frank ref Lects one of the fundamental concerns of twentieth-century philosophy • first among the Vienna
Circle followers and the Logical Empiricists• and latterly, within
the circle of so-called Linguistic Analyata, especially in England

and America.

ln Frank'• opinion, it is in the developments of

language that modern philosophy f1nda its forte.

He aays. for

example, "The new physics does not teach us anything about •matter'
and •spirit', but mucb about setD&Dtica • ..37

And, again, u1 believe

that the advances in philosophy which have been stimulated by
twentieth-century phyaica, like relativity and quantum tbeory, are
aot advances 1n metaphysic•, but advances in aemantica.•38
la an article entitled

0

No.n-sc1entific Symbol• in Scl-

ence, tt39 Frank discuaus the way in which scientific language can
be abused, on the one hand by those who advance the cause of anti-

37"Tb,e Present Role of Science," Loe., ca:t .. , 8.

38ttconte.'tlporaz:y Science and tbe Contemporaxy World View,"
12£. cj,t. • 63.
391.n ~Su=:b~=-=~~;&lllll~~p:.:....:.u.~:.-=~wi;p~
of the Conf erenee
1952, Harper Row,

r
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matter. such as J. J. Thomson and Rutherford• and on the other
hand by those, like the Marxists, who hold matter to be good.
Both extremes
1

overton~s•

tions.

comE~

from taking from scientific symbols certain

which are not to be found in their operational defini-

Frank suggests that the positivistic approach, as a ttneu-

tral" or non-committal view, is most fruitful, and avoids the pitfalls of the ex·i:remes.
the status of

Se says, "'Positivism' attempts to clarify

no~-scientific

symbols in science.

lt does not deny

their legitimacy, provided that this status is kept in mind.n40
The positivistic view of Language, which Frank inherited,
stems from a belief, first, in the efficacy of science to solve
human problems and to discover truth, and, secondly, from the
belief that traditional metaphysics loses all its meaning by in•
corporattng a language of universals which cannot be put to the
test of experience.

The first manifestations of this latter view

were put in reactionary and extreme terms. as in Qiapter II.

Mach• according to Frank, considered that

0

physics is noth-

ing but a collection of statements about the connections among
sense perceptions, and theories are nothing but economical means
of expression for summarizing these oonnectiona."41

In keeping

with this view, Mach advocated the elimination of metaphysics.
Similarly, Peirce and James, wnom Mach met in Europe• leaned away

40iw•• 348.

4ltto<lei;n Science and lts fhiLosophI, 62.

r
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from metaphysics toward the •cash value' of ideas, as the criterion
for their validity.
The pragmatic view of language Le<l to the formulation of
what has been called the •verifiability criterion of meaning,•
among the positivists of the Vienna Circle and its associates.
Carnap• tor example• held that meaningful discourse is either
(1) tautologous (analytical), such as in mathematics or logic,
(2) contradictory (and hE>.nce, false), or (3) empirical.

metaphysics is none of these, it must be meaningless.

Since
"Metaphyai-

cians 1" carnap jibed, uare musicians without talent.n42
'Lhe strict atomistic empiricism of the earlier positivism
faded out 1n the twentieth century, so that the so-ca11ed Logical
Empiricists of the Twenties no longer felt that meaningful langtll@e
is limited to 'observational tcrms 1 1 like red, warm, and spots
touching.

One might, 1t was allowed, uae abstractions. so long as

the statements derivable from the abstractions could be checked by
experiment.

There are concepts, as ?'re.,."lk poi:lte<l out, which "can-

not be deductld from sensory raw me.teriat.n43

Again, "According to

the conception of Logical empiricism the relations between symbols
which fcrm the:
by a11y Losical

5 top 1

of any scientific theory can.1.1ot be produced

mE:tho<-~.

'I.heir origin can only be exple.ined psycl:lo-

logical.ly. 0

42cf. Frank's "The Pragmatic Flement in Carnap's Elimination

Of Metaphysics, tt in ~I
Schilpp• Chicago, 19 ,

~il¥Ueb% Qf

9-

•

{\Us\ol{ Ca(Q,Jh e<l. P. A.

43nF.instein, Mach anc.~ Logical Positivism., 1oc. ci;. • ?80.
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It is th.e latter view, rather tha.n the strict

1

op~rational

ism1 of Bridgman, which Frank developed in his later works.

Not

that Frank ct:itici.zed Bridgman unfavorably; b.e a,sret'<l with the

Latter in respect to the application of Language of science gua
science.

But

F~ank

saw th.at meaning goes beyond the operational

ciefinitio.n - the Oi>eratio.r1s one performs to test t.11.e idea.

Frank

saw the non-scientific aspects of scie11c:EJ• for wb.ich operational-

ism fails to hold.
Discussing the c:our ses he taught in philosophy of scie·nee,

Frank illustrated this more moderate view.
he said,

0

0

t take great pains,"

t:o present an adequate conception of 'straight meta-

physics' and, at the other extreme, 'straight positivism' 'Which
bluntly says th.at there is W! principle exce.!pt those which can be

confirmed by the agreEltnent of their consequences with @xperience. 044

In this latter group, F'ra.nk would include Hume• Comte,

Sta11o, Peirce, Mao.;., Poiticare, James, Dewey• Bridgman• Wittgen-

stein ancl Carnap.

G'HAPTER Vll
SCIENCE AND CULTURE

As has been demonstrated in numerous examples above, Frank
h.ad

a great interest in science, not only as a theoretical disci•

pline and. a source of truth about nature, but also as it fits into
the Whole human endeavor.

Whatever confidence he may have felt in

the processes of science as the best way to thi.a.k, he recognized
the need to integrate science into the liberal education and social
philosophy of the culture that developed it.

Lacking such an in•

tegration, he felt, science had been abused, and misunderstood.
The efforts of this Chapter will be to co.naider more closely the

role that science can, and in Frank's opinion, ought to play, for
the advancement of society, not only as a tool for its material
well-being, but more important, as a way of thinking.
There

ar~

natural tendencies for scientists to develop an

attitude of uncritical isolationism, and for science to divorce
itself from other fields.

ln the first place, society at large

often views scientists, especially

u..~ivers1ty

types, as cold and

reasoning individuals, wbo steep themselves in abstractions which
have little appeal for the conmon man.

i-~urther,

science is also

viewed at times with suspicion as an agency for the advancement of
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lSl
materialism• and the engines of political power.
been

Th.is view ltas

supported from time to time by cases in which politically

naive scientists have become dupes of governmental leaders, or
social reformers, who uae the scientists• reputation and profes•
sional aki1L to support their own schemes for power.

Often scien-

tists, particularly those knowledgeable in the field of war
machinery, have been targets for defection operations mounted
against major world powers, like America and the SOVlet Union.
On the other hand, scientlsta themselves add to the es-

trangement by viewing the political and philosophical worlds with
suspicion or disgust.

Th.ey are not at home in the realm of un-

predictable human actions.

Instead of becoming involved ln poli-

tical and social machinations. or philosophical speculation, they

prefer to lea<l a cloistered 11fe in the safety of their laboratories, where all the variable• are known, or at least knowable.
Physicists may call the attempts to find metaphyeical interpretations of scie.nce - for example, the theories of relativity - just
so much nonsense.

8ut 1 as Frank comments, "Unfortunately, this

•nonsense• has a powerful effect upon human behavior, and a phyalcist who is not able to glve his students a precise account of the
philosophical repercussions of relativity does not fulfill the
auties of a physics teacher in a democratic society."1
In an article entitled "Science Linked to Life, n2 Frank
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suggeata one way in which aclentiats

~•n.b.elp 1

through publica•

tions. to overcome the tendency to divorce acleoce from culture.
Science does not normally advance. he says, through the publishing
of booka 1 in the. way that other fields do.
lfl•tlxl~

is a rare exception.

more ef foi:-ts along this 11.o.e.

linate#.n'a HtfaJ,,pg of

There ahould 1 Frank think.s 1 be
For example, one aigb.t use

:,
11

l

i
I

I.

I

~ortho•

dox texts in his courses that place equal emphasis on the mathe•
matical, the experimental, and the philosophical views.

Tb.is would

allow for more comparison and choice on the students• part.

Also,

more 1bandbooks 1 and other reference materials should be made
available.

Another important area is in the ao-called 'populari•

aat1on 1 of aclentlflc findings for the consumption of

1 1ayaen•.

frank calls for more 'literary' works to be written by trained
scientists, JllefttlOAing by way of illustration the book gQ•fph

SIQO'• B\• Llfe
add

•ed.. Wgrk.

Of

more recent publications, we might

Tbt M1sft! IMS•Cf 1 and XU T.Grlto.£it•I. lnsatlye.

seema 1 as a matter of fact, that biology has been far more
to literary interpretation than other aciences.

It
g~ven

Finally• books

that combine humanistic and scientific philosophy are needed.

As

a good example of this, Frank cites C&•sirer's book, 'tJ\t ptob\n

2( &!cmlf!dU•
Today 1 looking over the ac1eAtific publlcatioas since 1950,
when Frank's critici• waa written, OAe ia surprised and encouraged
to see that all the typea of writing that Frank mentioned, de•
acrlbed above, have undergone an 1.o.creaae of publication.

This is

especially true in the populari.zatiOAs of scientific developments,

!

I
I
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and more recently, 1n the u.p-gradl.ag of text materials, such as
th.e Bi.ologlcal SCience Curriculum

S~t and

the Physical Science

Study Commlttee aeries for high school, and beglmat.ng college

courses.

1n view of this one wonders if Frank'• early crlt1c1am

was somehow 1Af1uentia1.

At any rate, the lncreaaes i.n publica-

tions indicate tbat Prank's opi.nt.on of the COW\tey 1 s need.a in th.la
area has become the generally-accepted opinion.

The first place to begin ef f orta at reuniting acience and
the humanities is, of course, in the science classroom.

A sci•

e.ntist who i.a knowledgeable of hi.a cultural environment should be
particularly well-suited to develop in his students a sense of

direction - to give

them what

Hutchi.ns has called wisdom, namely,

"the knowledge of principles and causes.n3

§Sl!BS!;

Iha LMJ!s il£ntA IQIQSI

ln his fb&losoehX of

!Qd £bi121mmza Frank describes

th.e potential educational value of science in terms similar to

those of Hutchins.

'!'here, he says,

Science has to do• on the one hand, with hard
stubborn facts 1 and on the other hand, with general
ideas. 5.'hat aei.e.nce teacbes us is the correlation
between both. 'lhe chief thing w'li.versity educators
should give to students la interest in tb.e possibility
of coordinating stubborn facts by means of abstract
prillcipl.es. 1.'hia is the most faacioatlng topic of
university education. • •• We need a full understand•
!.Ag of the principles of physics or biology, and under•

301ted 1.n EllilosPQb,Y gf isl:8"1t xiii.

,1

1
'

'
j,I
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ae&nding not only of logical argument but alao of P81'•
chological and sociological lava; briefly, we need to
complement the science Of physical nature b)' the science of man. 4 ·
l'bia is the potential value of science.

However, it is a

matter of tact that: science teachers often fail to meet Cbeir
potential, :ln Che classroom.

'J.b.8" tend to be dull, eometlaes even

o.n purpose, from a misguided aenee of duty to what Chey call •objectlvity1.

lt is safe to say that most atudenta who atay t.n sci-

ence do ao J.B. m;1 of their teachers, rather than lflSl.Qll of th-.
These atude.nta are so highly motivated to learn about science that

they put up with their education, for the sake of the end.

"there ia scarcely any doubt,,. Frank observes, "that the
teachers of pb.lloaopb.7 1 hiatoq 1 or EngU.ab. bave a much greater ln-

flue11ce upon the intellectual and emotional make-up of the average
college atUdent than the teacbera of maeh.atics or cll•istry."S
Wben faced with questions about the mean1ng of science I. proaoa of
the •relativity of trutb. 1 or the 'freedom of the td.11 1 1 Frank
c1a1.ma 1 "The ac1ent1at will, aa a matter of fact• often be more
helpleae than an intelligent reader of popular magaa:l.nes."6

eoa-

ventional teaching i.n science baa resulted 1n uncritical tM..ald.ng ..
Frank goes on to observe, ttthe Longing for the :l.ntegration of
knowledge is very deeply rooted ln the human ml.Ad.

4£b&&ii2WIZ gf
'

j

§ci1PSS!1 xiv.

s~•• xv.

~ss a;&snc,~ I&! ftY.L2•sm.ut. 230.

If it 1• 11ot

155
cuJ.tivated by the science teacher• it will look for other outlets. n7
Such other outlets may be popular presentations of scie.nce,
or worse, even anti•acientific ideologies.

Thus, the student with

a purely technical training is, Frank continues, "extremely gullible when he is faced with paeudopbi.losophic and pseudoreligious
interpretations 'that f 111 somehow tb.e gap left by bis acie.ace

couraea."8

'lhia writer i.a rf!llli...Nled of a piece of graffiti that

made the rounds of the engineering school he attended.

lt pictured

a country bick.1 with bayaeed in hie hair, and a sliderule in his

pocket, saying, "Two years ago 1 couldn't even spell 'lnjuneer•,
and now 1 Ga one I "
Frank recommend• th.at cou.raea in the pbiloaopb.y of science

be made obligatory tor all students of science, be it pure science

or technology.

1n the chapter of tlOJiltra Sc1taa and lttl

rl!iLosE1Y

entitled .. Philosophy of Science in the Physic• CUrr1culum 1 ° he
outlines sucb. a course, aa he taught it at Harvard for many years.

"t1 starting point,"

he

eays there, "has been the traditional dis-

tinction between •scientific truth.' and

1

pbJ.Losophic truth.'

Specifically, 1 have referred to the formulation that the great

medieval philosopher, lhotnas Aqulna.a, gave to Ch.ls diati.nction."
Fram t:hia point, Frank gives a hiatorical survey of principles Cbat have been used by adentiata, as a basis for their
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1>ropositions.

His students studied the mechanistic period in its

entirety - approximately 1600-1900 - based on Newtonian laws of

mechanics.

To show that these latter are not 'self-evident' the

students examined tb.e earlier period of Aristotelian or 'organis•
mic' science.

Having established this historical perspective,

Fra.ak took his students through the development of 'Logico-empir•
ical analysis'• and showed its .epplicat1on to tb.e most relevant

parts of physics today 1 such as geometry 1 Iiewtonian mechanics, the

corpuscular and relativistic theories of light, and quantum theory.
Similar examination was given to causality, determination, chance,

energy and mass.

Finally, the course examined the philosophical

interpretations of science, and what Prank calls "the lin.k. of
metaphysical creeds with religious and political creeda.u8
Tb.is is the way in which Frank tried, in his ovn work, to
reestablish the link between philosophy and science.

Whatever

merits his particu.1.ar approach to the course may be, Frank makes

a strong case for this kind of study in the well-rounded curriculum.

He generalizes hia convictions

about the efficacy of such.

a program, thus:
lf science is taught in thia way, t:b.e emphasis o.n
science ane. technology will no longer be an obstacle
t:o a Liberal education of the student. Tb.e deplorable
gap between science and the humanities will not arise,
let aloae widen. On t:be other hand, the latenalve
stuciy of science as a living being will give to the
student of it a prof oun<l understanding of tb.e role of
the human mind 1n human action, which. is the very goal
81,W.., 258.
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of instruction in the humanities.9
Frank's suggestions about science teaching seem almost
prophetical.

ln the last few years there has been a tendency

among science textbook writers, and curriculum study committees,

to follow some of the suggestions that Frank has offered.

Partic-

ularly effective are the Biological Science Curriculum Study, and
the Physical Science Study Committee, supported by federal and
private funds, wilich have combined the experience and ideas of
thousands of teachers throughout the United States, to develop a
unified approach to the teaching of science to high school, and
latterly, to college students.

One of their principal beliefs is

that one cannot simply teach fa5g1; indeed, the explosion of know-

ledge in the sciences has 1Rtde 1t a practical impossibility to
learn all the facts, even were it desirable to know them.

This

Frank would agree with entirely.
The effort baa now become, of necessity• a search for gen•
aralizat1ons and unifying principles.
Frank tells about Einstein.

One

is reminded of a story

The Latter was once confronted with a

remark Thomas Edison had made about the uaeless.neaa of college
education.

When someone told Einstein what Edison bad said, he

answered, "lt ia not so very important for a person to learn facts.
For that he does not really need a college.
9~•• 282.

He can Learn th• from
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books.

The value of an education in a liberal arts college is not

the learning of many facts but the training of the mind to think

sometlling that cannot be learned from textbooka. 11 10 Tllis remark
also characterizes Frank's attitude.
3.

~cie,gtif!£

Specia\lzati9n

Sometimes it is held that the depth of detail demanded of a
scientist in order to be a leader in his field makes it impossible
for him to gain a proper perspective on his study.

He has to run,

just in order to keep from falling behind, it b.as been said.
Therefore, in order to gain any depth. of understanding, scientists
must limit their area of study drastically.

Gone are the days of

the so-called 'natural philosopher' who knew something of all the
sciences, and tried to integrate them with an overview.

Now there

are experts in solid-state electronics, laser optics, crystal•
ograph.y, and the like - topics that are totally foreign to the
uninitiated.

As Frank points out,11 it seems almost like another

Tower of Babel, where there bas been a •confusion of tongues•, and

the progeas

baa stopped.

How does Frank answer this criticism?

He holds that there

is actually a unifying trend within science th.at tends to overcome
the disintegrating effect of specialization.

Aa more and more is

discovered about particular sciences, 'Which at first seemed to be

lOcited in f.io@;fHl.i.

His

&ife and Tkla, 185.

llcf. "Contemporary Science and the Contemporary World
View, 11 Loe. cit., 60.
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disparate 1 principle• are dlacovered wh1ch can be applied to more
than one branch of study• thua reunltlng them.

For example, the

apparent boundariea between traditional 'chemistry• and traditional
'phyalca• have been broken down, so that one can now study physical chemistry, or atomic pbyaica 1 aa intermediate areas.

Much. the

same elimination of boundaries seems to be tald.ng place as well in
the area of bio-phyalce.
Some educators look for integrating principles to come from
so-called perennial philoaophlea 1 which will not need revision.
For Catholics 1 this might be provided by Thomism; for Communists,
by Dialectical Materialism.

But Frank warns that there would be a

high price to pay for such perm&nel'lt unifying principles.

The

only way to keep euch ph11oaopb.1es from becoming outmoded would be
to eliminate their direct connection to present reality • in other
words, to make them tautologous and irrefutable.
see this as a satisfactory solution.
1

Frank does not

1Datead 1 he offer• the

acient1fic method' as the only realistic way of integration.

Scientists and philosophers need not agree on uL;1!!te general
princlples 1 in order to agree on the practical aims of their

education

4.

and researcb.12

S5\enst anq

Mft~r1•&ltm

lt vas seen above that science has often been called upon
to support varying philosophical and moral codes; in.deed, one anc
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the same ac1entif ic theory baa at times bean used to prove two
contradictory ideas.

Because the making of generalizations is a

creative. human endeavor, wblch. can go far beyond the collecting
of facts, it can often be abused in the sense mentioned.

The link·

ing of science and philosophy ia of ten as much a matter of personal
taste as it is a matter of logic.

As R. Oppenheimer once said,

commenting on a paper of Frank. 1 a, "Everything cannot be connected
with everythlftg; everythlng can be co.nnect:ed with anything.•13
Does science encourage ma teriallatic thinking 'l

Al though

one cannot say that a particular scientific theory supports this or
that metaphysical qst•, or naoraL code• ia there not some ev:l.dence
Chat scientific tblnking in general supports material1811l't

After

all, scientists look for causal lows wholly within the material
realm, and do not consider any other realm.
lt appears that Frank'• vie'tl of this 411ueatioa cbanged some-

what toward the end of his life.

ln 1938, in the lpsY'cL!?.R!d'=! of

ynifltd Sciense, Frank suggested that metaphysical terms do not

belong i.n science.

'J.'b.ere he satd, "A •soulless• pqcbology and a

•matterless' phyaica have been eatabl.iahed as parts of 'Unified
Science.•

Word• 11.lte •matter• and •mind' are left to the language

of everyday life where they have their legitimate place and are

W'lder•t:OOd by the famous 'man i.n the street• unamblguoua1y.n14

13ct. "1.be Growth of Science and the Structure of CUlture:
Comments on Dr. Frank's Paper, .. DtedtLY! 87, 1958, 67-76.
1422,. si.t•t 502.

II'

~
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Similarly, one critic of Frank's book, Modtm sc&.11999 and 1§1.

filiL012alll:t suggested th.at its main thesis waa:

"There are no sig-

nificant questions th.at are ao profound that they cannot be solved
by tb.e

exact aciencea.nl5
Toward the end of his 11fe, Frank exhibited an increasing

tendency to view science proper &Ad its metaphysical interpret&·
tio.na to be somehow integrated 1n the person of the scientist.
The connection is not a logical one; 1t ia paycholog1ca1 1 and it

certainly is real.

ln respect to tb.e queation. asked about mater•

iali.sm anc1 science, tb.en 1 one can claim thia:

Science does not

1.ead to, or support, a material.iatic view of life, nor does it
discourage or refute it.

Such a view of life R£•£tdll the know-

ledge that acience offera, since it is pare of the makeup of the

scientist.
In oi:der to avoid the materialistic interpretation, if it
is to be avoided, educators mwst do two things.

First, aa Frank

suggests, they must show the historical development of science and

its several revolutt.ona, and the metaphysical interpretations that
have been attached to it from time to time.

'l'his vlll break down

the idea. 1 on the one ba.n.d. 1 that there is a 'right' interpretation,
and on the ot:her ha.od 1 it will ebow how closely I.inked science and

its interpretations are, as a matter of fact.

Secondly, educators

must establish. the aoats for which they vish science to be employed, not only as a technical tool, but especia11y 1 as a way of

thought.
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These ideas do not tell what Frank. may have felt personally
with. respect to materialism as a philosophy.

l'hi• writer is unable

to interpret hia views in this regard, v1th any degree of certainty.
One

might aasUl'l.\e, from the 1.nterest Frank b.ad 1n such groups ••

the Co.nfertmce on science, Ph.l.Loaophy and Religion, that he vaa
not a materialist, although h1• background was positiviatic.

Frank was born a Jew, wblc:h ceul.d support the same conclusion.
Yet one of his Lifett.me friends has auggeated thla conclusion is

on shaky ground.

She

aaya,

8

Ph111pp might have 'been an aeh.elat." 16

1n terms of hi.a vlews on truth• Frank • • an empl.rict.at.

However, he seems to view empt.rt.cal. knowledge in a very broad way
• broad enough, one might even say, to admit of atl experience.
la 1950, for instance, be stated,

Beyond experience, reason and imagination there are
no faculties by which the human mind can find knowledge.
the cooperation of these three faculties follow• one and
the same general pattern in all fields. Not only science
proper, but also politics and religion, are ultimately
based on principles that are the result of creative
1mag1nat.1on, and that are teated by experience.17

A scientist who claims to baae his ideas on facts must take
into account historical and psychological facts too.
this frequently.

Frank noted

Thus the truest view of the world must include

the ec1.ant1st 1n it as a human, alongside the Chin.gs he studies.

16t..etter from Mme. R. von Mises to Justin Synnestvedt,
April 10, 1969.
17se1a5iv&u1 ..A N&1l!r I(g~h,

ss.

i
'I,
I'
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ln the words of Heisenberg, mi.ch Frank cited in one of his last
writings, "Method and object can no Longer be aeparated. 0 18

Else-

where, i.n the same year, Frank suggested that it is false to
separate pure science from QUJ.tural values.

Such a vlew 1 he main•

tai.ned, "ignores the close ties vh.l.cb. have always a.ad everywhere
existed between

maA 1 a

picture of the pl\ya1ca1 universe and his

picture of an ideal human society."19
Finally, collating theae idea.a, one is safe to assume

t..iutt

Frank felt science does not strengthen any one view of the nature
of reality over any other.

Rather it is a way of aymboliaing

reality, just aa poetry is another way.

Neither way gives the

•true picture•. As Frank aaid 1 "Reality can o.nly be experieACed 1
never repreaented. 1120

s.

S;,1tace anq R.!m2craa
After World War 11 there were many pb.11osophical confer·

ences and many works written to reexamine democratic ideals, and
to determine what forces in society might e.xplain the growth of
autocracies in various parts of the world.

Frank belonged to one

such effort - the Conference on Science, Ph.ilosoplly and Religion•
from its start in 1940.

His book, R!!Latj,v&tx:

A JY:chtE Iruhl!,

published in 1950 1 is an integration of llis ideas as they were

1.2£. £&.t.
Present Role of Science, " 12£. sit.• , 14 •

18"?.ifan Confronts Himself,"

19 "Tb.$

20"Contanporary Sc1e11ce and the Contemporary World View,"

1.f.C._sll., 65.
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presented an<l developed during the decade of his concern vi.th that

Conference. _It was Frank's belief that science - or, more exactly,
t.he •splri.t of modern science' - 1.s in no way deleterious to the
ideal of a

democra~ie

society.

On the contrary, it provides the

possibility for establishing that ideal in th•

t.~inking

of its

students with something more permanent and valid than prejudice or
propaganda.
How a good science education can accomplish this is, i.n
Frank's opinion• quite aimple,

14\at one might call the scientific

attitude la one that la basically critical of .new ideas until it
bas exand.ned them in the light of experience.

Because it tries to

stay close to the 'facts•, it is antimetaphysical.

And because it

is co.naciou1 of the need for exact •operational detinltio.n•, it is
wary of oversimplifications, attd the application of generalities

to realms that are untested.

In Frank's words, "If the student of

physics gets Ms instruction with a view to the integration of
knowledge, hs wi11 Learn that sciMce cannot •prove• any fact.

Instead, it confirm• principles by the deacriptio.n of facts that
are 'observed' by scientists generally."

In his years at Prague, during the long build•up toward the
second World war, Fra.nk had many opportunities to see the evils
th.at can be supported by an unscientific attitude.

OJ:le

example

will suffice for illustration - the Nazi concept of racial superiority.

Because it was useful as a propaganda tool, the Nazis

took over wholeheartedly the idea of Aryan supremacy which was
initiated in the ninetee.nth century, and strengthened by Nietzsche.
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The term non-Aryan soon came to refer, under NnS. thinking, to
Jews. who were used as a scapegoat for all Gersaan problems.

How-

ever, when Finns, and Japanese came to be allied with the Nazis, it

was suggested, in all aeri.ouaneaa, that
nor non-Aryans.

they

were neither Aryans,

'Ihia obvious contradiction is typical of the ab.l8e

to whleb. language can be put, i.f t.t: ia viewed unscientifically.
'l1l.e scientifically trained peraon w.l.ll not be apt to follow

banners or slogans blindly.

Th.ea• can be meaningful, if the con•

tent they symbolize is mac1e known.

But

t:b.ey

can al so become a too1

for covering over specific meanings that leaders do not want to

i'I"

l'I
:11,

I!
1:

disclose.

~hat

meaning 1 for example, dat'ts one man give to the

1
,11

I
11

national flag, when he salutes it freely fr.om Love? And how does
that meaning compare to the .meaning understood by another man whose

faith forbids him to salute, and who is proaecuted as a result?

'l'he thoughtful person will try always to see within the
symbol the specifics of the symbolism, and act accordingly.

Such

a "pragmatic spirit, n as Frank called it, "has notbJ.ng to do with"

philosophic:aL skepticism. 21

l~ther, the meaning of principles

consists, for the scientist, 1n the facts mich follow from them,
and, as Frank concluded, "not in their sound or in the pleasurable
emotions th.is soWlc1 arouses. n

CHAPTER V111
CONQ.USION

lndicated 1.n the Pref ace above, the purpose of this study
has been to exhibit the ideas of Philipp Frank as representing
some of the major developments 1n the philosophy of science, to
mid-century.

It vi.11 be the effort of this Qi.apter to recapitulate

briefly some of the points developed already, in order to confirm
this thesis.
The first historic trend that Frank's th.ought mirrors is
the

replaci~>

of metaphysical idealism by positivistic empiricism.

The Renaissance, as Whitehead and Frank suggest, brought an autonomy to science which encouraged, first, an anti-religious reaction,

and after that, an anti-metaphysical reaction too.1

This scien-

tistic or positivistic trend, inspired by the successes in mathematics a.nc: phy!iicaL scie.nce during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, and supported by the ideas of British empiricists,

ha<l

all but moL<led the intellectual milieu of European scientists including Frank and his young colleagues in Vienna.

One aspect of

this positivism waa a strong distaste for metaphysics, which scientists considered to be vain and pompous.

lcf. Ch.apter 111, section 5.
166
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Of course the ninteenth century also witnessed the culmina-

tion of romantic idealism • primarily Kantian thought in much of
Germany ... and an anti-scientific view as well.

However, this was

not the primary in.f luence on the young Frank, by hi.a own admission.
What it provided vas an area of non-scientific thought to which

Frank and his friends could turn, when they began to notice the

problem• which the eAd of mechanistic science brought about.
the second trend Frank'• writi.Ag bri.Aga out is the resur-

gence of metaphysic• once more, as a reaction to certain revolutionary developments in mathematics 1 logic, and physics during the
nineteenth eentw:y.

Frank points out Chat Newtonian mechanics be-

gan to collapse in the face of non•Euclidean mathematics and

eleetro-magnetlca.2

Thie invited the feeling that science, with a

capital '•'• had ec:qeb,ov failed.

Into the vacuum left by mechanism

poured all sorts of religious and metaphysical iJlterpretations of
the new science 1 all trying to say, in effect, "1 told you so.

0

For Frank and his associates, steeped in positiviatic tradition,
there was a period of intense thought and study of the old and .new
scientific ideas. together with their interpretatiOA•t to discover
whether or not science had really failed and must be abandoned.

Frank abed light on some of the metaphysical miai.ntet:pretations of
acleace 1 which Wive been discussed in tbi• work.3

2Cf. Qiapter 11, section 2.

3ct. especially Chapters lY and

v.
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'lhe developments being dlscuaaed bere are not clear and

dlatt.nct. however, in terma of hi.atorl.c: periods.

They overlap,

and at tlmes run side-by-aide in time, ao that their edges are
fuzay.

nie distinction between these periOda is further smeared

because aome persona tend generally toward the metaphysical viewpoint, while others tend always toward the empirical.

so, too, if

Frank is to be representative, we must aee hi.JD as developing, not
1n distinct, isolated stages, but continuously.

For this reason,

we cannot safely say bia early ldeaa were Mhphya1ca1 1 or that
bJ.a middle period was given to Logical Poaitlviam, or that in the
wisdom ot age he reached the aougbt-for ayntbesia although there
i• aot1e truth 1n tbJ.a aimplificatio.n"

OUr study baa tried to eh.ow

that the b.umanlm, breadth, and moderation of Frank's ideas devel•
oped

along the 11.Jle, throughout his life.

For this reaaon 1 too,

it ia not often easy to discover juet what Frank thought.

At any

one point, his thoughts were a combination of pros and eons further complicated by b.ia objectivity 1n reporting• even with

respect to his own developmant.4
~at

saved science for Frank a.nd his acquaintances, as we

nave pointed out, was the ayntheais of several important ideas,
from me.a Like Macll 1 Poincare, Dub.am and Einstein.5 Of course, the
syntbeslzi.ns itself was done ma1.n11 by Frank and his colleagues.
4we have shown several instances of misunderstanding on the
part of Frank'• cr1t:1ca, which may, 1n part at leaat 1 be excused
for thia reason.

Set. Chapter 11, section 3.
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The message they took from tbeae four men, and others of leaser
importance,

ways

had two

t:hat the

main parts.

First, it was shown in various

tenet• of Newtonian mechanics, which had come to be

viewed as self-evident truths about observable nature were in fact
only useful constructions of the mlAd. 1 sat up to give sensible

causal form to the expl.a.aation of obaaned pb..-aena 1 and to provide a means for predicting future events.

Maas, velocity and

energy are examples of such S'Mlltal. constructs, 11b.lc:h by themselves
have no more claim to reality than Che moat unreachable ldeaa of
metaphysics.

It waa ab.own concomitantly that traditional mechan•

i.cs, which employed such terms, was neither sacrosanct, nor was it
synonymous with science in general.
system• for viewing the world.

It was one of many possible

Co.naequent1y 1 for Frank's group,

science became free to develop along modern llnea, without carryS.ng along the burden of metaphysical. trappi.nga that bad been hWlg

on Newtonian mech.a.aica.
2.

TtAMW!&~

Al!.!.U:•i•; .A Qmltr11Nti,AA gf M!91;n P2sit&vie

the second part of 'the synthesis we are discussing was
cLoaely related to the first. having to do with the language of

science,

In th.la area, several things are .noteworthy.

Fl.rat,

ninet:eenth•century advances ln matb.ematlca and logic led to the
realization that there may be many different language systems to
describe tb.i.n.gs 1 and that no

Ol'l8

system carries any guarantee of

being the true interpretation of facts.

The reason for choosing

one system aver another • say Euclidean over Riema.nnian geometry -
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1.a just a matter of it• convenience
job to be done.

a.rad

approprt.ateneaa for the

Frank pouted this out.6

Similarly in logic 1 one

may chooae two-valued, or .W.ti•vaLued aystema, depeadln.g on what
he wiahea to describe.

Juat

~t

constitutes the con.nection between a language

system and what 1t purports to describe is another sector of the
language development that concerned Frank.

ln acientif ic work,

which proved to be most amenable to analysis, Bridgman presented
the phase cal.Led •operatio.aaliam 1 , which can be summarized aa

follows:

Tbe meaning of a scientific term, aay maaa for example,

does not inhere b

tb.e name.

Ratner, a term 11 properly defined

simply by elucidating what operations one may perform to illustrate vb.at the term aigoifiea.
relative to other tems.

Thia signification will always be

The c0t0plex. of terma are mutually

def 1.ned by tile i.Dterrelation of the operations to which they
refer.

Maas, in our example, could mean the measured value one

gets for mi or 1112 wen they are related to other measured values
by the equation:

F • G m1 ·m2 •

r2

However, Bridgman added, there is a danger of circularity, if one
defines all the members of such a relation only ill terms of the
other members.

One must teat such operational definitions

independent means • as, for example,

by

other operatiorus.

6cf. eapec1a1Ly Olapter Vt, section 6.

by

ln the
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example of maaa, one could aolve another equation involving 'm'
which ls independent of the first, and comparing the values by
measurement.

Newton's Second Law:

F • m•a, might provide such a

second test.
Bridgman's developments in scientific Language were incorporated in the Vienna group's emphasis on

1

physica1ism', which

proposed to reduce scientific statements to their Leaat common
denominator, in terms of sense-data, or sense-related statements
called •protocols.•
by his words,

0

Thia pbaae of Frank's thought ia epitomized

A 'soulless' psychology and a 'matterleaa' physics

have been established as parts of 'Unified Science.'

Words like

•matter' and 'mind' are left to the language of everyday Life
where they have their legitimate place ••• u7
There was a similar effort to reduce !JJ. Language to ex•
plicit sense-oriented statements - atomic propositions, as
Wittgenstein, for one• called them.

Of course, lt was seen, too,

that many statements can have a clearly defined meaning without

depending on sense-experience.

Such are the statements in matbe•

matics and Logic, like, "A straight Line is the shortest distance
between two points, 0 or "Not p and •p simultaneously."

This sort

of statement, together with empirical statements, tied down by
suitable operational def initiona, were said to exhaust the realm of
meaningful discourse.

ALL else was cognitatively empty.

7cf. Chapter IV, section 2, on "The Abuse of Scientific

Language."
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3.

The Ri!! •Qd

l•&L

of Logical Posittvi1m

Such ideas as these developed into the Logical Positivism

of the Vienna Circle.

Although Frank waa influenced by the ideas,

and added his own to the rest, be remained somewhat apart from the

main movement, for reasons of practicality, aa well as by choice.
This bae been pointed out frequently.
Ramiflcatlcns of linguistic and scientific analyses pro-

pounded by the Vienna Circle led to the Analytic school, and still
later to the so-called ordlnary language philosophy within and
without Logical Positivism - especially ln F.ngland

an~

America.

the main movement, covering. a period, aay, from 1910 to 1940,
developed many valuable contributions, as this eaaay has tried to
point out.8

Nonetheless, it included some inaurmountable problems.

Doctrinally speaking, its major weakness Lay in the so-called

'criterion of verifiability.•

Put in simplest terms, this doctrilE'

held that no statement is meaningful unless it ia (1) empirically
verifiable, or (2) necessarily true, 1n the manner of mathematical
and logical propositions.

'lbe argument against this dOc:trine can

be 1\IDIDarized as follows:

If every meaningful statement either

baa logico-mathematical necessity, or else can be empirically verified, then the criterion for meaningfulness ia itself meaning-

less, because (1) it is not Logico-mathematical in form, and (2)

Set.

Chapter 11, section

s.

173
it ia not eaplrically true, alnee lt cannot be teated, and many

people doubt it.
More important 'than thl• teehnlcal problem with Logical
Poaltlvism, however, ls the attitudinal problem it symbolizes, and
it is here that Frank dlff ers most strongly from th.at movement.

Frank, aa well as Carnap and others, came to crltlclze the Vienna
group'• efforts at linguistic reduction, for going too far.9
Clearty there were concepts, even in the sciences, whichcould not
be reduced to

the level that lridgrun, for f.tll:Ample, had suggested.

But what the crltlciama that Frank and others put forward really

mean, for our purposea, 1• that they began to eee in Logical Poaltiviam a degree of eelf•certalnty and oversinlplifieation that was
objectlonable.

It was ln&ppropriata to face a world full of con•

fusion and complexity With this attitude.

More apeclfically,

Logical Positivism did not allow enough room for a broad human•

istic :Lnterpreta.tion, to inclUde areas of discourse that were
emotional, psychological, religious,

aea~hetlc

and the like.

According to our thesis, tnia is just the reason tlh.y Frank never
fully embraced Logical Poa1t1Tism, and why he left it more and
more with time's passing.IO
Such criticisms aimed against Logical Positivism for its
lack of breadth and its over-emphasis of logico-matbematical

9cf. Chapter II, sections 3 and 4.
lOcf. Chapter 11, section 7.
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thought, brtnga us to the culmination of thla atud:y.

These criti.•

clams point up the need for ayntheaia in philosophy a.ad science,
just as Fra.nlc.'s own development shows an effort at auch llJ"ntheaia.
There is a dialectic pattern in his Life, if one may borrow Regel•
1an terms.

Tb.e metaphysical domination of science up to about

16001 and Frank's corresponding metaphysical interests, form a
thesis; the developing autonomy of science from metaphysics • say
from 1600 to 1900 • and Frank'• interests in pure pb.yalca and
Logical Positivism represent an antithesis; finally, current
developments, which. emphasize the h1atorlca1 and sociological
aspects of science, represent a synthesis of the former extremes.
But as we bave suggested above, our dialectic has fussy edges,
because lt is a theoretical model forced upon the facts.

lt does

not fit 1n all respects.

4.

Ph1ti2e.fra1!5:

P&~al1tt 1

Bument:st 1

Rtla~ivisk

The complexity of Frank's ideas makes of him a good paradigm for contemporary philosophy of science..

Just as his avowed

aim was to sy.ntb.eaize philosophy and science, his •ny-faceted

ideas demand from us, too, a ayntheals of some sort.

A brief

Listing of his traits may accompllah this.
Frank was an intellectual, capable of great abstraction and
erudition, as illustrated by hls mastery of Languages, and his
knowledge of Einstein's work in relativity.

But he was also an

activist, originating and supporting numerous agencies for science and philosophy - especially those which might help to improve
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the quality of education and inspire a.n appreciation for democracy.

Frank. was a theoretical phyaiciat, yet his concern for

experimentation ve have aLao noted.

Frank waa a traditionalist,

insofar as be aimed at historical perspective and demonstrated his
debt to people like Mach, Kant, Hume, and even Aquinas.

He was

also mocteaa,prai.aing the developments of contemporary aclence and
methodology, and criticiziag the untested metapb.yalca and outmoded
mechanics, even of twentiety•century aclentiata.

Frank was prag-

matic, often me11tion1ng the thoughts of James aftd Peirce 1n support of tbe social meaning of theories - their

1

cash value'.

Yet

he also dealt 1n metaphyalca - pexhapa a aimpl1f1ed 1 common-sense

type• but metaphyaica n011et:heleaa.

Frank showed concern with

moral questions, especially those surrounding the abuse of political power.

Nevertheless b.e felt that most efforts to find a

perennial moral system to sexve as a guide to education • such as
R. K. Hutchins had advocated .11 would probably fail.

In this

regard, Frank aaid,

The trouble with such a program (aa Hutchins
proposed) l.a 1 of course, the problem of ft.ndl.Ag these
principles of permanent validity. As a matter of
fact, the permanence of the philosophical prl.ncl.plea
can be kept up and guaranteed only by apt.ritual or
secular authorities or both. No univeralty education
can be based on metaphysics unless the choice of it
:La decided by an authority that ls permanently 1..n
control of the teaching.12

llcf. fh:iJ:.01opQz of sc~tace, xiii.
12llJr.9..
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Note, f'rank di.d not aay it is wrong to look for metaphysical prl.nciples, to use, for example, in guiding a university curriculum; it la •imply t.mpractlcaL to find such principles that are
truly permanent.

That Frank did, l.n fact, believe in the efficacy

of guiding principles ia definite.

Thay are part - a non-scien-

tific part, granted, but .nonetheless a real part - of our given
culture.

To de.ny them would be aa foolish aa it would be near-

sighted.

Frank commented to thla effect in one of his last papers,

delivered to the Twelfth lnter.national Congress of Philosophy, at
Venice, in 1958.

He stated tbat the man who posits a •strict

dichotomy• between 'facts• (e.g. of science) and •values' (e.g. of
politics)

0

ignorea the close ties which bave always and every-

where existed between man 1 a pict:ure of the physical universe and
his picture of an ideal human aociety. 0 13

ln sum, Frank was a pluralist, a humanist and al.ways a
moderate person.
a relativist.

Faced with ao many vi.able options, he was alao

But that term muat be applied cautiously in this

caae 1 and only now, after we h.ave studied Frank, can we apply it
in the same way th.at Frank would apply it.

ln hi• book, &!L•tiv•

iSYI A Richer: T;YiQ, Frank proposes that relativism is a necessary and useful part of our culture.

He does not favor the skep-

tical relativism which. Likes to cite J:'elativity theory to prove
that nothing is certain.

Rather, what Frank means ia the attitu<le

13cf. "The Present Role of Sci.ence, 0 in Acts of the

lniernatl:,qnaJ. 90Dgr9a1 ot f4'L21mmz:, Florence,

!Ho.

I!t!Lf~q
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of suspending judgment until the faeta are in • the wllllngnesa to
take the time to examine• scientifically and objectively as possible, all aides of the question.

Finally, he means also that

wbe.a one doea make a judgment, he makes it ln modest terms - not

with self-confident aplomb - because ha realizes that wben our
tools are more refined, or when the socio-psychological situation
demands it, there will be a re-examination, and a re-evaluation,
and most Likely the judgment will have to be changed.

In t:hia

sense of relativism, as Frank defines it, we see one of the best
off spring of modern scientific thought.

It is the attitude wb.ich

characterizes Frank himself.
Frank was not a highly original thinker.

Hts abilities lay

more in the way of rethinking and synthesizing what had already
been said.

famous.

He did not have a pet theory for which he might become

His ideas were many, and his approach was modest.

He

fits well the description of Werner Heisen.berg 1 in IQe fQ:rs!sist'£

ConcoQti,on qf .tf..a1;u;1, that 'modern science' (after Galileo) is
characterized by 'modesty•.

This modesty disappeared in the nine-

teenth century, but nas reappeared in the twentieth.14

Perhaps

such modesty will prevent Frank from being widely read; 1t should
not, howavei", preven.t a thoughtful student who reads him from discovering an impressive depth of knowledge, well expressed.
Frank discussed most of the aspects of philosophy of science.

He shed ligb.t on all of them, primarily by refusing to lose

14cf. ''Ma.a Confronts HimseLf 1" Frank's review of Heisenberg's book, in §!~dar Rev\~ 2f Lite~a£~! 41, Oct. 25, 1958.

r

178

sight of the whole.

ln this way• his contribution appears to be

an eloquent reaffirmation of the Greek norm:

moderation.

method or insight may claim to off er the whole truth.

No

Frank

showed that metaphysics alone 1s vague and 1.neffective; he also
showed that empiricism alone is pointless.

A philosopher of

science - if he follows Fra.nk's leading • will make uae of both.
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